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This thesis argues that the intergroup level remains largely unexplored within current 
models of moral and political cognition such as Moral Foundations Theory (MFT; Haidt & 
Joseph, 2004). In Study 1 (N = 153) we framed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) 
using ingroup and outgroup targets. Here, liberals and conservatives demonstrated 
important distinctions by group with the general pattern being liberals showing investment 
in Harm and Fairness foundations when framed about outgroups and conservatives showing 
investment in Loyalty, Authority, and Purity foundations when framed about ingroups. In 
two further studies, we replicated this pattern using specified ingroups and outgroups and 
further showed these differences mediated bias, negative bias, threat, and implicit bias 
(Study 2, N = 307; Study 3, N = 288). A further study demonstrated a similar pattern using 
standard versus outgroup moral foundations (Study 4, N = 253). The second line of research 
examined how moral foundations relate more generally to intergroup variables (Study 5, N = 
90), strong social ideologies and negative attitudes towards immigrant groups (Study 6, N = 
157). This project concludes that understanding the group level leads to new avenues for 





This research was supported by an Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) studentship 
to David, S. M. Morris [grant number ES/J50001X/1]. I am thankful to the ESRC for their 




























There are many people I would like to thank for their help, support and guidance 
with this thesis. I would firstly like to thank my supervisor Dr. Brandon Stewart. I have 
learned an innumerable amount from working with Brandon over the last few years, and he 
has been an excellent supervisor and mentor throughout this process. Brandon also 
encouraged me to pursue research and taught me a lot of the methods through the years of 
my masters study up to now that have enabled me to conduct this project. This thesis has 
been a collaborative effort I would like to thank Brandon for all of his help and guidance in 
psychology, it is a brilliant privilege working with Brandon who is an excellent supervisor, 
mentor and social psychologist. 
I would also like to thank my parents who have always encouraged me to pursue my 
interests and whose encouragement, support and hard work has led me to this point, my 
thanks also go to my sister who has been brilliant throughout. I am further thankful to the 
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) for providing me with a PhD studentship to 
conduct this research, and to the University of Birmingham which has been an incredible 
























In sum I have a lot of people to thank including my supervisor, family, friends and 
great colleagues and teachers and many more whose support has led me to be able to 
conduct this research. I am strongly thankful for their support and encouragement which has 






STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP 
Two of the chapters presented in this thesis form standalone co-authored chapters in the 
format for submission to U.S. academic journals in Psychology. These two chapters were co-
authored by David. S. M. Morris (D.S.M) and Dr. Brandon, D. Stewart (B.D.S);  
Chapter 2 
 Stewart, B. D., & Morris, D. S. M. (In preparation) Moving morality beyond the ingroup: 
Liberals and conservatives show differences on group- framed moral foundations and 
these differences mediate threat and intergroup bias.  
Chapter 3 
Morris, D. S. M., & Stewart, B. D. (In preparation) Moral Values, political ideology and threat 
based cognition: Implications for intergroup relations.  
The material in these chapters is co-authored and presented in the format to submit to U.S. 
academic journals.  
For the material in Chapter 2, B.D.S conceived of the original study idea with D. S.M. 
providing significant input in its development. D.S.M developed the study materials. Study 
Design and Analysis of Data was conducted by D.S.M with assistance by B.D.S and writing up 
of the studies was done by D.S.M and B.D.S. 
Additional thanks go to undergraduate students Kiran Manku, Samuel Spencer, Jennifer 
Hughes and Ben Irving who assisted in running the participants in Study 4 of Chapter 2. 
For Chapter 3 the study idea and study design was developed by D.S.M. The material in 
Chapter 3 was designed by D.S.M and B.D.S, Design of Materials was prepared by D.S.M with 
assistance from B.D.S, Analysis of Data was conducted by D.S.M and B.D.S and writing up of 
studies was done by D.S.M with assistance from B.D.S. 
Additional thanks go to master’s student Rob Houghton for suggesting potential inclusion of 
Collective Narcissism in Study 5 of Chapter 3. 
Authors Note: Throughout all chapters of the thesis (including the introduction and 
discussion) I use language of ‘we’ ‘our’ etc., rather than personal pronouns to reflect the 
collaborative nature of the research conducted within the thesis. 
v 
 
Earlier versions of the work presented here were given in the form of talks at academic 
conferences which the listed first author delivered in each case; 
Conference Proceedings 
Chapter 2 
 B.D. Stewart & D. S. M. Morris (2016). Ingroup Morality, Political Ideology, and Group-Based 
Cognition, British Psychological Society (BPS), Social Psychology Section Annual 
Conference, Mercure Holland House, Cardiff. 
 
B.D. Stewart & D. S. M. Morris (2015). Exploring Moral and Political Ideology in Group-Based 
Cognition, British Psychological Society (BPS), Developmental Section and Social 
Section Annual Conference, The Palace Hotel, Manchester.  
 
Chapter 3, Study 2, Models 1 and 2. 
D. S. M. Morris, & B. D. Stewart (2016) Morality, Politics and the Social World: The Role of 
Moral and Political Values in Intergroup Relations, British Psychological Society (BPS) 









Table of Contents 
 
FUNDING ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .............................................................................................................. i 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............................................................................................................................ ii 
STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP ................................................................................................................ iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................................................................. vi 
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................................... x 
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................................................... xii 
 
CHAPTER 1: MORAL AND POLITICAL COGNITION: UNEXPLORED IMPLICATIONS FOR IMPROVING 
INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND REDUCING PREJUDICE .......................................................................... 1 
1.0. Intergroup Relations and Ideology  ............................................................................................. 1 
1.1. Political Psychology and Social Cognition ............................................................................... 3 
1.2. Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation ............................................................... 9 
1.3. The Moral Undercurrents of Political Cognition  ..................................................................... 11 
1.4. Moral Foundations Theory  ........................................................................................................ 12 
1.4.1. Measuring Moral Foundations  ........................................................................................... 14 
1.4.2. Moral Foundations and Political Ideology  ........................................................................ 16 
1.5. Theoretical Critiques of Moral Foundations Theory  .............................................................. 19 
1.5.1. Model of Moral Motives (MMM)  ...................................................................................... 19 
1.5.2. Evolutionary Coalitional Theory (ECT)  .............................................................................. 22 
1.6. Intergroup Relations and Moral Foundations  ......................................................................... 26 
1.7. Threat, Morality, and the Social Political World   .................................................................... 31 
1.8. Unresolved Questions: Moral Foundations, Political Ideology, Threat Perceptions, and 
Intergroup Relations  .......................................................................................................................... 35 
1.9. Summary of the Current Research Thesis  ............................................................................... 36 
 
CHAPTER 2: MOVING MORALITY BEYOND THE INGROUP: LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES SHOW 
DIFFERENCES ON GROUP-FRAMED MORAL FOUNDATIONS AND THESE DIFFERENCES MEDIATE 
THREAT AND INTERGROUP BIAS ........................................................................................................... 39 
2.0. Abstract  ........................................................................................................................................ 39 
2.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 40 
vii 
 
2.1.1. Individual versus Group-Based Thinking ........................................................................... 40 
2.1.2. Ideology and Intergroup Thinking ...................................................................................... 42 
2.1.3. Ingroups, Outgroups, and Moral Foundations ................................................................. 42 
2.1.4. Intergroup Bias and Threat .................................................................................................. 45 
2.2. Study 1 ........................................................................................................................................... 47 
2.2.1. Predictions  ............................................................................................................................ 47 
2.3. Method  ......................................................................................................................................... 48 
2.3.1. Participants and Design  ...................................................................................................... 48 
2.3.2. Materials and Procedure  .................................................................................................... 48 
2.4. Results  .......................................................................................................................................... 51 
2.5. Discussion  ..................................................................................................................................... 54 
2.6. Study 2  .......................................................................................................................................... 55 
2.6.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 55 
2.6.2. Predictions ............................................................................................................................. 58 
2.7. Method  ......................................................................................................................................... 59 
2.7.1. Participants and Design ....................................................................................................... 59 
2.7.2. Materials and Procedure ..................................................................................................... 60 
2.8. Results  .......................................................................................................................................... 62 
2.9. Discussion  ..................................................................................................................................... 68 
2.10. Study 3  ........................................................................................................................................ 69 
2.10.1. Introduction and Predictions ............................................................................................ 69 
2.11. Method  ....................................................................................................................................... 70 
2.11.1. Participants and Design  .................................................................................................... 70 
2.11.2. Materials and Procedure  .................................................................................................. 71 
2.12. Results  ........................................................................................................................................ 74 
2.13. Discussion  .................................................................................................................................. 80 
2.14. Study 4  ........................................................................................................................................ 82 
2.14.1. Introduction and Predictions ............................................................................................ 82 
2.15. Method ........................................................................................................................................ 83 
2.15.1. Participants and Design ..................................................................................................... 83 
2.15.2. Materials and Procedure ................................................................................................... 83 
viii 
 
2.16. Results  ........................................................................................................................................ 86 
2.17. Discussion  .................................................................................................................................. 91 
2.18. General Discussion .................................................................................................................... 93 
 
CHAPTER 3: MORAL VALUES, POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND THREAT-BASED COGNITION: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERGROUP RELATIONS ................................................................................... 104 
3.0. Abstract  ...................................................................................................................................... 104 
3.1. Introduction   .............................................................................................................................. 105 
3.1.1. Moral Foundations and Intergroup Attitudes  ............................................................... 107 
3.1.2. Threat Processing In Intergroup Relations and Political Ideology  .............................. 108 
3.1.3. Moral Foundations and Intergroup Relations: The Present Research  ....................... 109 
3.2. Study 5  ........................................................................................................................................ 111 
3.2.1. Hypotheses  ......................................................................................................................... 111 
3.3. Method  ....................................................................................................................................... 112 
3.3.1. Design  .................................................................................................................................. 112 
3.3.2. Participants  ......................................................................................................................... 112 
3.3.3. Materials   ............................................................................................................................ 113 
3.4. Results  ........................................................................................................................................ 115 
3.4.1. Intergroup Variables  .......................................................................................................... 115 
3.4.2. Moral Foundations and Intergroup Variables   ............................................................... 116 
3.5. Discussion  ................................................................................................................................... 117 
3.6. Study 6  ........................................................................................................................................ 119 
3.6.1. Introduction and Hypotheses  .......................................................................................... 119 
3.7. Method  ....................................................................................................................................... 120 
3.7.1. Design and Procedure  ....................................................................................................... 120 
3.7.2. Participants  ......................................................................................................................... 122 
3.7.3. Materials  ............................................................................................................................. 122 
3.8. Results  ........................................................................................................................................ 125 
3.8.1. Moral Foundations and Political Ideology  ...................................................................... 125 
3.8.2. Exploratory Analyses Considering the Role of Threat  .................................................. 129 
3.9. Discussion  ................................................................................................................................... 131 
ix 
 
3.10. General Discussion .................................................................................................................. 132 
 
CHAPTER 4: GENERAL DISCUSSION ..................................................................................................... 139 
4.0. Moral and Political Cognition is Related to Group-Focused Cognition.  ............................ 142 
4.1. Moral Foundations, Strong Ideologies, and their Relationship to Intergroup Relations. 
 .............................................................................................................................................................. 148 
4.2. General Implications and Further Considerations ................................................................ 152 
4.2.1. Binding Foundations, Bias and, Threat Perceptions ...................................................... 152 
4.2.2. Study Design and Cultural and Demographic Factors ................................................... 157 
4.2.3. Measurement of Political Ideology  ................................................................................. 160 
4.2.4. Implicit Cognition and Moral Foundations Theory ........................................................ 162 
4.3. Limitations and Future Considerations ................................................................................... 164 
4.4. Future Research and Policy Implications ................................................................................ 169 
4.4.1. Future Research in Moral Foundations and Group-Based Framing  ........................... 170 
4.4.2. Threat Focused Framing Interventions and Political Ideology ..................................... 171 
4.5. Overview: Going Beyond Moral and Political Ideology. ....................................................... 173 
 
REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................... 176 
APPENDICES ....................................................................................................................................... 191 
Appendix A-K: Study Materials  .......................................................................................... 191 
Appendix L: Supplemental Analyses Chapter 2 .................................................................. 217 









List of Figures 
 
FIGURE 2.1. Multiple mediation of the Political Orientation to Explicit Bias relationship by the 
Outgroup Individualizing index and by the Ingroup Binding index, Study 2 ............................... 66 
FIGURE 2.2. Multiple mediation of the Political Orientation to the Negative Bias relationship 
by the Outgroup Individualizing index and by the Ingroup Binding index, Study 2 ................... 67 
FIGURE 2.3. Multiple mediation of the Political Orientation to Perceived Threat relationship 
by the Outgroup Individualizing index and by the Ingroup Binding index, Study 2 ................... 67 
FIGURE 2.4. Multiple mediation of the Political Orientation to Explicit Bias relationship by the 
Outgroup Individualizing index and by the Ingroup Binding index, Study 3 ............................... 78 
FIGURE 2.5. Multiple mediation of the Political Orientation to Negative Bias relationship by 
the Outgroup Individualizing index and by the Ingroup Binding index, Study 3 ........................ 79 
FIGURE 2.6. Multiple mediation of the Political Orientation to Perceived Threat relationship 
by the Outgroup Individualizing index and by the Ingroup Binding index, Study 3 ................... 79 
FIGURE 2.7. Multiple mediation of the Political Orientation to Implicit Bias relationship by 
the Outgroup Individualizing index and by the Ingroup Binding index, Study 3 ........................ 80 
 
FIGURE 2.8. Multiple mediation of the Political Ideology to Explicit Bias relationship by the 
Outgroup Individualizing index and by the Standard Binding index, Study 4 ............................. 90 
 
FIGURE 2.9. Multiple mediation of the Political Ideology to Perceived Threat relationship by 
the Outgroup Individualizing index and by the Standard Binding index, Study 4 ...................... 90 
 
FIGURE 2.10. Multiple mediation of the Political Ideology to Implicit Bias relationship by the 
Outgroup Individualizing index and by the Standard Binding index, Study 4 ............................. 91 
FIGURE 3.1. Mediation model of the relationship between Individualizing Foundations to 
Intergroup Bias by Social Dominance Orientation, Study 6. ....................................................... 126 
FIGURE 3.2. Mediation model of the relationship between Binding Foundations to 
Intergroup Bias by Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), Study 6. ............................................. 127 
FIGURE 3.3. Mediation model of the relationship between Individualizing Foundations to 
Intergroup Bias by Social Dominance Orientation and Threat, Study 6 .................................... 130 
FIGURE 3.4. Mediation model of the relationship between Binding Foundations to 
Intergroup Bias by Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Threat, Study 6. ......................... 131 
FIGURE S.1. Controlling for the influence of race Individualizing to Explicit Bias mediated by 




FIGURE S.2. Controlling for the influence of race Binding to Explicit Bias mediated by RWA, 
Study 6 .....................................................................................................................................223 
 
FIGURE S.3. Controlling for the influence of race Individualizing to Explicit Bias mediated by 
Threat with SDO in the model Study 6 ....................................................................................224 
 
FIGURE S.4. Controlling for the influence of race Binding to Explicit Bias mediated by Threat 
with RWA in the model, Study 6 .............................................................................................225 
 






















List of Tables 
 
TABLE 2.1. Framed moral foundation ingroup-preference scores predicted by Political 
Ideology, Study 1 ...................................................................................................................... 52 
TABLE 2.2. Linear regressions with Political Ideology entered as predictor and Ingroup and 
Outgroup moral foundations acting as the outcome variables, Study 1 ................................. 53 
TABLE 2.3. Framed moral foundation ingroup-preference scores predicted by Political 
Ideology, Study 2 ...................................................................................................................... 63 
TABLE 2.4. Linear regressions with Political Ideology entered as predictor and Ingroup and 
Outgroup moral foundations acting as the outcome variables, Study 2 ................................. 64 
TABLE 2.5. Framed moral foundation ingroup-preference scores predicted by Political 
Ideology, Study 3 ...................................................................................................................... 75 
TABLE 2.6. Linear regressions with Political Ideology entered as predictor and Ingroup and 
Outgroup moral foundations acting as the outcome variables, Study 3 ................................. 76 
TABLE 2.7. Regression equations with Framed moral foundation Preference scores predicted 
by Political Ideology, Study 4 .................................................................................................... 87 
TABLE 2.8. Linear regression analyses using Political Ideology as the predictor and the 
Standard- and Outgroup-framed moral foundations as the outcome Variables, Study 4 ....... 88 
TABLE 3.1. Correlation Matrix for the main Intergroup Variables, Study 5 ............................116 
TABLE 3.2. Correlations of Individualizing and Binding Foundation Scores with the Intergroup 
Variables, Study 5 ....................................................................................................................117 
TABLE 3.3. Information criteria comparing the Moral Foundations Predictor Models to the 
SDO and RWA Alternative Models, Study 6 ............................................................................129 
TABLE S.1. Correlation matrix for the main Intergroup Variables Based on Participants 
Identifying as Caucasian Ethnicity and who passed the MFQ attention checks, Study 5 .......219 
 
TABLE S.2. Correlations of Individualizing and Binding Foundation Scores with the Intergroup 
Variables Based on Participants Identifying as Caucasian Ethnicity and who passed the MFQ 
attention checks, Study 5 ........................................................................................................219 
 
TABLE S.3. Correlation matrix for the main Intergroup Variables Based on Participants who 
had Lived in the U.S. for more than 10 years and who passed the MFQ attention checks, 




TABLE S.4. Correlations of Individualizing and Binding Foundation Scores with the Intergroup 
Variables Based on Participants who had Lived in the U.S. for more than 10 years and who 
passed the MFQ attention checks, Study 5 .............................................................................220 
 
TABLE S.5. Correlations between Individualising and Binding Foundations, RWA and SDO, 





CHAPTER 1: MORAL AND POLITICAL COGNITION: UNEXPLORED IMPLICATIONS 
FOR IMPROVING INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND REDUCING PREJUDICE. 
1.0. Intergroup Relations and Ideology 
The role of moral and political ideology in intergroup relations reflects an important 
and rapidly developing area of psychology with widespread global implications. Political 
polarisation has recently been highlighted within the U.K. in the context of E.U membership 
(Pew Research Center, 2016) and ideological polarisation has been growing in recent years in 
the U.S. (Pew Research Center, 2014); other aspects of societal and political divides can be 
seen in policy perceptions concerning immigration and immigrant groups globally (Duffy, & 
Frere-Smith, 2014; Goodwin, Raines, & Cutts, 2017). Politically, in Europe, Far Right 
sentiment has also increased in several countries including France, Austria, Denmark, and 
the Netherlands (Adler, 2016). Research in psychology on perceptions of diversity has found 
that those with strong ideological beliefs such as Authoritarian ideologies show an increase 
in negative attitudes as perceptions of diversity increase (Kauff, Asbrock, Thörner, & 
Wagner, 2013). Recently work on moral cognition has changed the psychological 
understanding of the nature of political ideology (Haidt, 2012) and the current thesis 
integrates research on morality, political ideology, and threat perceptions to explore the 
implications of these variables for intergroup relations.  
This thesis employs two novel lines of research to study the relationship between 
moral and political cognition and intergroup relations. The first line of research considered in 
Chapter 2 examines how existing work in moral and political psychology has often omitted 
and obscured the intergroup level. In order to study the group level in moral and political 




judgements in terms of ingroups and outgroups to examine how group-based framing 
relates to political orientation. The first line of research, then goes on to further examine the 
associated impact of political ideology and ingroup- and outgroup-focused moral investment 
upon intergroup attitudes and threat perceptions. The second line of research in Chapter 3 
looks at how different sets of moral values relate to intergroup relations and more extreme 
social ideologies. This second line of research also considers how investment in different sets 
of moral beliefs relates to perceptions of immigrant groups and to strong socio-political 
ideologies and in turn, how these strong ideologies mediate this relationship. In both lines of 
research, threat perceptions are further considered as an important variable as predicted by 
moral and political attitudes. Overall this thesis brings together work on moral and political 
cognition with the study of intergroup relations to argue that moral cognition is important in 
determining the kinds of groups that liberals, conservatives and other strong forms of socio-
political ideologies care about. 
The potential role of social, moral, and political psychology for understanding 
intergroup relations is in rapid development. In order to understand the growing global 
trends surrounding political polarisation and immigration perceptions, it is first necessary to 
consider the current psychological literature on socio-political ideology and intergroup 
relations (Jost, 2006; Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2014; Altemeyer, 1996; 1998; Pratto, 
Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). We will then consider the importance of the moral 
values which underpin these ideologies (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt, 2012). Finally, we will 
investigate the role of threat perceptions (Sherif, 1961; Stephan & Stephan, 2000) and group 
categorization (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; Brewer, 1999) which we propose act as 




perceptions are considered especially important within the project in terms of 
understanding the implications for negative immigration attitudes as well as the role of such 
perceptions as underlying different components of ideology (Craig & Richeson, 2014a; Kauff 
et al., 2013; Jost et al., 2007; Thórisdóttir & Jost, 2011; Van de Vyver, Houston, Abrams, & 
Vasiljevic, 2016). These areas of research will be explored in relation to the two lines of 
research considered in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of the thesis. In order to achieve this, we will 
first turn to the definition and study of political ideology from a psychological perspective.  
1.1. Political Psychology and Social Cognition 
Ideology has been defined as “any comprehensive and mutually consistent set of 
ideas by which a social group makes sense of the world…” (McLean & McMillan, 2009, 
p.255). Psychologist, John Jost (2006) defined political ideology more specifically based on 
earlier work by Tedin (1987) “as an interrelated set of moral and political attitudes that 
possesses cognitive, affective and motivational components” (Jost, 2006, p.653). Jost, 
Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway (2003) have generally distinguished political liberalism (also 
referred to as the political left) from political conservatism (also referred to as the political 
right) in two ways. 1) They have argued that in liberalism there is more of a focus on 
inequality as a central concern in society and 2) that conservatives express more support for 
maintaining the current societal state of affairs or “status quo” as compared to liberals (see 
also Jost, 2006; Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008, p.127). There has been growing evidence that 
different sets of political ideologies have distinctive cognitive antecedents. For example, Jost 
et al. (2003) have suggested that ideological belief systems are a product of “motivated 




consequences of knowledge and uncertainty reduction strategies, and cognition involved in 
the mitigation of personal and contextual threat perceptions (Jost et al., 2003). 
 In Jost et al.’s (2003) meta-analysis of the existing literature on political ideology and 
cognition, they found that “death anxiety (weighted mean r = .50); system instability (.47); 
dogmatism-intolerance of ambiguity (.34); openness to experience (-.32); uncertainty 
tolerance (-.27); needs for order, structure, and closure (.26); integrative complexity (-.20); 
fear of threat and loss (.18); and self-esteem (-.09).” (Jost et al., 2003, p.339) were correlated 
with stronger conservative orientations. It is important to note that there may be both 
benefits and costs to these differences for both liberals and conservatives in different ways; 
for example, heightened threat perceptions may also make people more vigilant to real 
dangers (Hibbing et al., 2014). 
 In studying political cognition, Jost et al. (2003) have further found that whilst left 
right measures of political ideology are broad in scope they have been effective in 
distinguishing important psychological differences across a large host of psychological and 
neuroscientific research (Hibbing et al., 2014; Jost et al., 2003; Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 2008; 
Jost & Amodio, 2012; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). This research often measures political 
ideology by asking participants to rate themselves on a scale from “extremely liberal” to 
“extremely conservative” (See ANES in, Jost 2006, p.659). Examining the American National 
Election Studies (ANES), Jost (2006) has found that “responses to this single ideological self-
placement item explain 85% of the statistical variance in self-reported voting behaviour over 
the last 32 years” (Jost, 2006, pps. 658-659), which demonstrates the pragmatism and utility 





More recently, in a review of the psychological and psychophysiological literature on 
political ideology, Hibbing and colleagues (2014) have argued that the main factor 
delineating those on the left and right of the political spectrum was “negativity bias” 
(Hibbing et al., 2014, p.303). This negativity bias “reflects the fact that humans generally 
tend to respond more strongly, to be more attentive, and to give more weight to negative 
elements of their environment” (Hibbing et al., 2014, p.303). Hibbing et al. (2014) suggested 
that we evolved this important tendency so as to be vigilant to potential harm within the 
environment; they found that liberals are less sensitive (and conservatives more sensitive) to 
negatively charged stimuli across a large host of research, to the extent that Hibbing et al. 
(2014) were unable to find any research contrary to this trend. One study by Dodd et al. 
(2012) found that those with higher levels of conservatism also had “…faster orienting 
towards, and greater total time spent attending to, aversive relative to appetitive images” 
(Dodd et al., 2012, Study 2, p.646), whereas more liberal individuals demonstrated a 
contrary pattern. Together these findings suggest that political ideologies may meaningfully 
and differentially relate to biases and vigilance towards negatively charged stimuli.   
The findings on negativity bias theory (Hibbing et al., 2014) can be seen to offer 
further evidence of the cognitive underpinnings of ideology and complement other work on 
socio-political ideologies and political communications. For example, Lavine et al. (1999) 
found that those high in Authoritarianism, which is a more extreme form of conservatism, 
have been found to be more responsive to negatively (as compared to positively) framed 
messages about voting (Lavine et al., 1999); this research points to the idea that negativity 
biases can be influenced by the framing of messages much like other forms of cognitive 




bias hypothesis is interesting (Hibbing et al., 2014), whether negativity bias may be more 
effectively explained as a result of heightened vigilance to threat based stimuli remains open 
to debate. For example, “studies from neuroscience and genetics suggest that right- (vs. left-
) wing orientation is associated with greater neural sensitivity to threat and larger amygdala 
volume, as well as less sensitivity to response conflict and smaller anterior cingulate volume” 
(Jost & Amodio, 2012, p.55). Others have also highlighted how differences detected in 
disgust responses as a function of ideology could also have implications not covered within a 
simple negativity bias model (Inbar & Pizarro, 2014; Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer, & Haidt, 2012). 
In contrast to the general focus on conservatism and its relation to social contextual 
variables, research evidence has also suggested that liberals may be more approach (or risk) 
orientated than conservatives, as can be seen in the work of Shook & Fazio (2009). They 
employed a learning paradigm in which participants had to view a series of different shaped 
and patterned beans in a computer based task and were asked to learn which beans were 
favourable and which were unfavourable receiving increments in points for correct 
identifications and deductions for incorrect decisions. In the task participants could approve 
or refuse beans however the values of the beans (in terms of the points received or 
deducted) were only revealed in the case of approval of a bean, therefore rejection did not 
give information in regards to points gained or lost. They observed that both liberals and 
conservatives learned on the task, but did so in different ways. More conservative 
participants were more likely to generally reject beans (overclassify negative) than liberal 
participants who used a more approach focused orientation, though liberal participants 
were also exposing themselves to more potential risks. Further supporting this notion Rock 




groups as a measure of “cognitive rigidity” after participants had received framing of either 
an “approach” or “avoidance” focused message. Here across two studies the interaction 
between ideology and framing was significant where higher conservatism led to increased 
categorical thinking but not if these participants had received the approach-based frame 
(see Rock & Janoff Bulman, 2010, p.31). 
 The work of Shook and Fazio (2009) and Rock and Janoff Bulman (2010) can be seen 
to complement other research considering personality factors in ideology which suggests 
that liberals will show higher levels of ‘openness to experience’ as measured via personality 
scales, but are also less ‘conscientious’ than conservatives (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 
2008, pps. 815-16). Recently work has also correlated higher ratings of interdependence 
with groups other than one’s own with political liberalism (Van der Toorn, Napier, & Dovidio, 
2014) and has indicated that conservatives feel an increased sense of social consensus to 
politically similar others whilst liberals feel more individually differentiated to politically 
similar others, though in both cases these feelings are exaggerated relative to actual levels of 
both consensus and differentiation (Stern, West, & Schmitt, 2014).  Research has also 
suggested a relationship with Schwartz’s (1992) value of universalism and political liberalism 
(Jost, Basevich, Dickson, & Noorbaloochi, 2015) with universalism generally being defined in 
Schwartz’s work as the “understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the 
welfare of all people and for nature” (Schwartz, 1994, p.22) supporting the general notion 
that liberals may have lower threat perceptions and more willingness to expose themselves 
to different novel scenarios and groups. 
Given the literature showing that political ideology relates to approach-avoidance 




2014), motivated social cognition around uncertainty and threat reduction (Jost, 2003; Jost 
et al., 2007), and to personality characteristics (Carney et al., 2008), there is good evidence 
to suggest the study of ideology may have relationships to broader social cognition (Hibbing, 
Smith, & Alford, 2014b; Shook & Fazio, 2009). In addition, when considering this literature it 
is also important to note that a balance between higher and lower sensitivity to threat 
perceptions may have wider implications for society. For instance, it could be argued that 
too little threat perception would also be a risk and that balances of both liberal and 
conservative ideologies may have some benefits for society (See Hibbing et al., 2014a; 2014b 
for discussion). For example, some evidence has suggested societies with more balanced 
rather than over or under-restrained moral-ideological climates have stronger economies 
(see Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2016, Study 3). 
 Hibbing et al. (2014) have argued that responses to threats may also have served a 
number of important evolutionary functions as vigilance to different threats may have aided 
survival. However, whilst this may be the case, threat perceptions that lead to intergroup 
tensions and conflict could be seen as potentially detrimental. Jost et al. (2003) have noted 
that “one of the most consistent and enduring targets of right-wing criticism has been 
immigration, which is often experienced as frightening, confusing and potentially 
threatening to the status quo” (Jost et al., 2003, p.351). Political ideology thus may be 
informative regarding intergroup relations in general, as well as related topics such as 
immigration perceptions. In the context of intergroup relations, we now turn to examples of 






1.2. Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation.  
In considering how social ideology relates to intergroup relations, there has been a 
particular focus on the strong ideological beliefs with implications for intergroup 
perceptions; these can be seen in: (1) Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1988; 1996; 1998) and 
(2) Social Dominance Orientation ideologies (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 
1994), which are distinct in content and are both related to prejudicial and negative 
attitudes towards different groups across a large host of research (Pratto et al., 1994;  
Altemeyer, 1988; 1996; 1998; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; 2009; 2010).  
Altemeyer’s (1988; 1996; 1998) concept of Authoritarianism assesses the 
psychological components of authoritarian ideology using a measure termed the ‘Right Wing 
Authoritarianism’ scale (RWA) where the term ‘right’ refers to a sense of strong conviction 
about ones views rather than just politically (Altemeyer, 1996). Altemeyer (1996; 1998) 
defines Authoritarianism tendencies as consisting of three aspects (1) Submitting to the 
authority of those seen as valid authority figures, (2) highly normative or ‘conventional’ 
behaviour to fit perceived social norms and (3) the acceptance of committing aggression 
against individuals deviating from perceived norms and authorities. These three facets are 
measured using different items within the RWA scale which is often collapsed to form an 
overall measure of Authoritarian investment. This measure has consistently demonstrated 
strong reliability and validity (Altemeyer, 1996) and has been related to negative perceptions 
of a number of societal groups.  
People scoring high on Authoritarianism would show strong agreement with items 
such as “If the society so wants, it is the duty of every true citizen to help eliminate the evil 




Authoritarianism is also related to the view that the world is dangerous (Altemeyer, 1998) as 
measured using the ‘belief in a dangerous world scale’ (BDW: Altemeyer 1988; Duckitt & 
Sibley, 2009; 2010). Authoritarian ideologies aim to emphasize tradition and are also anti-
democratic in content (Altemeyer, 1988; 1996). It has further been argued that RWA 
represents reactions to perceived societal threats (Stenner, 2005), whilst Duckitt and Sibley 
(2009; 2010) have viewed RWA as a result of BDW perceptions. 
 In contrast to RWA, Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994) 
represents a distinct ideology, which also has important implications for the study of 
ethnocentrism and derogation as expressed towards different groups in society (Pratto et 
al., 1994). As compared to RWA those high in SDO are more likely attracted to hierarchy and 
leadership rather than following norms or rules of others (Altemeyer, 1998). Individuals high 
in SDO also have strong beliefs surrounding the dominance and superiority of themselves 
and their group and support actions against other people or groups who they view as being 
of lower status. This strong belief system revolves around a strong favourability towards 
hierarchy (Pratto et al., 1994). Work by Duckitt and Sibley (2009; 2010) have found that the 
SDO belief system is predicted by beliefs that the world is highly competitive and in turn that 
SDO predicts a host of negative attitudes surrounding particular societal groups. Social 
Dominance Orientation is often measured using the SDO scale, a further 16-item version of 
the scale was also specifically developed in order to assess group based social dominance 
(see Pratto et al., 1994, Appendix C). Those high in group based social dominance agree with 
statements such as “to get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups” 
(Pratto et al., 1994, p.763) demonstrating the social implications associated with this 




More recently work around SDO and RWA has argued that RWA and SDO represent 
strong socio-political ideologies influenced by context rather than as solely based on 
individual personality (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; 2010). Feldman and Huddy (2014) and others 
have also argued that a focus on SDO and RWA relate to distinctions between social forms 
(in the case of RWA) and economic forms (by SDO) of ideological beliefs (Duckitt & Sibley, 
2009; Feldman & Huddy, 2014) even though these ideologies are more polarised than more 
general measures of ideology concerned with liberalism and conservatism (Jost, 2006) they 
are also arguably more developed in terms of their relationship to intergroup relations. 
Whilst SDO and RWA represent strong ideological belief systems, both also arguably contain 
important relationships to moral beliefs around societal and social values, Altemeyer (1998) 
has argued SDO’s do not endorse normal moral distinctions; this is supported by the 
correlation of SDO with the “Exploitative Manipulative Amoral Dishonesty (E-MAD) scale” 
(Altemeyer, 1998, p.78). In contrast those high in RWA, have strong unbreakable codes 
which they follow, believing themselves to be morally superior to others (Altemeyer 1998). 
The view that ideological belief systems are being supported by sets of moral beliefs about 
the world has become increasingly prevalent and well researched which has led to a more 
complex appreciation of how more general (as well as more polarised) political beliefs 
function (See Haidt, 2012; Federico, Weber, Ergun, & Hunt, 2013; Kugler, Jost, & 
Noorbaloochi, 2014), to which we now turn. 
1.3. The Moral Undercurrents of Political Cognition:  
Research considering political ideology has helped to shed light on how people think 
about political issues and the social world; however, increasingly psychologists have 




& Joseph, 2004). Work by Skitka and Wisneski (2011) has highlighted the role of strong 
conviction in one’s own set of moral values and how this can lead to political activism 
through paths of both positive and negative emotions. Lackoff (2010) has also focused on 
moral cognition and its relationship to political orientation distinguishing between liberals 
and conservatives in regards to their strictness of moral values, with liberals being more 
permissive. More recently, examining internet communications in cyberspace in relation to 
political policy and ideology, researchers have found that “using a large sample of tweets 
concerning three polarizing issues (n = 563,212), the presence of moral-emotional words in 
messages increased their transmission by approximately 20% per word” (Brady, Wills, Jost, 
Tucker, & Van Bavel, 2017). This result suggests moral-emotional language in the context of 
political messages increases their spread on social media. From the perspective of some 
researchers, political beliefs are seen fundamentally as beliefs about what is morally right 
(Haidt, 2012). Moral Foundations Theory (MFT; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt, 2007; 2012) has 
arguably developed one of the most substantive and widely studied psychological 
frameworks for understanding morality as it relates to both social and political ideology 
within and between cultures, this research has also identified important distinctions 
between the way different political ideologies use moral foundations to formulate their 
ideological views of the social world (Haidt, 2007; Graham et al., 2009). 
1.4. Moral Foundations Theory 
 MFT was first developed by Haidt and Joseph (2004) and aimed to integrate the 
study of moral values from anthropology with the field of psychology (Haidt, 2012). 
Psychology had hitherto been centrally focused on Kohlberg’s (1969) fairness based research 




al., 2011; Haidt, 2012). For Haidt and Joseph (2004), this represented an overly constrained 
appreciation of the sets of moral values people hold. Such a view neglected exploring a 
broader conception of the moral values outside of the harm and fairness domains which 
were more readily expressed across different cultures and within different subsections of 
societies across the globe (see also Haidt, 2012). Graham and colleagues (2009) noted that 
“nearly all research in moral psychology, whether carried out using interviews, fMRI, or 
dilemmas about stolen medicine and runaway trolleys, has been limited to issues of justice, 
rights, and welfare” (Graham et al., 2009, p. 1030). For Haidt (2012), this has meant that 
psychology has underplayed important moral values present in all cultures surrounding 
Loyalty, Authority, and Purity focused moral beliefs. Moral Foundations Theory is partially 
derived from Haidt’s (2001) Social Intuitionist Model (SIM), which argues that moral 
cognition is first intuitive and is then rationalised after the fact into coherent narratives and 
explanations (though Cf. Wright & Baril, 2011). MFT has further provided a framework for 
the study of moral values within and across cultures, though it is also important to note that 
MFT is a descriptive theory of morality, meaning that it does not make judgments about 
what is morally right and instead aims to describe how people reason about morality and 
their sense of right and wrong in their everyday lives (Graham et al., 2011). 
Within MFT Haidt (2012) outlines five main moral values which he proposes have 
evolved to assist our survival (Haidt, 2012: using a group level evolutionary selection 
account) these moral values are conceived of as innate and as culturally influenced. Haidt 
(2012) argues that the moral foundations were first based on evolutionary pressures (such 
as the harm and care instincts in parents enhancing child survival; Haidt, 2012) and have 




foundations are as follows: (1) the ‘Harm’ foundation which is concerned with avoidance of 
harm or suffering of others, (2) the ‘Fairness’ foundation includes making sure that ourselves 
and others are treated fairly and that we are not cheated. (3) The ‘Loyalty’ foundation 
includes supporting our group and being vigilant to those who go against the group’s values. 
(4) The ‘Authority’ foundation encompasses viewing those who are elders and leaders with 
respect and also reflects social hierarchy.  (5) The ‘Purity’ foundation evolved in relation to 
concerns around disease avoidance and was later co-opted into values surrounding morally 
sanctified symbols of the group and religion. Haidt’s (2012) work has highlighted how Harm 
and Fairness values have been strongly represented up until now in psychology. The Loyalty, 
Authority, and Purity values, however, have not been considered previously (Shweder, 
Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997; Haidt, 2012). Supporting this idea Moral Foundations 
Theory has found consistent differences in the expression of these five sets of moral values 
within and across different cultures (see Graham et al., 2011). In addition, MFT has also been 
applied within cultures to the understanding of differences in political cognition (Graham et 
al. 2009; Graham et al., 2011) and social policy perceptions (Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & 
Haidt, 2012).  
1.4.1. Measuring Moral Foundations 
In order to measure people’s investment in the five moral foundations Graham et al. 
(2011) formulated the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) that measures investment in 
the five foundations of: Harm, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority and Purity. The factor structure of 
the MFQ has been demonstrated to be most effective with a five-factor solution 
(confirmatory factor analysis: Graham et al., 2011) and the scale has been found to have 




(Graham et al., 2011). The MFQ is divided into two subscales one looking at more abstract 
conceptions of the five different moral foundations and the other looking at the more 
concrete applications, these two subscales are termed the “relevance” and “judgement” 
subscales respectively (Graham et al., 2011, p.369); these subscales are collapsed in order to 
gain a more comprehensive account of the use of each moral foundation. Research has 
demonstrated that moral relevance investment for each of the five foundations matches 
judgements subscale foundation investment (See Graham et al., 2009, Study 1 & 2). 
Collapsing the subscales also increases the overall reliability of the moral foundations 
measured by the MFQ (Graham et al., 2011). The development of the MFQ was partially a 
response to value based theories such as Schwartz’s (1992) which are well validated models 
but were more constrained in their cultural conception to Western societies (Graham et al., 
2011). Comparing the MFQ to the Schwartz’ values scale (SVS; Schwartz, 1992) has found 
that “the MFQ was actually a more powerful predictor than the SVS for most of the scales 
and political issue positions, and all of the social group attitudes” (Graham et al., 2011, 
p.376). These findings further suggest the validity of the MFQ as a useful measure for 
assessing ideological and social attitudes. 
The most recent version of the MFQ contains 30 items. Six items assessing each 
moral foundation (Harm, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, Purity). The MFQ also contains two 
items designed to detect participants who are completing the measure in an acquiescent 
way. An example includes an item that asks if it is an important moral concern to them 
“whether or not someone was good at math” (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2008) in which 
participants scoring “somewhat relevant” or above on the response scale are removed. 




al., 2011) moral investment; an example harm item asks people how important a moral 
concern it is “whether or not someone was cruel” (Graham et al., 2008). In contrast, an 
example of Authority investment would be agreement that “Respect for authority is 
something all children need to learn” and Purity being asked to rate an item stating: “people 
should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed” (Graham et al., 2008). 
Within the MFQ, 6 items measure each of the moral foundations and these are then 
averaged to form an overall score reflecting investment in that particular moral foundation 
(See Graham et al., 2011). The MFQ is a quantitative measure that was complemented and 
informed by earlier more qualitative explorations of moral values and other quantitative 
surveys (McAdams et al., 2008) and these different sets of foundations can also be seen in 
research examining the way speech is used across different political and religious 
orientations using word frequency analyses (See Graham et al., 2009, Study 4). The MFQ 
represents an assessment of investment of each of the five identified moral foundations 
using a standardised and validated measurement tool for use within and across cultures 
(Graham et al., 2011; Graham et al., 2009). Research using MFT often employs the MFQ as 
the main method for measurement of people’s investment in the five moral foundations. 
1.4.2. Moral Foundations and Political Ideology 
One of the main uses of the MFQ has been to measure differences in moral 
foundations as a function of political ideology. Graham and colleagues (2009) conducted 
research considering how liberals and conservatives would differ in their investment in the 
five different moral foundations (Harm, Fairness, Authority, Loyalty and Purity). Here it was 
found that in the U.S. and U.K, the same patterns emerged. Those who were more politically 




Purity foundations on the MFQ, whilst those higher on political conservatism invested in all 
five moral foundations (Harm, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority and Purity), which suggests that 
differences in moral foundations are related to political ideology; See Graham et al. (2009; 
Graham et al., 2011; See also Haidt, 2007). 
This distinction between liberals, and conservatives is important as Graham et al. 
(2009; Haidt, 2012) propose that this reflects a fundamental difference in moral emphasis 
between liberals and conservatives and can explain ideological divides across the political 
spectrum. For Graham and colleagues (2009; also Haidt, 2012) the Harm and Fairness values 
are argued to be based on moral concerns to do with individual members of society, in this 
respect liberals are primarily concerned that individuals are not hurt, harmed or treated 
unfairly rather than the broader societal group. Therefore, the Harm and Fairness 
foundations have been called “Individualizing” moral foundations as the “the individualizing 
approach focuses on individuals as the locus of moral value” (Graham et al. 2009, p.1030). In 
contrast, conservatives cared more strongly about the three other moral foundations of: 
Loyalty, Authority, and Purity (as well as Harm and Fairness). The Loyalty, Authority, and 
Purity foundations have been termed as “Binding” foundations by Graham et al. (2009) 
because all three are considered to be evolved moral values with the function of assisting 
group cohesion. “This binding approach focuses on the group as the locus of moral value” 
(Graham et al., 2009, p.1030). For example, the Authority foundation reflects hierarchy and 
respect for the group leadership. The Loyalty foundation reflects support for the ingroup and 
vigilance to those who may betray it. Finally, the Purity foundation reflects reverence and 
respect for symbols of importance to the group (through moral sanctification) which aids 




foundations was also constant geographically, as Graham et al. (2011) measured sets of 
Eastern and Western global regions finding that: “in every country and world region we 
examined, people on the political right placed greater emphasis on concerns about ingroup 
loyalty, respect for authorities and traditions, and physical/spiritual purity than did people 
on the political left” (Graham et al., 2011, p.380); this analysis included several regions 
within Asia and Europe as well as the broader Middle East and Africa.  
Overall the findings of Graham and colleagues (2009; 2011) mean that according to 
MFT, conservatives have more of a concern with their group and keeping their group 
together as “the building block of society is thought to be the family, and a much greater 
emphasis is placed on virtues and institutions that bind people into roles, duties and mutual 
obligations” (Graham et al., 2011, p.368) whereas liberals are concerned mainly with moral 
values regarding the rights of individuals (Graham et al., 2009). This difference in emphasis is 
argued to explain a large number of differences that liberals and conservatives encounter 
when they discuss or debate policy issues (See Koleva et al., 2012). However, this difference 
leads to important consequences for political and ideological divides as Haidt (2012) argues 
that “morality binds and blinds” (Haidt, 2012, p.222). Here Haidt (2012) proposes that 
liberals and conservatives disagree because they use different moral frames of emphasis in 
discussing and evaluating policies and positions; thus, they are often unable to take each 
other’s moral perspective due to differences in their fundamental moral values (Haidt, 
2012).   
Moral Foundations theory has many advantages as an alternative measure of the 
underlying structure and function of political ideology. Whilst this is the case, there have 




binding distinctions, and whether the binding foundations may ever be problematic when 
applied to intergroup relations more generally or to the influence of groups on political 
ideology (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013; Kugler et al., 2014). This is a point that the MFT 
theorists themselves have alluded to when Haidt and Joseph (2004) note that “for liberals, 
the conservative virtues of hierarchy and order seem too closely related to oppression, and 
the conservative virtues of purity seem to have too often been used to exclude or morally 
taint whole groups (e.g., blacks, homosexuals, sexually active women)” (Haidt & Joseph, 
2004, p.64). These examples suggest serious issues with the moral foundations framework at 
the intergroup level. We now turn to the unresolved issues with the group level in MFT and 
then go on to explore in further depth, what the moral foundations mean for a better 
understanding of political ideology and intergroup relations once the group level is examined 
in greater detail. 
1.5. Theoretical Critiques of Moral Foundations Theory 
1.5.1. Model of Moral Motives (MMM) 
The group-level in MFT has recently become a point of criticism by some 
psychological theorists. Janoff-Bulman and Carnes (2013; 2016) have proposed that MFT 
does not accurately capture group-level moral values amongst liberals. They have instead 
proposed a model of morality that relates to approach/avoidance tendencies as seen in 
models of Behavioural Activation and Inhibition cognition (see Carver & Scheier, 2000; Rock 
& Janoff-Bulman, 2010). In Janoff-Bulman and Carnes’ (2013; 2016) Model of Moral Motives 
(MMM) these distinctions are reflected in “prescriptive” moral values revolving around 
pursuing active behaviours and values and “proscriptive” moral values revolving around 




levels “from self (personal) to other(s) (interpersonal), to the group (collective)” (Janoff-
Bulman & Carnes, 2013, p221). Supporting this idea, MMM research has demonstrated that 
questionnaire items assessing the six different moral motives in the MMM model loaded on 
distinct factors from each other (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2016, Study 1) and such inhibition 
and activation based moral motives also predicted liberal and conservative social and 
economic policy attitudes differentially (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Baldacci, 2008, Study 2). 
The final level of the MMM has particularly important implications for MFT and is 
concerned with group-focused morality. Here they propose two moral motives operate; one 
is concerned with “social order” (proscriptive) which is based around controlling and 
ordering the wider societal group and the second “social justice” (prescriptive) is concerned 
with assisting and aiding the wider societal group (Janoff Bulman & Carnes, 2013, p.222). 
Most crucially for MFT there are differences in these ‘group-focused’ moral motives as a 
function of political ideology. They have found that a liberal political ideology was positively 
and significantly related to higher social justice concerns, whereas having a more 
conservative ideology was significantly related to higher levels of social order endorsement 
across research studies (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2016; Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008). In the 
MMM Janoff-Bulman and Carnes (2013; 2016) propose that Social Order (higher in 
endorsement amongst conservatives) had much similarity with the standard MFT binding 
foundations of Loyalty, Authority, and Purity. However, in further considering the findings at 
the group level, Janoff-Bulman and Carnes (2013; 2016) argued that social justice 
represented what they viewed as a liberal equivalent to the group focused moral 
foundations aimed at active support for the group which had not been detected or 




In response to Janoff-Bulman and Carnes (2013), Graham (2013), a MFT proponent, 
suggested that a more effective way to consider the group level within the MMM would be 
in the intergroup context considering the influence of both ingroups and outgroups in moral 
values. Whilst the MMM provides an important critique of MFT it has also used a different 
set of measures and methods to assess the group level in political ideology with its own 
associated empirical and theoretical issues (See Graham, 2013 for critique). This means it 
may be more difficult to conclusively resolve the ongoing debate (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 
2013a; Graham, 2013; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013b) about the nature of group-focused 
moral cognition and political ideology between MMM and MFT theorists, due to their 
reliance on different measures and conceptualisations of morality when considering the 
group level. 
 To more rigorously test the group-level in political ideology, the framing of the moral 
foundations themselves in terms of ingroups and outgroups would compellingly 
demonstrate that liberals think about their moral foundations differently within MFT when 
framed based on outgroups as compared to ingroups and would contribute to resolving the 
currents debates in the field. By framing the MFQ in this way, the current thesis research 
would also begin to shed more light on the influence of intergroup relations within moral 
values, which has only partially been considered in prior research. No existing research has 
framed the moral foundations questions in terms of Ingroups and Outgroups, which remains 
an important omission within the research literature on moral values, ideology and the 
broader relationship of these areas to intergroup relations. We now consider how other 





1.5.2. Evolutionary Coalitional Theory (ECT) 
One new perspective on the lack of the group level within the MFT has very recently 
been proposed by Sinn & Hayes (2016) in their Evolutionary Coalitional Theory (ECT), which 
is based on evolutionary theory surrounding social cohesion and disharmony. The 
Evolutionary Coalitional Theory (ECT) argues that moral foundations theory is another way 
of exploring constructs already considered within the political and evolutionary psychology 
literature, namely the ECT. This theory argues that the Binding Foundations of Loyalty, 
Authority, and Purity are another way of measuring the already established construct of 
Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA: Altemeyer; 1988; 1996; 1998) as they argue binding 
foundations equate to the strong traditional values found within RWA. ECT calls this the 
“Authoritarian motive” (Sinn & Hayes, 2016, p.2). They also accuse MFT of ignoring the 
implications of low investment in of Harm and Fairness foundation, which they suggest 
reflects high levels of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO: Pratto et al., 1994), ECT terms this 
the “Dominating Motive” (p.2). Finally, ECT further argues that one final component of 
liberal political ideology which is not adequately captured by the high investment in harm 
and fairness for liberals within MFT is the “Universalizing Motive” (Sinn & Hayes, 2016, p.2) 
which reflects a broader form of identification than the focus solely on individual rights 
found within in MFT (Haidt, 2012; Graham, 2013); this general motive has been explored by 
others in traditional models of values (Schwartz, 1992) that Sinn and Hayes (2016) integrate 
within their model.  
In one study, Sinn and Hayes (2016) measured moral foundations to test whether 
they related to strong persecutory attitudes against immigrants, using the immigration posse 




(using their own measure of threat focused on “direct” and “values” based threats, Sinn & 
Hayes, 2016, p.7). They observed that in both cases binding foundations (as a composite) 
positively related to immigration posse scale scores and threat perceptions (Sinn & Hayes, 
2016, Study 1). While the study was provocative, one issue was that the threat measure 
employed was created by the authors for the study, rather than using more established 
measures of threat within social psychology, such as Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman’s (1999) 
measure of realistic and symbolic threat. Another issue with this study was that the 
immigration posse scale (Altemeyer, 1996) was the main measure of outgroup attitudes. 
While the immigration posse scale is an important measure, it is also a measure of extremely 
strong persecutory attitudes including willingness to commit violence toward immigrants 
(see Thomsen et al., 2008) which are arguably markedly different from more general 
attitudes on immigration. The scale is also predicated on asking participants to think of a 
context “assuming immigrant organizations have become illegal” (Sinn & Hayes, 2016, p.7) 
meaning more general attitudes towards immigrants were not measured. Finally, a crucial 
issue for this study was that Sinn & Hayes (2016) did not use the full 30-item measure of the 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) and instead used the moral judgements 15-item 
subscale; this means that it is more difficult to conclusively determine if the relationship 
would hold using the full 30 item measure of moral foundations that includes aspects 
surrounding both the ‘relevance’ of moral concerns to individuals as well as application as 
‘judgements’ (Graham et al., 2011, p.369).  
 In a third study, Sinn & Hayes (2016) observed that moral foundations loaded 
differentially onto two factors. One factor was labelled “Universalizing vs. Dominating” 




“identification with all humanity” scale (Sinn & Hayes, 2016, p.14; see McFarland, Brown & 
Webb, 2013), all of which loaded positively, along with the Social Dominance Orientation 
scale that loaded negatively on the factor. In contrast, a separate factor was labelled 
“Authoritarianism” (p.14), and included the three binding foundations of Loyalty, Authority, 
and Purity foundations along with RWA, all positively loaded. They argued that Moral 
Foundations did not improve models over and above other variables (Study 3) when they 
were added to the regression equations. 
Whilst ECT represents a promising new model, it could be argued that this 
relationship overlooks the value of moral foundations as being useful in understanding the 
potential antecedents of ideologies such as RWA and SDO, as well as the large amount of 
evidence and utility of moral foundations as a tool for measuring morality and its 
relationship to ideology across cultures and nations (Haidt, 2007; 2012; Graham et al. 2009; 
Graham et al., 2011). Moreover, a single paper indicating that moral foundations does not 
explain variance above other variables is not enough evidence to dismiss the dozens of 
studies showing its value. More research needs to investigate these ideas. Somewhat in line 
with the ideas expressed within ECT about the relationships of the moral foundations to 
polarised ideologies, versions of the SDO and RWA scales were used to originally validate the 
fairness and authority subscales of the MFQ respectively though these measures also related 
to broader foundations (See Graham et al., 2011, Table 7); this points to how, even in the 
MFQ’s inception, there was potentially a relationship to strong intergroup variables. 
However, replacing the moral foundations with these classical measures could be argued to 
obscure sets of underlying moral values which may help us to better understand the 




understanding of how moral foundations relate to intergroup processes and strong social 
ideologies which may be important for developing interventions and methods to improve 
social harmony.  
In order to more fully understand the group level in Moral Foundations Theory, the 
first line of research considered in Chapter 2 of this thesis will investigate the influence of 
group-based framing (ingroup versus outgroup) on the Moral Foundations Questionnaire 
and its relationship to political ideology and intergroup variables. By focusing the MFQ items 
on ingroups and outgroups, the current research will address the ongoing debates about the 
nature of the group level in MFT (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013; Graham, 2013). After 
establishing how the ingroup and outgroup based framing of the moral foundations relates 
to political ideology, Chapter 2 will then examine the influence on intergroup attitudes and 
will also specify ingroups and outgroups when framing the MFQ. Detecting differences in 
moral emphasis as a function of the group level would have important implications for moral 
and political psychology. Finally, Chapter 2 of this thesis will consider the implications of 
ingroup and outgroup framed moral foundations for broader intergroup relations and social 
attitudes. 
In light of this focus, we now turn to other work of particular importance to the 
second line of research considered in Chapter 3 of the thesis which considers how moral 
foundations relate to intergroup relations more generally as well as to more extreme social 
ideologies. In doing so, we will highlight how this work causes further issues for MFT when 






1.6. Intergroup Relations and Moral Foundations 
 There has been only limited research considering the implications of MFT for the 
study of intergroup relations. Federico et al. (2013) and Kugler et al. (2014) separately 
conducted studies that aimed to assess the relationship between the five moral foundations 
and their relationship to levels of SDO and RWA ideologies. The general pattern from these 
studies was that the Loyalty, Authority, and Purity foundations were positively predicted by 
RWA, whilst the Harm and Fairness foundations were negatively predicted by SDO. Kugler et 
al. (2014) went on to examine and extend the intergroup implications of these findings to 
also consider the relationship of the five moral foundations to a measure of outgroup 
hostility. They found that the Authority, and Purity foundations positively predicted hostility 
whereas the Fairness foundation negatively predicted hostility. As a result of these findings, 
Kugler and colleagues (2014) argued that the descriptions of the ‘binding’ moral foundations 
as ‘moral’ was a misnomer considering their relationship to hostility aimed at those not 
within the ingroup; however, one issue with this conclusion was that within Kugler et al.’s 
(2014) measure they made strongly salient intergroup comparisons between different 
groups such as Muslims and Christians as well as also considering illegal immigration in two 
of the six items assessing hostility; such salient examples of more non-normative or extreme 
groups may have partially driven their effects and therefore work assessing more general 
attitudes towards immigration and immigrant groups as well as outgroups more generally is 
lacking.   
Other work in MFT considering its implications at the intergroup level has suggested 
that when MFT is applied to the intergroup context there could be important implications 




how moral foundations may affect attitudes towards outgroups whilst also accounting for 
how strong or weakly people rated themselves on a measure of moral identity; they used 
MFQ in one study (Graham et al., 2008) and Sacredness scale in another (Graham et al., 
2009, Study 3) to measure moral investment in the individualizing and binding foundations 
(Smith et al., 2014, Studies 1a, 1b). It was found that those with lower moral identity and 
who were invested in the binding foundations were more likely to support torture (Smith et 
al., 2014). In a follow-up study they also found a similar effect when participants were asked 
to rate a hypothetical survival scenario involving two groups. In this study, those primed in a 
moral condition and who scored high on binding foundations and low on moral identity were 
less likely to share water resources with a foreign group as compared to their own group 
(Smith et al., 2014, Study 2). This research has pointed to the possibility that under certain 
conditions Binding moral foundations may relate to negative attitudes towards outgroups 
and outgroup members. 
Whilst Moral Foundations Theory and associated theories have aimed to understand 
moral values as they relate to society and policy, the relationship between these variables 
and the study of more general intergroup relations is lacking.  Some research has aimed to 
examine differences in perceptions of moral values from the self and other groups but has 
often asked participants to fill out the standard MFQ from their own perspective and then to 
fill the MFQ out again as if they were a member of another group completing the items 
(Obeid, Argo, & Ginges, 2017; Graham, Nosek, & Haidt, 2012). This approach however means 
that there is no clarity in how moral values affect perceptions of other groups as targets for 
judgements on the MFQ as compared to one’s own group. Other early work in moral 




groups (Graham et al., 2011) but again did not investigate intergroup relations or how such 
group affinities related to more general intergroup processes.  
The group level remains only partially explored within moral foundations theory 
(Janoff Bulman & Carnes, 2013; Graham, 2013). Within social psychology, however, there is 
a large history of demonstrating the power of group-level thinking (see Social Identity 
Theory, SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 2004; Spears, 2011) and group-level categorisation in intergroup 
relations. For example the Minimal Groups Paradigm experiments (Tajfel et al., 1971) found 
that placing individuals into arbitrary groups had immediate effects on their resource 
allocation decisions, whereby they would favour members of their own group. Social Identity 
Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 2004; Spears, 2011) began in reference to understanding the 
minimal groups paradigm (Tajfel et al., 1971) and explained these findings of “maximum 
difference” between groups by demonstrating that individuals emphasised distinctiveness 
between groups most in their resource allocation rather than simply thinking about gain to 
themselves (Tajfel & Turner, 2004, p.282). SIT further highlighted the role of ingroups and 
outgroups in providing individuals with a sense of “self-esteem” and “group distinctiveness” 
(see Spears, 2011, p.204), which also related to processes of social categorization to explain 
how individuals defined group boundaries and the features of groups, affecting their social 
behaviour and self-concept (Tajfel & Turner, 2004). Social Identity was also developed 
further by work within Self-Categorization Theory (SCT; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & 
Wetherell, 1987) which expanded the SIT framework to understand how individuals define 
themselves within groups as well as between groups, for “If social identity theory is primarily 
a theory of intergroup relations, self-categorization theory can be seen as a more general 




had an important influence particularly in the context of group salience and identity debates 
and research. SIT is a long established and effective framework for the study of intergroup 
relations and processes and highlights the importance of ingroups and outgroups in our 
social attitudes. 
Other social psychologists such as Brewer (1999) have also considered the 
implications of ingroup and outgroup categorisation in which the effects of ingroup 
preference can have an important impact on other groups. In doing so Brewer (1999) has 
suggested that some forms of “discrimination can be motivated solely by ingroup 
preference, in the absence of any negative affect or hostile intent towards outgroups” 
(Brewer, 1999, p.431). This group categorisation has been argued to relate to evolutionary 
processes; humans have increasingly focused on group-based reciprocity and learning 
throughout evolution. One implication of this idea is that people may show favouritism 
towards their own groups as a way of minimising chances of not being repaid.  Group 
categorisation has been demonstrated in experimentally controlled behavioural economic 
scenarios (Fitzgerald & Wickwire, 2012) and has also been found to play an important role in 
real life conflicts as well as atrocities (Zimbardo, 2007). While group categorisation often 
leads to prejudice and discrimination, there are many conditions in which it does not (Lepore 
& Brown, 2002; Park & Judd, 2005; Kurzban, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001). 
Despite the moral foundations addressing the group level in the Binding foundations, 
there is yet to be a full account of what this can mean for understanding intergroup 
perceptions in the context of polarised ideologies. Research demonstrates that the 




positively related to RWA (Kugler et al., 2014; Federico et al., 2013; Sinn & Hayes, 2016) but 
less research has considered the intergroup implications of these processes and how the 
moral foundations relate to intergroup variables more generally. The second line of research 
considered within Chapter 3 of this research thesis examines MFT and more extreme 
ideologies in the context of intergroup relations and attitudes. This chapter first sets out to 
examine how Individualizing and Binding moral foundations relate to a number of different 
intergroup variables with importance for societal cohesion. Chapter 3 then goes on to 
examine the role that more polarised social ideologies play in the relationship between 
moral foundations and intergroup processes. Investigating the relationships between moral 
foundations, polarised ideologies, and intergroup relations may lead to a better 
understanding of how moral and ideological attitudes contribute to social attitudes and the 
values which underpin more polarised ideologies and may therefore suggest potential 
interventions to reduce prejudice and discrimination. This research will also examine the 
extent to which individualising foundations may promote positive intergroup relations.   
The research literature considered up to this point examines how group-
categorisation and -cognition can play an important role in intergroup tensions; however, 
another strand of literature suggests that threat and threat perceptions also play an 
important explanatory role in intergroup conflict and cooperation (Sherif, 1961), and 
prejudice and discrimination (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Threat is also currently only 
partially explored within moral foundations theory (Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009). Threat-
related perceptions (i.e., belief in a dangerous world) have also been found to underlie 
political ideologies more generally as well as more extreme social ideologies such as 




therefore there is good reason to consider how moral foundations relate to threat 
perceptions within the existing research literature (Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009); such an 
investigation is especially important in regards to the broader literature concerned with the 
relationship between threat and intergroup relations (Stephan & Stephan, 2000); we now 
consider this literature.  
1.7. Threat, Morality, and the Social Political World  
The implications of threat perceptions for intergroup relations will be explored within 
the two strands of research and can also be seen in classical social psychological models of 
intergroup conflict. Initially, Realistic Conflict Theory (RCT) argued that conflict between 
groups was a function of perceptions of a lack of societal resources which lead to heightened 
threat perceptions and conflict between groups (Levine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1961). 
More recently the study of threat perceptions has been expanded upon by Stephan & 
Stephan (2000) who proposed an ‘Integrated threat theory of prejudice’ (Stephan & 
Stephan, 2000, p.23) which outlines stereotyping, anxiety, and two main forms of threat 
perceptions as antecedents to prejudice. The first threat perception is ‘realistic threat’ which 
is orientated around perceived threats to resources in society, jobs and the economy etc., 
(Stephan et al., 1999, see p.2228; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). The second is ‘symbolic threat’ 
which is orientated around threats to a group’s moral and social values or beliefs (Stephan et 
al., 1999, see p.2228; Stephan & Stephan 2000). Importantly within the model threats do not 
have to be actual and can simply be perceived to exist and have been found to lead to 
prejudicial attitudes (Stephan & Stephan 2000).  
The use of measures from Integrated Threat Theory (ITT; Stephan & Stephan, 2000) 




the development of ITT had a focus on the group level processes involved in threat 
processes. For example we have noted that realistic threat perceptions within the ITT were 
based upon earlier work in realistic group conflict theory (Levine & Campbell, 1972) where 
the Sherif (1961) Summer Camp Studies found that the division of participants into groups in 
a competitive context allowed for the creation of group based identities, focus on resources 
and tribalistic behavior (see Stephan & Stephan, 2000). In contrast work regarding symbolic 
threat was influenced by earlier measures of “symbolic racism” (Kinder & Sears, 1981; see 
Stephan & Stephan, 2000, p.26) which were then developed into items measuring perceived 
threat perceptions in relation to symbolic values. Together these areas of threat perception 
highlight the intergroup aspects of threat based cognition. More broadly ITT often measures 
“negative stereotypes” and “intergroup anxiety” alongside threat highlighting the intergroup 
focus around the development of the perceived threat measures (see Stephan & Stephan, 
2000, p.27). 
In measuring threat perceptions, Stephan et al. (1999) designed a measure to assess 
levels of both realistic and symbolic forms of threat. For example, an item assessing realistic 
threat perceptions towards Asian American immigrants measured agreement and 
disagreement with statements such as: “Asian [American] immigration has increased the tax 
burden on Americans” (Stephan et al., 1999, p.2237). Whilst, an example of an item 
assessing symbolic threat is: “immigration from Asia is undermining American culture” 
(Stephan et al., 1999, p.2237). Riek, Mania, and Gaertner (2006) considered the relationship 
between realistic and symbolic threat and outgroup perceptions by conducting a meta-
analyses of the literature, and they found that these two types of threat alongside, group-




(Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006, p.343) this demonstrated the important influence that 
different kinds of threat perceptions have on intergroup attitudes.  
Threat-related processing does not just have implications for intergroup relations 
because threat-based variables have also been consistently related to left-right ideological 
differences (Lilienfeld & Latzman, 2014; Jost et al., 2007; Thórisdóttir & Jost, 2011). 
Experimental evidence suggests that those with higher skin conductance and eyeblink startle 
responses, which indicate vigilance to threat, demonstrated increased support for ingroup-
favouring political policies such as “opposition to pacifism, immigration, gun control, foreign 
aid, compromise….” etc. (Oxley et al., 2008, p.1668). Importantly threat as a variable has also 
been found to be an important factor in understanding general ideological changes in 
response to diversity (Craig & Richeson, 2014a), as well as more extreme social ideologies 
such as Authoritarianism (Stenner, 2005; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; 2010) and threat 
perceptions also help to explain how individuals, who are invested in authoritarianism, 
display more prejudice in the context of racial diversity (Kauff et al., 2013). Finally, Kugler et 
al. (2014) and Federico et al. (2013) have independently further demonstrated that the 
binding moral foundations of Loyalty, Authority, and Purity were related to Authoritarianism 
suggesting an underlying conception of group-based morality may be important for the 
understanding more extreme social ideologies and further may be applied to intergroup 
relations in the context of threat perceptions.  
Given the prior literature surrounding threat, in the current project we additionally 
hypothesize that realistic and symbolic Threat processes may be positively related to 
endorsement of binding moral foundations and negatively related to individualising moral 




for intergroup processes. This hypothesis follows from a number of observations given that 
threat relates to more conservative ideologies (Jost et al., 2003; 2007) and more 
conservative ideologies show stronger investment in the binding foundations (Graham et al., 
2009). The binding foundations have also been related to negative outgroup attitudes under 
certain conditions (Kugler et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2014) and have also been related to 
increased sense of a dangerous world (Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009) and to RWA ideologies 
which evidence suggests may be product of threat-related perceptions such as BDW (Duckitt 
& Sibley, 2010; Stenner, 2005).  Finally, the content of the binding foundations reflects 
ingroup concerns which may also reflect sensitivity to threats (Sinn & Hayes, 2016, Study 1). 
Liberal ideologies may also be associated with more approach orientation and therefore a 
lower sense of threat perception (Rock & Janoff-Bulman, 2010; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 
2013; 2016; Shook & Fazio, 2009) and higher sense of feeling more connected to other 
groups (Sinn & Hayes, 2016; Jost et al., 2015; Van der torn et al., 2014). We investigate these 
hypotheses surrounding threat perceptions within the two lines of research explored within 
this thesis. 
The current research aims to integrate areas of social psychological theory with the 
current debates surrounding the intergroup level within MFT (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 
2013; Graham, 2013) and political ideology more generally. By using social identity principles 
concerning the importance of ingroups and outgroups for individuals (Tajfel & Turner, 2004) 
in the current research we will extend the social identity perspective to provide a new 
framework for ingroup and outgroup processing in moral and political cognition. The aim of 
this integration is to provide new avenues for the understanding and measurement of 




threat perceptions as measured within the studies reported here will further expand the 
scope of existing theories surrounding threat perceptions (Stephan & Stephan, 2000) and 
the broader relationship of threat based cognition to intergroup relations.  
1.8. Unresolved Questions: Moral Foundations, Political Ideology, Threat Perceptions, and 
Intergroup Relations 
Overall MFT has provided greater insights into understanding the fundamental 
differences in the way different political ideologies view the social world. Whilst this 
framework has been effective in understanding differences within cultures (Graham et al., 
2009), across cultures (Graham et al., 2011) and in social policy perceptions (Koleva et al., 
2012), the theory has unresolved issues in regards to the intergroup level. Haidt (2012) 
proposes that conservatives use moral foundations orientated around cohesiveness of their 
group termed the ‘Binding’ foundations of Loyalty, Authority, and Purity. In contrast, he 
proposes liberals mainly consider individuals in their moral reasoning; he has therefore 
termed the Harm and Fairness foundations as ‘Individualizing’ foundations. Several theorists 
have taken issue with this conceptualisation arguing liberals can conceive of the group level 
within their moral values (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013; Sinn & Hayes, 2016). Whilst these 
approaches have highlighted issues with the group level of MFT, both ECT and the MMM 
propose replacing moral foundations with their own frameworks even though moral 
foundations have been found to be highly effective in explaining moral values across the 
cultural and political spectrum (Graham et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2011). Graham (2013) 
has called for more work considering the intergroup implications of MFT.  
 This growing literature sheds light on the importance of the intergroup level in a 




power of group categorisation in intergroup conflict and discrimination (Tajfel et al., 1971) 
and the importance of social identities for all individuals (Tajfel & Turner, 2004; Spears, 
2011). Understanding how the group level operates within moral foundations theory may 
also highlight new ways to improve intergroup relations whilst also taking into account more 
general political ideologies (Jost, 2006), as well as more polarised ideological social cognition 
(Altemeyer. 1988; 1996; 1998; Pratto et al., 1994). Finally, the relationship of the moral 
foundations to other more general explorations of threat perceptions and ideology remains 
an important research area as higher ingroup emphasis may make threats more salient 
(Stephan & Stephan, 2000); therefore, the current research sets out to answer a number of 
unresolved empirical questions regarding how moral and political ideology inform 
perceptions of immigrant groups and intergroup relations more generally.  
1.9. Summary of the Current Research Thesis 
 The current thesis consists of two lines of research. The first, considered in Chapter 2 
investigates the role of ingroups and outgroups within the moral foundations framework 
(Graham, 2013). This will be achieved through framing the questions within the moral 
foundations questionnaire (MFQ) in terms of ingroups and outgroups to ask whether liberals 
do have a group level conception within their application of Harm and Fairness moral 
foundations. After investigating the effects of framing the MFQ in terms of ingroups and 
outgroups, Chapter 2 will consider the effects of specifying target ingroups and outgoups 
framed within the MFQ on political orientation and further aim to understand how 
differential investment in ingroup and outgroup focused moral foundations affects explicit 




go on to measure how ingroup and outgroup focused moral and political cognition affects 
implicit as well as explicit biases. 
 The second line of research considered in Chapter 3 of this thesis concerns the more 
general implications of moral foundations for intergroup relations and then considers how 
moral foundations relate to more extreme social ideologies. Chapter 3 first involves testing 
the application of moral foundations at the intergroup level by considering how 
Individualising and Binding foundations in the MFQ relate to intergroup variables such as 
bias (Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009) and threat (Stephan et al., 1999) towards 
immigrants as well as more general intergroup variables such as collective action (Saguy et 
al., 2009), perspective taking (Davis, 1983), and collective narcissism (Golec de Zavala, 2011). 
Chapter 3 then expands prior models of MFT and its relationship to strong RWA and SDO 
ideologies (Federico et al., 2013; Kugler et al., 2014) to also consider the role of perceived 
threat as well as extending the current models to explicit bias towards immigrant groups. 
Finally, this chapter will explore the importance of threat processes in understanding the 
relationship between moral foundations and intergroup variables. 
The research outlined here will collect data from both online and laboratory samples. 
The work in Chapter 2 will be conducted in the laboratory and online using U.K samples and 
will use both abstract and specified ingroup and outgroup based framing of the MFQ to 
answer important existing theoretical debates in MFT (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013; 
Graham, 2013). The work in Chapter 3 will be conducted online and will further expand the 
scope of our ideological measures in understanding, morality, threat perceptions and 
intergroup relations. Together the lines of research considered here will include the use of 




sampling methods (online and laboratory) and the design of several studies to assess 
replication. Overall this research will aim to advance our understanding of the relationship 
between moral and political ideology and intergroup processes. 
 The implications of the findings from the two lines of will be discussed in Chapter 4. It 
will also consider what the findings here mean for future research in moral and political 
ideology, the study of threat based cognition, social policy attitudes and approaches to 
interventions aimed at improving intergroup relations. This thesis argues that moral and 
political cognition are related to each other and to broader intergroup cognition in a number 
of important ways. It ultimately argues that studying the intergroup level in the moral and 
political cognition yields important new insights towards improving intergroup relations, 







CHAPTER 2: MOVING MORALITY BEYOND THE INGROUP: LIBERALS AND 
CONSERVATIVES SHOW DIFFERENCES ON GROUP-FRAMED MORAL 




Moral foundations research suggests that liberals care about moral values related to 
individual rights such as harm and fairness, while conservatives care about those 
foundations in addition to caring more about group rights such as loyalty, authority, and 
purity. However, the question remains whether liberals are indifferent to group-level moral 
principles. We used two versions of the moral foundations questionnaire with the target 
group being either ingroups or outgroups. Across three studies, we observed that liberals 
showed more investment in Harm and Fairness with an outgroup target, while conservatives 
showed more investment in -Loyalty, -Authority, and -Purity with an ingroup target. This 
general pattern was found when the target group framed was abstract i.e. ‘ingroups’ and 
‘outgroups’ (Study 1) and when target groups framed were specified (Studies 2 & 3). In 
Studies 2 and 3, we demonstrated that increasing liberalism was associated with less explicit 
bias, less negative bias, implicit bias (Study 3), and less perceived threat from immigrants. 
Outgroup-individualizing foundations and Ingroup-Binding foundations showed different 
patterns of mediation. A final additional study (Study 4) found similar patterns when 
comparing the Standard MFQ to the Outgroup MFQ as those found when using the Ingroup 
MFQ.  
 





To understand how people make sense of right and wrong in their social 
environment, Moral Foundations Theory proposed that five core moral values evolved to 
help direct social decisions and judgments (Haidt, 2012; Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 
2012; see also Shweder, Much, Mahapatra & Park, 1997). These moral foundations are Harm 
(e.g., decisions that hurt others), Fairness (e.g., giving everyone an equal chance), Authority 
(e.g., respect for leaders, group roles, etc.), Loyalty (e.g., loyalty to a country or social group), 
and Purity (e.g. cleanliness, religious sanctification; Haidt, 2007; 2012). Recent evidence has 
supported the idea that political liberals care about the moral foundations of Harm and 
Fairness most strongly, while conservatives care about the foundations of Authority, Loyalty, 
and Purity in addition to Harm and Fairness (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek., 2009; Graham et al., 
2011; Graham, Nosek, & Haidt, 2012; Haidt, 2012; Koleva et al., 2012; Van Leeuwen & Park, 
2009). However, the question arises of whether this differentiation is fully accurate and 
under what conditions it may be accurate or inaccurate. Other important questions 
regarding this distinction involve how moral foundations relate to interpersonal and 
intergroup processes. A deeper understanding of these relationships can help improve the 
dialogue and communication between people with different political orientations when they 
discuss issues related to intergroup processes (e.g., immigrants, intergroup bias, and policies 
related to those issues).  
2.1.1. Individual versus Group-Based Thinking 
In considering differences in moral values between liberals and conservatives, 
researchers have suggested that ostensibly liberal foundations (Harm and Fairness) concern 




itself, and supporting these policies is still about supporting individuals; therefore, it has 
been said that liberals tend to use ostensibly Individualizing moral foundations (Graham et 
al., 2009; Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 2012). In contrast, conservatives may react more 
strongly to hearing about somebody who went against group principles, leaders, or beliefs 
(Authority, Loyalty, and Purity foundations), which are considered to be broader group-
based, Binding foundations in which the group is the locus of moral value and is used in 
moral judgments (Haidt, 2012; Kidwell, Farmer, & Hardesty, 2013; Van Leeuwen & Park, 
2009). This finding that conservatives use binding foundations more than liberals raises more 
questions in regard to morality and groups. Do liberals and conservatives show differences 
relating to group-based moral foundations?  Or are they influenced by different types of 
groups instead of liberals being less morally influenced by groups as the locus of moral 
values? Finally, how do these distinctions impact upon social perception and the intergroup 
context? 
 There also is an issue related to individualizing and binding foundations and an 
ingroup-outgroup distinction that may be obscured by the current framing of the moral 
foundations questions (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2008; Graham et al., 2012; Kidwell et al., 
2013). In its current form, it is possible that some people will answer the questions on the 
widely used Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ: Graham et al., 2008; Graham et al., 
2011) by thinking about “society” or a generic “someone” in terms of their default or most 
important groups (e.g., their ingroups) while other people may think of other types of 
groups. Because the target group is somewhat vague and an intergroup comparison is 
implied within the moral foundations questionnaire1, the groups that come to mind may be 




2.1.2. Ideology and Intergroup Thinking  
Work in other areas has also highlighted the importance of processing distinctions in 
political ideology that should impact on social perception and intergroup processes; Hibbing, 
Smith & Alford (2014) suggest that conservatives are more vigilant to negativity, while 
others emphasize them as being more vigilant to threat cues (Lilienfeld & Latzman, 2014). 
Thus, in an intergroup context, they may show ingroup over outgroup emphasis because of a 
wish to minimize risk to their ingroups. Other researchers have also noted the need for more 
appreciation of the impact of the group-level influence in moral foundations theory (Janoff-
Bulman & Carnes, 2013; Graham, 2013). However, while researchers have expressed a need 
for investigating group-level influence, there has been little empirical evidence in moral 
foundations research, with just one foundation focusing on ingroup loyalty and 
conservatives endorsing it more (Graham et al., 2011; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013; Smith, 
Aquino, Koleva, & Graham, 2014). We therefore argue that making the group distinction 
explicit within the moral foundations questionnaire items in terms of ingroups and 
outgroups will reduce this ambiguity and provide a clearer picture of the impact of group-
level processing on moral reasoning and political ideology. 
2.1.3. Ingroups, Outgroups, and Moral Foundations 
While the group level may have remained difficult to detect in previous research, 
there are reasons to suspect that the intergroup distinction is important to both political 
cognition and moral foundations theory. Existing evidence suggests that liberals will be less 
invested and conservatives will be more invested in moral foundations when framed about 
the ingroup because of conservatives wanting to avoid risks and threat, and to protect group 




promotion oriented (Jost, Stern, Rule & Sterling, 2017). For example, distinguishing between 
groups may be influenced by approach versus avoidance tendencies, which may differ by 
ideology; research that primed approach motivations (i.e. promotion focus) led people to 
identify themselves as more liberal, while priming avoidance motives led people to identify 
as more conservative (Cornwell & Higgins, 2013), and avoidance motivation interacted with 
ideology so that conservatives showed greater cognitive rigidity when participants were 
primed (Rock & Janoff-Bulman, 2010). More evidence of this promotion difference is 
observed in research showing that conservatives use more caution-based, avoidance 
techniques when investigating novel stimuli (Shook & Fazio, 2009); in doing so, they were 
less prone to risk. Research also shows that liberals, while showing less conscientiousness, 
also show higher levels of openness to experience than conservatives (Carney, Jost, Gosling, 
& Potter, 2008; Thórisdóttir, Jost, Liviatan, & Shrout, 2007; Sibley, Osborne, & Duckitt, 2012); 
Finally, liberal’s resistance to inequality and their acceptance of change are key differences 
that could also contribute to them being more willing to account for outgroups in their moral 
judgments, especially ones that revolve around harm and fairness judgments because they 
may be less willing to accept inequality (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Federico, 
Hunt, & Ergun, 2009; Jost, 2006; 2009; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). Overall, 
tendencies to be approach-motivated, to be open to experience, and to be less accepting of 
inequality may lead liberals to be less invested in moral foundations than conservatives 
when framed about ingroups compared to outgroups. This will be observed in a lower 
Ingroup Preference Score (e.g., Ingroup Authority Score = Ingroup Authority – Outgroup 
Authority rating) in which higher scores indicate more investment in the foundation when 




Our research will be the first to test the influence of ingroups and outgroups on 
moral foundations by framing the moral foundations questionnaire (MFQ) in terms of both 
ingroups and outgroups to examine the relationship between political ideology and moral 
foundations. We believe the research associating liberalism with more openness, more 
approach orientation, and more acceptance of change and more resistance to inequality 
suggests that liberals would be comfortable with including outgroups in their moral values 
which has not yet been detected in empirical work within moral foundation theory. This 
distinction has implications for MFT, in which liberals are argued to not include groups as the 
locus of moral judgments and are proposed to be mainly concerned with the rights of 
individuals. We predicted that liberals and conservatives would be equally invested in harm 
reduction and fairness when framed about the ingroup, but that liberals would more 
invested and conservatives less invested when framed about the outgroup because 
conservatives are more protective and risk avoidant, and liberals are more open to 
experience, promotion oriented, and risk accepting. We would also predict that liberals 
would be less invested, and conservatives more invested, in ingroup binding foundations of 
loyalty, authority, and purity when framed about the ingroup because conservatives are 
more invested in avoiding risk and threats to the ingroup, which are more closely linked to 
loyalty, authority, and purity. We did not predict a difference between liberals and 
conservatives on outgroup binding foundations because we did not expect either group to 
care if people from other groups showed loyalty, and respect for authority and purity for 






2.1.4. Intergroup Bias and Threat 
In terms of the binding foundations of loyalty, authority, and purity, the role of risk 
and threat processes should be highly relevant to understanding the relationship of 
intergroup concerns and political ideology (Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009). For example, threat-
related motivation and goals of maintaining group and societal order have been 
demonstrated among those with more politically conservative ideologies (Duckitt, 2001; 
Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Federico et al., 2009; Hibbing et al., 2014; Jost, 2006; 2009; Jost et al., 
2003); these prevention-oriented motivations often appear to focus on social order, which 
may help with social coordination and protecting one’s groups from harm (Janoff-Bulman & 
Carnes, 2013). Researchers have demonstrated that a variety of threats, from threats to 
one’s self or one’s group, and threats to their country’s systems cause participants to show 
more self-reported conservatism and issue-based conservatism (Thórisdóttir & Jost, 2011) 
and that threat management needs (e.g., death anxiety, system threat, and perceptions of a 
dangerous world) are correlated with more conservatism, but not more political extremism 
(Jost et al., 2007). Those who endorsed more conservative positions on a variety of social 
issues also have shown more sensitivity to threatening visual images (Oxley et al., 2008). 
Finally, those with more conservative ideologies often endorse attitudes that minimize 
contamination threats (Terrizzi, Shook, & McDaniel, 2013) and show negative views toward 
unfamiliar groups or outgroups because there might be a threat of contamination (Inbar, 
Pizarro & Bloom, 2009; Jost & Amodio, 2012; Navarrete & Fessler, 2006).  
Minimization of threats may explain the high level of investment in binding 
foundations for conservatives because it could reflect protection of group boundaries, 




authority, purity of ingroups (Jost et al., 2003). Following from this, if liberals are less vigilant 
to threat, they may be more vulnerable to risk, but also less invested in moral foundations 
framed about the ingroup. The role of threat and its relation to moral foundations and 
intergroup processes will be explored further in Studies 2 and 3.  
In study 1, we will examine the framing of each foundation from the Moral 
Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011; Graham et al., 2008) in relation to the 
influence on an ingroup or on an outgroup and the extent to which it relates to the way 
liberals and conservatives think about their moral values (Studies 1, 2, & 3), and Studies 2 
and 3 will examine the relationship to threat and intergroup bias and whether different 
emphasis on including ingroups and outgroups in moral judgments mediate the relationships 
between political ideology and threat or bias; we use “bias” to mean response tendency 
instead of error. Finally in Study 4 we compare the standard version of the MFQ to the 
Outgroup version of the MFQ to examine whether people are conceiving of the standard 
MFQ in terms of their ingroups. Investigating the use of ingroups and outgroups when 
making moral judgments can be helpful in understanding differences in reactions to 
immigrants and other outgroups, and how to frame discussions that will likely continue 
given the need for immigration to offset low birth rates in UK, the US and the world; these 
debates currently show a deep partisan divide in many countries and are important to a 








2.2. Study 1 
2.2.1. Predictions 
 Study 1 is the first to measure moral foundations in terms of the group level, and 
here we make two predictions. First, we hypothesize that liberals would be less invested and 
conservatives would be more invested in all five Ingroup Preference Scores (i.e., Ingroup 
Preference Score = Ingroup Foundation – Outgroup Foundation). This prediction follows 
from the idea that the binding foundations reflect concerns related to maintaining group and 
social order, and avoiding threats, which is emphasized more strongly for conservatives 
(Haidt, 2012; van Leeuwen & Park, 2009); the loyalty, authority, and purity concerns relating 
to the ingroup should be particularly appealing.  Based upon the reviewed evidence 
demonstrating that liberals have more approach motivation, openness to experience, more 
acceptance of change, and less acceptance of inequality, we predict liberals would be less 
invested in moral foundations when framed about ingroups compared to outgroups. We 
further predict that when considering the linear relationships between political ideology and 
group framed moral foundations a more specific pattern will be detected. We first predict 
that there will be no difference in investment for the Ingroup individualizing foundations 
(Ingroup Harm and Ingroup Fairness) as a function of political ideology. For the Outgroup-
focused Individualizing foundations, we predict that liberals will show significantly higher 
moral investment than conservatives in Outgroup Individualizing foundations (Outgroup 
Harm and Outgroup Fairness). For the Binding foundations, we predict that political 
conservatism will be related to increased investment in Ingroup Focused Binding 
foundations (Ingroup Loyalty, Ingroup Authority and Ingroup Purity). For the Outgroup 





2.3.1. Participants and Design 
One hundred and sixty-two participants were recruited from the University of 
Birmingham in exchange for course credits or equivalent payment; this sample size was 
determined by an a priori power analysis to investigate a small to medium effect (f2 = .055) 
with two predictors and 155 participants in the final sample anticipating some loss of data 
from response acquiescence. Any participant demonstrating acquiescence on the moral 
foundations questionnaires (MFQ) was excluded from analyses as recommended by Graham 
and colleagues (Graham et al., 2009; Graham, Nosek, & Haidt, 2012; Haidt, 2007). These 
items check for inattention and an example of this is answering that it is more than slightly 
relevant that someone is good at math “when you decide something is right or wrong.” Our 
final sample therefore consisted of 153 participants with an age range of 18 to 35 years (M = 
20.07, SD = 2.67, 78.4% Caucasian2. The study used a correlation design in which participants 
completed both the ingroup and the outgroup versions of the MFQ, and political orientation 
was a measured, continuous predictor. To control for the effects of order, we 
counterbalanced the presentation of the ingroup MFQ and outgroup MFQ measures.   
2.3.2. Materials and Procedure 
Group Framed Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). Participants were informed 
that they would be answering questions about attitudes and beliefs about themselves, 
morality, and society. They were then randomly assigned to receive either the ingroup MFQ 
first or the outgroup MFQ first order. Participants read a brief description explaining the 
meaning of either ingroups or outgroups. Within the ingroup version, they were told that: 




this study, an INGROUP is any group or groups of which you DO class yourself as being a 
member, or belonging to, and that you identify with.” They then completed a moral 
foundations questionnaire in which the referent or target group was the ingroup; See 
Appendix A. In the outgroup version, participants read an identical description with the only 
difference being that they were asked to think about the “OUTGROUP,” with outgroups 
defined as “any group or groups of which you DO NOT class yourself as being a member, or 
belonging to, and that you do not identify with.” These definitions were based upon research 
on ingroup and outgroup differentiation (Brewer & Brown, 1998). For data analysis in all 
studies, the computer program coded the relevance subscales of the MFQ as 1 = Not at all 
relevant, and 6 = Extremely relevant, and the judgment subscales were coded 1 = Strongly 
disagree, and 6 = Strongly agree. A reliability analysis was performed on all subscales for 
both the ingroup- and outgroup-MFQ versions. For the outgroup version, the reliability for 
each foundation was α = .68 for Harm, α = .72 for Fairness, α = .67 for Loyalty, α = .65 for 
Authority, and α = .73 for Purity. For the ingroup-framed MFQ, reliability for each foundation 
was α = .60 for Harm, α = .52 for Fairness, α = .72 for Loyalty, α =.67 for Authority, and α = 
.80 for Purity. Further details regarding subscale reliability of the ingroup and outgroup MFQ 
as compared to previous research can be found in Appendix L 
Filler Task. After completing the first MFQ, participants were asked to complete a 
short task of cognitive processing; this task was a filler task that separated the two MFQ 
versions participants received. The filler task lasted for 40 trials with each trial asking 
participants to select a target number as fast as possible among 9 competing distractor 




completed the version of the MFQ that they had not yet completed (e.g., those who had first 
received the ingroup version now received the outgroup MFQ).  
Demographic Items and Political Ideology. Once both versions of the MFQ had been 
completed, a series of measures, unrelated to the current study, were completed3, and were 
followed by questions about general demographics. Self-rated, political ideology (Jost, 2006) 
was included among the demographic questions on age, gender, race, national identity, 
intergroup ideology, left-right political ideology, English as a second language, and years 
lived in the UK. The political ideology item (see Appendix C) was adapted from Jost and 
colleagues (2006; 2007) and consisted of a single item, single response, nine point, vertical 
scale format where participants were asked to: “Please rate your, personal political 
orientation” ranging from, at the top, 1 “Extremely Conservative” to 9 “Extremely Liberal”, 
with a midpoint of 5 “Centre/Moderate” here participants selected the single response 
option that described their ideology best. This item has been used in previous moral 
foundations research in the US and UK (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009) 
and is often included at the end of the study (Carney et al., 2008; Krosch, Berntsen, Amodio, 
Jost, & Van Bavel, 2013). This method of measuring political ideology was also used so as to 
be standardized and consistent with the general MFT literature, as well as the more general 
political ideology literature within psychology which has assessed political ideology using the 
single item, single response format (Jost, 2006). This method of measurement therefore has 
good prior evidence in relation to the ideological relationship to the different moral 
foundations (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, Graham, & Joseph. 2009) as well as behaviors of 




completed informed consent prior to the study and were fully debriefed upon study 
completion. 
2.4. Results 
For each moral foundation, a linear regression was conducted with Political Ideology 
as a continuous predictor and Ingroup Preference Score as the outcome (e.g., Ingroup Harm 
Preference = ingroup harm – outgroup harm). Higher Ingroup Preference Scores indicated 
more investment in the moral foundation when it was framed about the ingroup. A negative 
regression coefficient between Political Ideology and the Preference Score would indicate 
that conservatives showed more endorsement and liberals less endorsement of the moral 
foundation when it was framed about the ingroup as opposed to an outgroup. In these 
analyses, Political Ideology was significantly and negatively correlated with each Preference 
Score (see Table 2.1)4. Bias corrected and accelerated (BCa) bootstrapping of these 
regression analyses (5000 samples with 95% CI) supported these results. Moreover, both the 
Individualizing and Binding Ingroup Preference Scores were also significant; individualizing 
and binding scores were the average of the respective items (e.g., average of harm and 












Standardized regression coefficients (β) for regression equations with Framed moral 
foundation ingroup-preference scores predicted by Political Ideology. 
 
 
Note. Higher scores on ideology reflected increased liberalism (vs. conservatism). Higher 
Ingroup Preference Scores indicated more investment in the moral foundation when it was 
framed about the ingroup. A negative regression coefficient between Political Ideology and 
the Preference Score indicated that conservatives showed more endorsement of the moral 
foundation when it was framed about the ingroup as opposed to the outgroup. 
 
 An alternative method of analyzing the data entails conducting a series of linear 
regressions for the five ingroup-framed foundations and the five outgroup-framed 
foundations and the Ingroup and Outgroup Individualizing and Binding Indexes to examine 
the relationship to Political Ideology (see Table 2.2). Using this analysis, it was found that 
political ideology did not relate to Ingroup Individualizing Foundations, but did significantly 
relate to Ingroup Binding foundations suggesting that conservatives were significantly more 
invested in the Ingroup Binding foundations than liberals. For the Outgroup Individualizing 
                                    Political Ideology  
          Linear Regressions Bootstrapping (BCa) 
 β p-value R2 b 
 
95% CI for b 
Harm Preference Score  -.18 = .029 .03 -.06 [-.126, .002] 
      
Fairness Preference Score  -.36 < .001 .13 -.14 [-.201, -.075] 
      
Loyalty Preference Score -.36 < .001 .13 -.15 [-.215, -.086] 
      
Authority Preference Score -.37 < .001 .14 -.14 [-.204, -.087] 
      
Purity Preference Score -.33 < .001 .11 -.15 [-.229, -.077] 
      
Individualizing Preference Score -.31 < .001 .10 -.10 [-.155, -.042] 
      




Foundations, Political ideology positively predicted investment in these foundations 
suggesting liberals were more invested in Outgroup Individualizing foundations than 
conservatives, whereas Outgroup Binding Foundations were negatively related to Political 
Liberalism. Overall this suggests that liberals are more likely to be invested in Outgroup 
Individualizing Foundations than conservatives and vice versa for the Ingroup Binding 
Foundations supporting our Study hypotheses.  
 
TABLE 2.2  
 
Fourteen linear regressions with Political Ideology entered as predictor and Ingroup and 
Outgroup moral foundations acting as the outcome variables. Variables were rescored so 
that they matched the 0 to 5 coding for the Moral Foundations Questionnaire. 
 
 
                                  Political Ideology  
    Linear Regressions Bootstrapping 
(BCa) 
 β p-value R2 b 
 
95% CI for b 
i-Harm   -.04 = .609 .00   -.02 [-.094, .049]  
      
i-Fairness   .07 = .406 .01   .03 [-.034, .086]  
      
i-Loyalty -.47 < .001 .22 -.25 [-.324, -.185] 
      
i-Authority -.41 < .001 .17 -.22 [-.293, -.143] 
      
i-Purity -.49 < .001 .24 -.32 [-.416, -.224] 
i-Individualizing   .01 = .870 .00   .01 [-.056, .060]  
      
i-Binding -.52 < .001 .27 -.26 [-.331, -.196] 
      
o-Harm    .09 = .263 .01   .04 [-.040, .118] 
      
o-Fairness   .34 < .001 .11   .17 [.088, .243] 
      
o-Loyalty -.20 = .014 .04 -.10 [-.179, -.030]  
      
o-Authority -.14 = .077 .02 -.07 [-.156, .011]  
      
o-Purity -.31 < .001 .10 -.17 [-.249, -.087] 
o-Individualizing   .24 = .003 .06   .10 [.031, .174] 
      





This study demonstrated that framing moral foundations to be about either an 
ingroup or an outgroup altered the investment in the foundations by liberals and 
conservatives (Haidt, 2012; Graham et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2011). The findings are the 
first to show that investment changes based upon the type of group considered in the moral 
foundations questionnaire, and that when Ingroup Preference Scores were considered, 
liberals showed less ingroup preference than conservatives for all five foundations of Harm, 
Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, and Purity. 
Overall, these results indicate liberals and conservatives are both influenced by 
groups and both use groups as the basis of moral judgments, rather than conservatives 
being more likely to use groups as the locus of moral judgment. As predicted, there was no 
difference between liberals and conservatives for Ingroup Individualizing foundations, but 
conservatives were more invested and liberals less invested in Ingroup Binding foundations. 
Also as predicted, liberals were more invested, and conservatives less invested, in Outgroup 
Individualizing foundations, but unexpectedly liberals were less invested and conservatives 
more invested in Outgroup Binding foundations. In Study 2, we sought to replicate these 
effects using a more representative, online sample, and also sought to rule out whether 
liberals and conservatives thought about more or less positive groups when they considered 
ingroups and outgroups. To accomplish this goal, we listed specific groups within the ingroup 







2.6. Study 2 
2.6.1. Introduction 
Study 1 demonstrated the advantages of considering the group level to gain a better 
understanding of the relationship between political ideology and morality. The observed 
differences of liberals and conservatives in the use of ingroups and outgroups in moral 
judgments could also relate to and could alter social cognition and perception within an 
intergroup context. For example, these differences can be used to help explain political 
differences in perceived threat from outgroups and intergroup bias. It will also be important 
to test whether these findings were due to liberals and conservatives thinking of very 
different groups when answering the moral questions. Therefore, in Study 2, we will use a 
version of the framed MFQ that specifies British people as the ingroup and Pakistani 
immigrants as the outgroup within the MFQ items. Using this framing will bolster the 
confidence that the results of Study 1 using abstract ingroups and outgroups also relate to 
specific and real ingroups and outgroups. In addition, Study 2 will use a sample of 
participants from the general community to broaden the representativeness of the results.  
In the current research we selected a Pakistani immigrant group as the outgroup in 
the MFQ as we were interested in attitudes towards immigration and Pakistani immigrants 
represent one of the immigrant groups that has seen a recent rise in the UK population from 
the 1991 to the 2011 measurement period of the UK Census (see Jivraj, 2012; Office of 
National Statistics, 2011). Pakistani immigrants are also estimated to be one of the highest 
populations of foreign born immigrants to the UK (representing the third highest; see Rienzo 
& Vargas-Silva, 2017). We could have selected a number of other immigrant groups based on 




seemed understudied within the current psychological literature on immigration attitudes. It 
is important to study social attitudes towards understudied immigrant groups and to 
improve the psychological understanding of attitudes towards immigration therefore in the 
current study a Pakistani immigrant group was selected as the outgroup within the 
measures. 
Based upon the Study 1 findings, more investment in fairness and in reducing harm 
when outgroups are considered may be associated with reduced bias against different 
groups, and may explain liberal’s propensity to have more positive views of outgroups in 
general, and especially in regard to ethnicity, religion, and immigration, though there are a 
number of exceptions (Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014). In general, 
research has shown that liberals show less acceptance of inequality (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & 
Sibley, 2009; Federico et al., 2009; Jost, 2009; Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2017), have more 
positive attitudes towards gays and lesbians (Cunningham, Nezlek, & Banaji, 2004; Whitley & 
Lee, 2000; Webster, Burns, Pickering, & Saucier, 2014), Muslim Americans (Nisbet & 
Shanahan, 2004) or Arabs (Webster et al., 2014), demonstrate less outgroup hostility 
(Kugler, Jost, & Noorbaloochi, 2014), and more positive feelings toward non-normative 
groups (Luguri, Napier, & Dovidio, 2012; van Prooijen, Krouwel, Boiten, & Eendebak, 2015). 
Thus, an aim of Study 2 was to test the relationship between political orientation and 
attitudes toward immigrants and to test whether investment in outgroup individualizing 
foundations of Harm and Fairness mediated this effect.  Whether the ingroup binding 
foundations would also be related to intergroup bias and mediate the effect is much less 
clear because there is sparse evidence on the relationships of moral foundations and 




outgroup attitudes has found that investment in Loyalty, Authority, and Purity was 
associated with stronger outgroup hostility (Kugler et al., 2014). However, one issue with 
this conclusion was that the outcome measure used was heterogeneous and included some 
extreme outgroups and comparisons (e.g., illegal immigrants as opposed to immigrants; 
Muslims compared to Christian); thus, the measure may reflect hostility toward extreme 
outgroups as opposed to immigrants or outgroups in general. We sought to test whether 
investment in ingroup binding foundations when framed about the British ingroup would 
mediate the effect of political orientation to attitudes toward immigrants. 
A second extension of our findings from Study 1 relates to explaining the differences 
in intergroup threat responses to ethnic groups and immigrants. Previous research has 
shown that conservatives generally demonstrate more vigilance for threatening stimuli 
(Dodd et al., 2012; Hibbing et al., 2014; Jost & Amodio, 2012; Oxley et al., 2008), more threat 
from unfamiliar groups (Inbar et al., 2009; Navarrete & Fessler, 2006), and that needs for 
threat management were associated with conservatism, but not with political extremism in 
general in terms of locating oneself at the extreme ends of the political ideology scale (Jost 
et al., 2003; Jost & Napier, 2011; Jost et al., 2007). Given these findings, we were interested 
in examining whether ingroup binding foundations would predict perceptions of threat from 
immigrants, and whether investment in ingroup binding foundations would mediate the 
relationship with political ideology, potentially as a function of group boundary maintenance 
concerns. Finally, it is worth considering whether the patterns for abstract ingroups and 
outgroups that were demonstrated in Study 1 would replicate when the moral foundations 




about Pakistani immigrants for the outgroup version; testing this effect will help to 
demonstrate the generality and robustness of the findings. 
2.6.2. Predictions 
In Study 2, we hypothesized a replication of the main pattern of associations for the 
Ingroup Preference scores for all five foundations and political ideology that we had 
observed in Study 1. Thus, political ideology would negatively predict higher Ingroup 
Preference Scores (e.g., Ingroup Authority Preference Score = Ingroup Authority – Outgroup 
Authority); conservatives would show more investment and liberals less investment in all 
five foundations when they are framed about the British ingroup as opposed to the 
outgroup. We anticipated also replicating the patterns for the separate ingroup and 
outgroup moral foundations. 
Regarding bias, we predicted that a more liberal ideology would be associated with 
lower levels of bias toward immigrants, and that this relationship would be significantly 
mediated by more investment in Outgroup-Individualizing foundations; given the scant 
research on the binding foundations and intergroup bias, we did not expect the binding 
foundations to significantly mediate the relationship to bias. The explicit awareness of 
preferring loyalty to the ingroup and respect for the ingroup’s authority may lead people to 
be less likely to demonstrate bias on an explicit measure. However, given the dearth of 
research in this area, this was an empirical question that needed to be tested. In regard to 
threat, we predicted that a liberal orientation would be associated with less perceived threat 
from immigrants, and that this would be mediated by relatively lower investment in British 
Ingroup-Binding foundations and by more investment in Pakistani-Immigrant Outgroup-




political ideology and cognitive perspective taking ability, as opposed to motivation, so we 
did not expect a significant relationship here (Evans, 2000; Falk, Spunt, & Liberman, 2012; 
Jost et al., 2003). 
2.7. Method 
2.7.1. Participants and Design   
Participants were recruited from the United Kingdom using the Prolific Academic 
online recruitment platform in exchange for monetary compensation; based upon screening 
criteria for the moral foundations questionnaire and upon other online studies we have 
conducted using the questionnaire, we recruited three hundred and fifty-one participants in 
order to obtain a final sample close to 300 participants and to observe .8 to .85 power for a 
small to medium effect, f2 = .03 (Woods, Velasco, Levitan, Wan, & Spencer, 2015). Prolific 
Academic is a tool used to recruit participants in online settings and it is meant to provide a 
larger and more varied sample of participants than MTurk, which has been demonstrated to 
be an effective means of collecting data of comparable quality to laboratory data, if it is not 
sampled too frequently (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 
2013; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). In total, 351 participants completed the dependent 
variables for the study with 37 participants being excluded due to acquiescence on the MFQ, 
using the same criteria as in Study 1. Next, 4 participants of Pakistani ethnicity were 
removed as well as 3 participants who had not been born in the UK. The study therefore 
used a final sample of 307 participants, all of whom currently lived in the U.K., and who had 
an age range of 18 to 80 years (M = 35.94, SD = 12.10); 51.8% were Liberal and 24.4% were 





2.7.2. Materials and Procedure 
Group Framed Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). The first part of the study 
used the same design and procedure as Study 1 in which participants completed both the 
ingroup and outgroup versions of the moral foundations questionnaire with order 
counterbalanced. However, in Study 2, the two versions of the MFQ were now framed so 
that the ingroups and outgroups that were referenced were specific groups in the U.K. For 
the ingroup-framed version of the MFQ, participants read about moral foundations 
questions framed about British people. For the outgroup-framed version, the questions were 
framed about Pakistani Immigrants as the target group (See Appendix D). Reliability for 
subscales of the MFQ were found to be acceptable and comparable across versions for Harm 
(Ingroup Harm α = .71, Outgroup Harm α = .72), Fairness (Ingroup Fairness α = .73, Outgroup 
Fairness α = .71), Loyalty (Ingroup Loyalty α = .78, Outgroup Loyalty α = .65), Authority 
(Ingroup Authority α = .74, Outgroup Authority α = .62), and Purity (Ingroup Purity α = .83, 
Outgroup Purity α = .80). 
Filler Task. The two versions of the MFQ (ingroup and outgroup) were again 
separated with the same filler task from Study 1 to act as a delay. After participants had 
completed this filler task they next received measures of attitude bias, negative attitude 
bias, and then perspective taking and perception of threat from immigrants with the latter 
two measures being counterbalanced; bias was not counterbalanced to reduce socially 
desirable responding.  
Explicit Bias. The measure of attitude bias toward immigrants was adapted from 
Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009; See Appendix E. Participants rated their feelings 




Trusting, and Disgust) with a nine-point scale with endpoints from one dimension to the 
opposite dimension (e.g., “extremely cold” to “extremely warm”). After reverse scoring two 
items, the scale was averaged across items to create an overall index of bias with higher 
scores indicating higher levels of explicit bias towards immigrants (α = .94).   
Negative Bias. A second measure of negative bias was used to determine negative 
attitudes towards Pakistani immigrants and was adapted from Stephan et al., 2002; See 
Appendix F. The scale included 5 items assessing levels of disapproval, resentment, dislike, 
disdain, and hatred; these items were completed on a ten-point scale with endpoints 
changing to reflect the construct being measured and scored from 0 “no _____ at all” (e.g., 
no dislike at all) to 9 “Extreme” (e.g., Extreme dislike). These items were coded by the 
computer from 1 to 10 and had high reliability (α = .96). Next participants were randomly 
assigned to complete either the Perspective Taking scale first and then the Threat scale, or 
the Threat scale first and then the Perspective Taking scale.  
Perspective Taking. The seven item Perspective Taking subscale of the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index assessed participants’ ability to perceive the world from the perspectives of 
others (Davis, 1983). Items were presented in a random order and all items were rated on a 
five-point scale with endpoints of “A” Does not describe me well to “E” Describes me very 
well (coded from 1 to 5). The scale was averaged to form an overall Perspective Taking score 
(α = .83). 
Threat Perceptions. Finally, participants completed a measure of threat perceptions 
toward Pakistani immigrants in the U.K., which was adapted from Stephan, Ybarra, & 
Bachman, 1999; See Appendix G. This scale contained 15 items measuring attitudes towards 




beliefs and values; 7 items) from immigrant groups. All items were completed on a seven-
point scale ranging from 1 “Disagree Strongly” to 7 “Agree Strongly” with “Neither Agree nor 
Disagree” as the neutral midpoint and were presented in random order. After reverse 
scoring several items, the average represented an index of threat perceptions toward 
immigrants. Reliability for the scale was high (α = .94). Because the subscales share a 
common theme of threats to the ingroup (Stephen et al., 1999), we used the overall index of 
threat as has been done in previous research (Tip et al., 2012; Verkuyten, 2009); the 
correlation between symbolic and realistic threat was high (r = .78, p < .001).  
Demographics and Political Ideology. Finally, participants completed demographic 
measures that included age and gender. This section also included the same measure of 
political ideology used in Study 1.  
2.8. Results 
 
Following the analytical approach from Study 1, linear regressions were performed 
on Political Ideology as a continuous predictor and the Ingroup Preference Score as the 
outcome for each foundation (e.g., Ingroup Preference Score = British Ingroup Harm – 
Pakistani Outgroup Harm). A negative regression coefficient between Political Ideology and 
the Preference score would indicate that conservatives showed more endorsement and 
liberals less endorsement of the moral foundation when it was framed about the ingroup as 
opposed to the outgroup. Political Ideology was significantly and negatively correlated with 
each Ingroup Preference Score, with the exception of the (p = .057) Fairness effect (see 
Table 2.3). Again, bias corrected and accelerated (BCa) bootstrapping analyses (5000 
samples with 95% CI) supported these regression results. Both the combined Individualizing 





Standardized regression coefficients (β) for regression equations with Framed moral 
foundation ingroup-preference scores predicted by Political Ideology. 
 
 
Note. Higher scores on ideology reflected increased liberalism (vs. conservatism). Higher 
Ingroup Preference Scores indicated more investment in the moral foundation when it was 
framed about the ingroup. A negative regression coefficient between Political Ideology and 
the Preference Score indicated that conservatives showed more endorsement of the moral 
foundation when it was framed about the ingroup as opposed to the outgroup. 
 
 
Examination of the regression slopes (see Table 2.4) showed that Ingroup-
Individualizing foundation index (Harm reduction and Fairness) was, as expected, not 
significantly correlated with Political Ideology. As predicted, the Ingroup-Binding foundation 
index was significantly and negatively correlated with Political Ideology, suggesting that 
conservatives were more invested and liberals less invested with binding foundations when 
framed about the ingroup. Also as predicted, the Outgroup-Individualizing foundations were 
significantly correlated with Political Ideology such that liberals were more invested and 
                                  Political Ideology  
    Linear Regressions Bootstrapping (BCa) 
 β p-value R2 b 
 
95% CI for b 
Harm Preference Score  -.23 < .001 .05 -.10 [-.152, -.048] 
      
Fairness Preference Score  -.11 = .057 .01 -.06 [-.121, .004] 
      
Loyalty Preference Score -.41 < .001 .17 -.20 [-.250, -.141] 
      
Authority Preference Score -.37 < .001 .14 -.17 [-.228, -.116] 
      
Purity Preference Score -.22 < .001 .05 -.11 [-.164, -.049] 
      
Individualizing Preference Score -.24 < .001 .06 -.10 [-.156, -.051] 
      




conservatives less invested in Harm and Fairness when framed toward the Pakistani-
immigrant outgroup. In a replication of the excepted relationship from Study 1, we observed 
that the Outgroup Binding index was significantly and negatively correlated with Political 
Ideology, though this was a very small effect. 
 
TABLE. 2.4  
Fourteen linear regressions with Political Ideology entered as predictor and Ingroup and 
Outgroup moral foundations acting as the outcome variables. Variables were rescored so 





                                  Political Ideology  
    Linear Regressions Bootstrapping (BCa) 
 β p-value R2 b 
 
95% CI for b 
i-Harm    .03 = .607 .00   .02 [-.042, .073] 
      
i-Fairness   .12 = .042 .01   .06 [.002, .112] 
      
i-Loyalty -.41 < .001 .17 -.22 [-.274, -.159] 
      
i-Authority -.42 < .001 .17 -.22 [-.279, -.163] 
      
i-Purity -.35 < .001 .12 -.20 [-.260, -.138] 
.      
i-Individualizing   .08 = .175 .01   .04 [-.019, .090] 
      
i-Binding -.44 < .001 .19 -.21 [-.265, -.160] 
o-Harm    .22 < .001 .05   .12 [.053, .177] 
      
o-Fairness   .31 < .001 .10   .17 [.107, .225] 
      
o-Loyalty -.05 = .395 .00 -.02 [-.068, .025] 
      
o-Authority -.10 = .070 .01 -.05 [-.103, .003] 
      
o-Purity -.17 = .003 .03 -.09 [-.159, -.027] 
      
o-Individualizing   .29 < .001 .08   .14 [.085, .195] 
      




We next conducted three linear regressions with bootstrapping to 5000 samples to 
test the hypotheses that increased liberalism would be related to less Bias, less Negative 
Bias, less Perceived Threat from immigrants, and that Political Ideology would not be related 
to differences in Cognitive Perspective Taking; we again use bias to mean response tendency 
instead of error. Once again higher scores on Political Ideology indicated a more liberal 
ideology. As predicted, we observed that increasing liberalism was significantly related to 
less Explicit Bias, R2 = .15, ϐ = -.39, t = -7.36, p < .001, with bootstrapped b = .31, 95% CI [-.40, 
-.22], p < .001, as well as significantly less Negative Bias, R2 = .14, ϐ = -.37, t = -6.95, p <.001, 
with bootstrapped b = -.39, 95% CI [-.51, -.28], p < .001, and significantly less Perceived 
Threat, R2 = .28, ϐ = -.53, t = -10.91, p < .001, with bootstrapped b = -.36, 95% CI [-.43, -.29], 
p < .001. Unexpectedly, Political Ideology was significantly related to Cognitive Perspective 
Taking ability. R2 = .06, ϐ = .25, t = 4.44, p < .001, with bootstrapped b = .10, 95% CI [.05, .14], 
p < .001.   
 We next used an Outgroup-Individualizing Index of Harm and Fairness, and an 
Ingroup-Binding Index of Ingroup-Loyalty, -Authority, and -Purity, and then tested the 
mediational hypotheses using PROCESS mediation for SPSS using Bias Corrected Bootstrap 
analyses with 5,000 samples as suggested by Hayes, 2013. We observed a significant indirect 
effect of Ingroup Binding in which more investment was related to more Explicit Bias 
Completely Standardized Indirect Effect (CSIE) = -.11, and as expected, a significant indirect 
effect of Outgroup Individualizing foundations in which more investment was related to less 
Explicit Bias, CSIE = -.06 (see Figure 2.1). We observed a similar pattern of indirect effects for 
the measure of Negative Bias, CSIE = -.19 and -.10 respectively for binding and individualizing 




indirect effect of Ingroup Binding in which more investment in the Binding foundations was 
related to more Threat, CSIE = -.16. We also observed the expected significant indirect effect 
of Outgroup Individualizing in which more investment was related to less Threat, CSIE = -.10 
(see Figure 2.3).  
 All significant mediational effects become larger when an Individualizing-Binding 
Difference Score was used in the mediations (computed by subtracting Ingroup Binding 
scores from Outgroup Individualizing so that higher scores indicate a stronger preference for 
investment in Outgroup Individualizing foundations). The Individualizing-Binding Difference 
indirect effect was significant for Explicit Bias, b = -.18, CI [-.25, -.12], CSIE = -.23, Negative 
Bias, b = .29, CI [-.41, -.21], CSIE = -.28, and for Threat, b = -.17, CI [-.23, -.12], CSIE = -.26. 
Finally, we conducted a series of models with Ingroup Individualizing and Ingroup Binding 
foundations in the models and observed non-significant effects for the Ingroup 
Individualizing index (see Appendix L). 
FIGURE 2.1
Figure 2.1. Multiple mediation of the Political Orientation to Explicit Bias relationship by the 











b = -.21, p < .001 
b = -.64, p < .001 
b = .35, p < .001 
Indirect, b = -.09, CI [-.14, -.05] 
Indirect, b = -.08, CI [-.12, -.04] 







Figure 2.2. Multiple mediation of the Political Orientation to the Negative Bias relationship 




Figure 2.3. Multiple mediation of the Political Orientation to Perceived Threat relationship by 
the Outgroup Individualizing index and by the Ingroup Binding index. 
 










b = -.21, p < .001 
b = -.75, p < .001 
b = .94, p < .001 
Indirect, b = -.11, CI [-.17, -.06] 
Indirect, b = -.20, CI [-.28, -.13] 








b = -.21, p < .001 
b = -.47, p < .001 
b = .51, p < .001 
Indirect, b = -.07, CI [-.10, -.04] 
Indirect, b = -.11, CI [-.16, -.07] 





The current study supports the main findings of Study 1 in which ingroup and 
outgroup status influenced investment in the foundations; liberals were less invested and 
conservatives more invested in Ingroup Preference when making moral judgments, with the 
exception of the Ingroup Preference for Fairness score. In addition, more conservatism and 
less liberalism predicted investment in Ingroup Binding foundations, but not in Ingroup 
Individualizing foundations. We also observed that less conservatism and more liberalism 
predicted investment in Outgroup Individualizing foundations, and replicated the small 
effect of more conservatism and less liberalism predicting investment in Outgroup Binding 
foundations. With the exception of the Ingroup Fairness Preference score we observed a 
similar general pattern on the Ingroup Preference Scores for Studies 1 and 2, even though 
Study 1 used abstract ingroups and outgroups, and Study 2 used specified ingroups and 
outgroups; this comparison increases our confidence in the importance of the group-level in 
moral foundations. This study also extended the findings to important aspects of social 
perception such as Bias against immigrants and Perceived Threat from immigrants. 
The observed group effects had important implications for understanding the 
relationship between Threat and Bias, and Political Ideology. For Explicit Bias, Outgroup 
Individualizing foundations mediated the relationship between a more liberal ideology and 
less Explicit Bias and for Negative Bias; this supports past research that had shown that more 
investment in Individualizing foundations was related to less hostility to extreme outgroups 
(Kugler et al., 2014); Ingroup-framed Individualizing foundations, however, did not mediate 
these relationships, which we expected because we thought the difference on individualizing 




mediated the relationships between ideology and Explicit Bias and Negative Bias, suggesting 
that the Ingroup Binding foundations may also be important to consider in future research 
surrounding intergroup perceptions. For Perceived Threat, investment in Outgroup-focused 
Individualizing foundations was related to less Threat and it mediated the positive 
relationship between Threat and Political Ideology. Investment in Ingroup Binding 
foundations also mediated this relationship and was related to more Threat; the Ingroup 
Binding effect supports past research that showed that the Standard-framed Binding 
foundations were related to right wing authoritarianism (Federico, Weber, Ergun, & Hunt, 
2013) and to belief in a dangerous world (van Leeuwen & Park, 2009), both of which have 
threat-based motivations underlying them. Overall, the first two studies provide good 
evidence that liberals and conservatives are influenced differently by ingroups and 
outgroups, and that these differences have important implications for intergroup relations.     
2.10. Study 3 
2.10.1. Introduction and Predictions 
 In Study 3, we wanted to replicate the relationships between group framed-moral 
foundations and political ideology, as well as the linear regressions, and the mediational 
effects of group-focused Ingroup Binding foundations and Pakistani-immigrant Outgroup 
Individualizing foundations on the ideology to bias and threat relationships that were 
observed in Study 2. In particular, we were interested in replicating the significant Outgroup 
Individualizing and Ingroup Binding mediation of Political to Explicit Bias, Negative Bias, and 
Perceived Threat. These effects are particularly interesting in light of Kugler and colleagues’ 
(2014) findings of a negative relationship between Individualizing foundations and outgroup 




further extend the research, we added a measure of implicit bias to test whether we would 
observe a similar relationship with political orientation. 
2.11. Method 
2.11.1. Participants and Design 
Participants were recruited from the Prolific Academic online platform from the U.K 
in exchange for monetary compensation. We recruited participants to obtain a final sample 
close to 300 participants and to observe .8 to .85 power for a small to medium effect, f2 = .03 
(Woods et al., 2015). Study 3 was comprised of two sections where participants were 
compensated monetarily on completion of each section. The first part included all study 
measures apart from the implicit measure. The second section of the study included the 
online, implicit-measure, which had to be developed specifically for an online context, and 
some filler questions; part 2 was completed after participants had waited between three and 
nine weeks upon completing the first section. After filtering out participants who were of 
Pakistani ethnicity (due to attitudes towards this group being measured within the outcome 
variables in the study), keeping those who were born in the UK, and after filtering out those 
who had satisficed on the British-ingroup MFQ and the Pakistani-immigrant outgroup MFQ 
as was done in Study 2 (see Graham et al. 2009), 449 participants were eligible to complete 
section two. Of the 338 participants who began completing section two, a total of 300 
participants completed most of the experimental materials in this section; a response rate of 
88.76%. Due to an error with the website on which the implicit measure was hosted, the 
implicit data did not record for 12 of these participants, which left a final sample of 288 for 
Study 3. For the Implicit Bias findings, 2 participants, who responded with the same key 




sample of 286 for the Implicit Bias analyses. The final sample for Study 3 was 288 
participants with the average age being 38.88 years (SD = 12.63), 66.3% Female, and 90.3% 
being Caucasian, all participants were recruited from the U.K.  
2.11.2. Materials and Procedure 
Group Framed Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). In part one of Study 3, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of two orders in which they first received either 
the Pakistani-immigrant outgroup version of the MFQ or the British-ingroup version of the 
MFQ (see Study 2). Reliability analyses for each subscale of the Ingroup MFQ and Outgroup 
MFQ were as follows: Harm (Ingroup Harm α = .71, Outgroup Harm α = .73), Fairness 
(Ingroup Fairness α = .70, Outgroup Fairness α = .77), Loyalty (Ingroup Loyalty α = .78, 
Outgroup Loyalty α = .71), Authority (Ingroup Authority α = .73, Outgroup Authority α = .64) 
and Purity (Ingroup Purity α = .83, Outgroup Purity α = .84). 
Filler Task. In order to ensure a sufficient delay between the completion of the two 
MFQ versions participants again completed a filler task which was the same number 
selection task used in Studies 1 and 2. Participants next completed measures of Threat and 
Bias, with the order participants completed these measures being counterbalanced with 
participants being assigned to complete either the measure of Threat first followed by Bias 
and Negative Bias, or to the measure of Bias and Negative Bias first followed by the Threat 
measure.  
Explicit Bias. The same measure of Explicit Bias toward immigrants used in Study 2 




Negative Bias. The measure of explicit bias was followed by the same measure of 
Negative Bias as was used in Study 2, this measure also demonstrated good reliability (α = 
.96). 
Threat Perceptions. The measure of Threat Perceptions towards immigrant groups 
used in the current study was the same as in Study 2 and again demonstrated good reliability 
(Stephan et al., 1999; α = .95).  
Demographics Items and Political Ideology. After the outcome measures were 
completed, participants then answered the demographics items including, gender, ethnicity, 
years lived in the U.K and political orientation using the same item from Studies 1 and 2.   
Affective Misattribution Procedure (AMP). Part 2 of the study asked participants to 
complete an online version of the Affective Misattribution Procedure (AMP) as a measure of 
indirect bias toward immigrants (Imhoff & Banse, 2009; Payne, Burkley, & Stokes, 2008; 
Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005; Payne et al., 2010; Payne & Lundberg, 2014). In 
the AMP, participants saw a photograph of an Immigrant face (Pakistani/Indian face), a non-
Immigrant face (White), or a neutral grey square, and the photo was quickly replaced by a 
Korean pictographs of non-word letter strings; the prime faces were matched for 
attractiveness. Similar to previous research with the AMP online (Payne et al., 2010), on 
each of the 72 trials, participants saw a grey dot for 500 ms to denote the beginning of a 
trial, followed by the prime (face or grey square) for 75 ms, then the pictograph for 225 ms. 
A black-and-white pattern mask then appeared until participants responded with either 
pleasant or unpleasant as a response. Participants were instructed to ignore the faces of 
immigrants or non-immigrants and to only judge whether or not they believed the 




unpleasant key. The 72 pictographs were presented once and the 12 immigrant faces, 12 
white faces, and 12 grey squares were presented twice each and randomly paired with 
pictographs throughout the 72 trials.   
Need for Cognition Filler Task. Following the AMP measure 8 filler items from the 
Need for Cognition scale were administered that had been selected because they were not 
significantly related to political ideology, and thus were neutral questions (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1982). After completion of this section of the study, participants were again monetarily 



















2.12. Results  
 In order to test our hypotheses, we first conducted a series of linear regressions 
using political ideology as the predictor and Ingroup Preference Score (i.e., Ingroup Harm – 
Outgroup Harm) as the outcome in which higher scores reflected higher investment in the 
foundation when framed about the ingroup (See Table 2.5)5. It was found that Political 
Ideology negatively correlated with Ingroup Preference Score for Harm, Fairness, Loyalty, 
Authority, and Purity foundations, suggesting that those higher in liberalism had less of an 
ingroup focus when investing in these moral values as compared to conservatives. Once 
again, we observed that both Ingroup-Binding Preference Scores and Ingroup-Individualizing 
Preference Score significantly and negatively predicted Political Orientation. The robustness 













TABLE 2.5  
Standardized regression coefficients (β) for regression equations with Framed moral 
foundation ingroup-preference scores predicted by Political Ideology. 
 
 
Note. Higher scores on ideology reflected increased liberalism (vs. conservatism). Higher 
Ingroup Preference Scores indicated more investment in the moral foundation when it was 
framed about the ingroup. A negative regression coefficient between Political Ideology and 
the Preference Score indicated that conservatives showed more endorsement of the moral 
foundation when it was framed about the ingroup as opposed to the outgroup. 
 
To examine the relationships between Political Ideology and Ingroup and Outgroup 
moral values in more detail, we once again performed fourteen linear regression analyses 
entering Political ideology as a predictor and each of the British-ingroup foundations and 
each of the Pakistani-immigrant outgroup moral foundations as the outcome variables with 
boostrapping (BCa to 5000 samples). We again replicated the negative and significant 
relationship between Political Ideology and Ingroup Binding in which less liberalism or more 
conservatism was related to more investment in Ingroup Binding foundations (see Table 
                                  Political Ideology  
    Linear Regressions Bootstrapping (BCa) 
 β p-value R2 b 
 
95% CI for b 
Harm Preference Score  -.17 = .003 .03 -.07 [-.126, -.019] 
      
Fairness Preference Score  -.22 < .001  .05 -.11 [-.168, -.046] 
      
Loyalty Preference Score -.41 < .001 .17 -.22 [-.280, -.153] 
      
Authority Preference Score -.33 < .001  .11 -.15 [-.203, -.092] 
      
Purity Preference Score -.33 < .001 .11 -.17 [-.231, -.102] 
      
Individualizing Preference Score -.21 < .001 .05 -.09 [-.145, -.035] 
      




2.6). For the Outgroup framing, we also replicated the positive and significant relationship 
between the Outgroup Individualizing index and Political Ideology in which more liberalism 
or less conservatism was related to more Outgroup Individualizing investment.  
 
TABLE 2.6  
 
Fourteen linear regressions with Political Ideology entered as predictor and Ingroup and 
Outgroup moral foundations acting as the outcome variables.  Variables were rescored so 




We next conducted linear regressions with bootstrapping (BCa to 5000 samples) to 
test the hypotheses relating to Bias, Negative Bias, Threat, and Implicit Bias. As predicted, 
we observed that increasing liberalism was significantly related to less Explicit Bias, R2 = .17, 
                                  Political Ideology  
    Linear Regressions Bootstrapping (BCa) 
 β p-value R2 b 
 
95% CI for b 
i-Harm    .14 = .017 .02   .07 [.016, .122]  
      
i-Fairness   .20 = .001 .04   .09 [.036, .136] 
      
i-Loyalty -.34 < .001 .12 -.19 [-.251, -.123]  
      
i-Authority -.39 < .001 .16 -.20 [-.260, -.140] 
      
i-Purity -.34 < .001 .12 -.20 [-.263, -.134] 
      
i-Individualizing   .18 = .002 .03   .08 [.032, .124] 
      
i-Binding -.40 < .001 .16 -.20 [-.251, -.137] 
o-Harm    .28 < .001  .08   .14 [.083, .200] 
      
o-Fairness   .35 < .001 .12   .19 [.131, .252] 
      
o-Loyalty   .06 = .299 .00 .03 [-.030, .084] 
      
o-Authority -.11 = .073 .01 -.05 [-.107, .001] 
      
o-Purity -.05 = .385 .00 -.03 [-.110, .044] 
      
o-Individualizing   .33 <.001 .11   .17 [.112, .221] 
      




ϐ = -.42, t = -7.72, p < .001, with bootstrapped, b = -.34, 95% CI [-.43, -.24], p < .001, and less 
Negative Bias R2 = .19, ϐ = -.44, t = -8.22, p < .001, with bootstrapped b = -.50, 95% CI [-.62, -
.38], p < .001, and was significantly related to less Perceived Threat, R2 = .29, ϐ = -.54, t = -
10.89, p < .001, with bootstrapped b = -.38, 95% CI [-.45, -.31], p < .001. For the AMP implicit 
measure, we removed an additional 2 acquiescent participants who, contrary to instructions, 
had 99% or greater of their responses using the same response key. There were 286 
participants remaining for these analyses. Here we observed that Political Ideology was 
significantly related to Implicit Bias, R2 = .03, ϐ = -.17, t = -2.92, p = .004, with bootstrapped b 
= -.02, 95% CI [-.03, -.01], p = .005.  
We next tested the mediational hypotheses. As expected for Explicit Bias, we 
observed a significant indirect effect of the Outgroup Individualizing foundations, in which 
more investment was related to less Explicit Bias, Completely Standardized Indirect Effect 
(CSIE) = -.13 (see Figure 2.4). The Ingroup Binding indirect effect on Explicit Bias that was 
found in Study 2 was also replicated in Study 3, in which more investment was related to 
more Explicit Bias, CSIE = -.07 (see Figure 2.4). Conducting a further mediation analysis to 
examine Negative Bias, also yielded significant indirect effects of both Outgroup 
Individualizing, and Ingroup Binding foundations, in which more investment in Outgroup 
Individualizing foundations was related to less Negative Bias, CSIE = -.11, and more 
investment in Ingroup Binding foundations was related to more Negative Bias, CSIE = -.13 
(see Figure 2.5). For the Political to Threat relationship, we observed the expected significant 
indirect effect of Ingroup Binding, in which more investment in the Binding foundations was 
related to more Threat, CSIE = -.15, and we further replicated the significant indirect effect 




(see Figure 2.6).  We also conducted a mediation analysis to consider the relationship 
between Political Ideology to Implicit Bias (N = 286); here we observed an indirect effect of 
both Outgroup Individualizing foundations, CSIE = -.04, and Ingroup Binding Foundations on 
levels of Implicit Bias, CSIE = -.08 (see Figure 2.7).  
As in Study 2, the Individualizing-Binding Difference Score indirect effect was 
significant and larger for Explicit Bias, b = -.18, CI [-.25, -.12], CSIE = -.22, Negative Bias, b = 
.26, CI [-.36, -.18], CSIE = -.23, Implicit Bias, b = -.01, CI [-.02, -.01], CSIE = -.12, and for Threat, 
b = -.18, CI [-.23, -.13], CSIE = -.25. Also, as in Study 2, we conducted a series of models with 
Ingroup Individualizing and Ingroup Binding foundations in the models and observed non-
significant effects for the Ingroup Individualizing index (see Appendix L). 
FIGURE 2.4 
 
Figure 2.4. Multiple mediation of the Political Orientation to Explicit Bias relationship by the 















b = -.20, p < .001 
b = -.65, p < .001 
b = .30, p < .001 
Indirect, b = -.11, CI [-.17, -.07] 
Indirect, b = -.06, CI [-.10, -.02] 






Figure 2.5. Multiple mediation of the Political Orientation to Negative Bias relationship by 




Figure 2.6. Multiple mediation of the Political Orientation to Perceived Threat relationship by 












b = -.20, p < .001 
b = -.72, p < .001 
b = .74, p < .001 
Indirect, b = -.12, CI [-.19, -.07] 
Indirect, b = -.15, CI [-.22, -.09] 








b = -.20, p < .001 
b = -.43, p < .001 
b = .55, p < .001 
Indirect, b = -.07, CI [-.11, -.04] 
Indirect, b = -.11, CI [-.15, -.07] 






Figure 2.7. Multiple mediation of the Political Orientation to Implicit Bias relationship by the 




Study 3 replicated the overall general pattern of results observed in Study 2 for both 
the Individualizing and Binding Ingroup Preference Scores, except that in Study 3 the 
preference score for Fairness was now also significant. For the Ingroup-MFQ and Outgroup-
MFQ linear regressions, Outgroup Harm and Fairness were more strongly predicted by a 
liberal political ideology and Ingroup-Loyalty, Ingroup-Authority, and Ingroup-Purity were 
more strongly predicted by a conservative ideology replicating the key findings of Study 2. In 
Study 3 we also did find that the Ingroup-Harm slope was significant and the Outgroup-
Purity slope was non-significant unlike Study 2, though the effect sizes were much smaller 
for these relationships as compared to the other variables in Study 2. In Study 3 we also 
found that the focal relationships between Political Ideology and the Outgroup-








b = -.20, p < .001 
b = -.03, p = .044 
b = .05, p = .002 
Indirect, b = -.01, CI [-.0109, -.0004] 
Indirect, b = -.01, CI [-.0162, -.0036] 




supporting our main hypotheses. We, however, observed that the Ingroup-Individualizing 
slope was now significant and the Outgroup-Binding slope was non-significant; given that 
these effects were small in both studies, it is difficult to make conclusions about them. While 
this was the case for the ingroup-MFQ and outgroup-MFQs separately, the Ingroup 
Preference Scores discussed previously were significant suggesting that there are important 
differences in group focus of moral foundations as a function of political ideology. Together, 
these results support the notion that both liberals and conservatives take into account 
groups when making moral judgments, but that the type of groups used vary by foundations.  
Our findings suggest that there is a difference between liberals and conservatives 
when they consider outgroups. Liberals show more investment than conservatives in 
Individualizing Foundations when they are framed about outgroups in general. In contrast 
conservatives show more investment than liberals in Binding Foundations when they are 
framed about the Ingroup. Study 3 also replicated the finding that these differing influences 
of ingroups and outgroups for liberals and conservatives have a meaningful effect on 
intergroup relations. We replicated the relationship of Political Ideology to Explicit Bias and 
Negative Bias towards immigrants, and to Perceived Threat from immigrants; we also 
replicated the mediational analyses in which the Outgroup Individualizing index significantly 
mediated the effects on Explicit Bias, Negative Bias, and Perceived Threat, and the Ingroup 
Binding index also significantly mediated Political Ideology to Explicit Bias, Negative Bias and 
Perceived Threat. Finally Study 3 found a significant relationship between Political Ideology 
and levels of Implicit Bias which were mediated by both the Ingroup Binding and Outgroup 
Individualizing foundations; these relationships were not as strong as may be seen in the 




implicit measure being administered three to nine weeks later and due to a substantial drop-
out rate (i.e., 338 participants started the study, but only 300 finished the AMP).  
2.14. Study 4 
2.14.1. Introduction and Predictions 
 In Studies 2 and 3, the pattern of findings suggested that the Ingroup Binding and 
Outgroup Individualizing foundations mediated the relationship between Political Ideology 
and Explicit Bias, Negative Bias, and Threat as separate outcome variables, but they did so in 
opposite directions in which more investment in Ingroup Binding foundations was associated 
with more Bias, Negative Bias and Threat, but Outgroup Individualizing was associated with 
less Bias, Negative Bias, and Threat. In Study 4, we examined how the standard version of 
the MFQ (Graham et al., 2008) would compare to the outgroup-framed version of the MFQ 
in predicting intergroup variables.  This study was conducted prior to Studies 2 and 3, but 
since it answers a different question than the first 3 studies, we have decided to include it 
here as Study 4. Using the abstract outgroup-framing as a comparison to the standard (non-
framed) version of the MFQ served to create a test as to whether people are conceiving of 
the MFQ in terms of their ingroup and whether the effects demonstrated in earlier studies 
would hold when using the standard version of the MFQ as compared to an outgroup-
framed version. Detecting differences under these conditions could further suggest that 
people are conceiving of the standard MFQ in terms of their ingroups which would have 
important implications for MFT. In Study 4 we also included a measure of implicit bias to 







2.15.1. Participants and Design 
 A total of two hundred and sixty-eight participants were recruited from the 
University of Birmingham research participation scheme with participants receiving either 
credits or payment for study participation. The sample size was determined based on the 
observation of a small to medium effect effect (f2 = .03 to .05) at .7 to .8 power. After 
following the acquiescence removal procedure (Graham et al., 2009) for the two versions of 
the MFQ (standard and outgroup framed MFQ) the remaining sample consisted of 253 
participants with an average age of 18.92 years (SD = 1.32), 92.5% Female, and 67.6% being 
Caucasian.  
2.15.2. Materials and Procedure 
 
Outgroup Framed and Standard Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). Following 
the procedure of the earlier studies (See studies 1, 2, & 3), Study 4 used two orders of 
experimental materials in which participants were randomly assigned to receive the 
outgroup-framed version of the MFQ first or were randomly assigned to see the standard, 
non-framed, version of the MFQ first (Graham et al., 2008). Reliability analyses for each 
subscale of the MFQ and Outgroup MFQ were as follows: Harm (MFQ Harm, α = .57, 
Outgroup Harm, α = .55), Fairness (MFQ Fairness, α = .58, Outgroup Fairness, α = .64), 
Loyalty (MFQ Loyalty, α = .65, Outgroup Loyalty, α = .57), Authority (MFQ Authority, α = .58, 
Outgroup Authority, α = .46), and Purity (MFQ Purity, α = .72, Outgroup Purity, α = .69). Two 
filler tasks were also included between the versions of the MFQ in order to create a 




Growing Stone and Numerical Filler Task. The first filler task was the Growing stone 
delay task, which has been used in previous research as a means of creating a delay between 
study measures (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon & Breus, 1994). In the task, 
participants read and provided ratings of a literary passage; in our version, all references to 
the character’s race were removed to avoid making salient any group-based categories. 
After reading the paragraph, participants rated the passage from 1 “not at all descriptive” to 
9 “very descriptive” with a labelled midpoint 5 “somewhat descriptive”, and rated “how 
engaging did you find the story” and “how imaginative did you find the story”; This task was 
followed by the same number selection filler task, used in earlier studies (See Studies, 1, 2, & 
3).  
 Explicit Bias. Next, participants completed the measure of explicit bias towards 
immigrants also used in Studies 2 and 3 (Saguy et al., 2009; α = .86). The measure of bias was 
followed by the three following measures that were randomized within participants in 
presentation order.  
Threat Perceptions. We used the same immigrant Threat perceptions measure as 
was used in Studies 2 and 3 (Stephan et al., 1999; α = .89). 
Perspective Taking. We used the same Perspective Taking measure as was used in 
Study 2 (Davis, 1983, α = .72). 
Affective Misattribution Procedure (AMP). The version of the immigrant AMP used 
in Study 4 was similar to the one used in Study 3 except for the following differences: 1) The 
Study 4 AMP employed the use of Chinese rather than Korean pictographs, and 2) did not 
include the 500 ms attention dot used in the online studies, 3) and was administered in a 




conducted within a laboratory rather than online (Payne et al., 2005) and were consistent 
with current recommendations for conducting the AMP (Payne & Lundberg, 2014) 
Demographics and Political Ideology. After administration of the outcome measures, 
participants completed the demographics section of the study where political orientation 
and the demographic items from Studies 1, 2, and 3 were completed. After completing all of 
these main analyses, participants completed some exploratory questions that were not 
analyzed. They completed an exploratory measure of self-construal (Singelis, 1994, not 




















We first conducted a series of linear regressions entering political ideology as the 
predictor and framed Preference score as the outcome variable. In the current study, the 
Preference score was calculated by subtracting the Outgroup-framed foundation from the 
standard foundation; for example, the Harm Preference Score equaled the Standard-Harm 
foundation minus the Outgroup-Harm Score with a higher score indicating higher investment 
in the standard framed foundation. Again, higher scores on the ideology item indicated 
higher political liberalism meaning that a negative correlation between ideology and the 
Preference score suggested that as political liberalism increased there was less investment in 
the standard as compared to the outgroup-framed moral foundation, and also that 
conservatives were invested more in the standard foundation as compared to the outgroup 
foundation. The results of these linear regression analyses suggested that there was a small, 
but significant relationship between Political and the Individualizing Preference Score (see 
Table 2.7); in particular, there was a non-significant relationship for the Harm Preference 
Score. Fairness, however, was significant, though it was a very small effect size. There was 
also a significant relationship between Political Ideology and the Binding Preference Score; in 
particular, both Loyalty and Authority were significant, though they were small to medium 









Standardized regression coefficients (β) for regression equations with Framed moral 
foundation Preference scores (Standard foundation minus the Outgroup-Framed 
foundation) predicted by Political Ideology. 
 
 
We also conducted a series of linear regression analyses entering political ideology as 
the predictor and each individual framed moral foundation as the outcome variable. In the 
first set of linear regressions, it was found that the Standard Individualizing Scores 
significantly predicted Political Ideology (see Table 2.8); more investment in individualizing 
with no specific target group (i.e., Standard Framing) was related to more conservatism and 
less liberalism. Standard Fairness was significant, but Standard Harm was not. In contrast, for 
the Standard Binding Score was significant, but negative as was Standard-Loyalty, -Authority, 
and -Purity as expected from MFT predictions. In contrast, the Outgroup-Individualizing 
Score was positively and significantly related to Political Ideology such that more investment 
in Outgroup-Individualizing was related to less conservatism or more liberalism; both 
                                  Political Ideology  
    Linear Regressions Bootstrapping (BCa) 
 β p-value R2 b 
 
95% CI for b 
Harm Preference Score  -.05 = .436 .00 -.01 [-.05, .02] 
      
Fairness Preference Score  -.15 = .016 .02 -.04 [-.08, -.01] 
      
Loyalty Preference Score -.13 = .037 .02 -.04 [-.09, .002] 
      
Authority Preference Score -.23 < .001 .05 -.07 [-.11, -.03] 
      
Purity Preference Score -.10 = .097 .01 -.04 [-.08, .007] 
      
Individualizing Preference Score -.13 = .047 .02 -.03 [-.06, .000] 
      




Outgroup-Harm and Outgroup-Fairness were significant. The Outgroup Binding Score was 
also significant, but it had a negative relationship such that more investment in Binding 
foundations was related to more conservatism; Outgroup-Loyalty, -Authority, and -Purity 
were all significant. 
TABLE 2.8  
A series of fourteen linear regression analyses using Political Ideology as the predictor and 
the Standard- and Outgroup-framed moral foundations as the outcome Variables. Variables 




 Following the methods used in the previous studies a series of bootstrapped linear 
regressions were then conducted using Political Ideology as a predictor. In accordance with 
                                  Political Ideology  
    Linear Regressions Bootstrapping (BCa) 
 β p-value R2 b 
 
95% CI for b 
Standard-Harm    .09 = .145 .01  .03 [-.011, .075]  
      
Standard-Fairness   .18 = .005 .03  .06 [.019, .095] 
      
Standard-Loyalty -.34 < .001 .11 -.14 [-.188, -.089] 
      
Standard-Authority -.46. < .001 .21 -.17 [-.217, -.131]  
      
Standard-Purity -.32 < .001 .11 -.16 [-.213, -.102]  
      
Standard-Individualizing   .15 = .016 .02  .05 [.008, .082]  
      
Standard-Binding -.44 < .001 .19 -.16 [-.196, -.117]  
o-Harm    .13 = .036 .02  .05 [.002, .087]  
      
o-Fairness   .27 < .001 .07  .10 [.051, .145]  
      
o-Loyalty -.23 < .001 .06 -.09 [-.142, -.043]  
      
o-Authority -.28 < .001 .08 -.10 [-.148, -.059]  
      
o-Purity -.26 < .001 .07 -.12 [-.177, -.065]  
      
o-Individualizing   .23 < .001 .05  .07 [.032, .111] 
      




our predictions, we observed that those with a more politically liberal orientation 
demonstrated less Explicit Bias, R2 = .10, ϐ = -.32, t = -5.30, p < .001, with bootstrapped b = -
.21, 95% CI [-.30, -.13], p < .001, and also demonstrated significantly less perceived Threat 
Perceptions, R2 = .26, ϐ = -.51, t = -9.38, p < .001, with bootstrapped b = -.27, 95% CI [-.34, -
.21], p < .001. In regard to Implicit Bias, participants who demonstrated acquiescence as 
indicated via use of the same key response on more than 99% of trials were removed; after 
this removal, the final sample for this analysis consisted of 247 participants for the implicit 
measure analysis. In accordance with our predictions, it was found that less conservatism or 
higher levels of liberalism was related to lower Implicit Bias scores, R2 = .05, ϐ = -.23, t = -
3.71, p < .001, with bootstrapped b = -.04, 95% CI [-.05, -.02], p < .001. In accordance with 
our initial predictions, but in contrast to Study 2, Political Ideology was not significantly 
related to Cognitive Perspective Taking ability, R2 < .01, ϐ = .09, t = 1.35, p = .18, with 
bootstrapped b = .03, 95% CI [-.01, .07], p = .157. 
 After considering the relationship between political orientation and the outcomes of 
interest we next considered mediational hypotheses. When examining the influence of 
Political Ideology on Explicit Bias, we found that the Outgroup Individualizing Foundations 
significantly mediated this relationship, CSIE = -.05, while the Standard Binding Foundations 
did not act as a significant mediator, CSIE = -.02 (See Figure 2.8). For the Political Ideology to 
Threat analysis, both Outgroup Individualizing, CSIE = -.06, and Standard Binding 
Foundations, CSIE = -.08, significantly mediated the relationship to Threat as was the case in 
Studies 2 and 3 (See Figure 2.9). Finally, we observed that the relationship between Political 
Ideology and Implicit Bias was significantly mediated by the different sets of foundations; 




Foundations mediated the relationship to Implicit Bias, CSIE = -.04 (See Figure 2.10). Further 
analysis confirmed that the indirect effect for Outgroup-Individualizing minus Binding Score 
was significant and larger for Explicit Bias, b = -.07, CI [-.13, -.03] , CSIE = -.11, for Implicit 
Bias, b = -.02, CI [-.03, -.01], CSIE = -.13, and for Threat, b = -.08, CI [-.13, -.05], CSIE = -.16.  
FIGURE 2.8 
 
Figure 2.8. Multiple mediation of the Political Ideology to Explicit Bias relationship by the 





Figure 2.9. Multiple mediation of the Political Ideology to Perceived Threat relationship by 










b = -16, p < .001 
b = -.49, p < .001 
b = .15, p = .215 
Indirect, b = -.04, CI [-.07, -.01] 
Indirect, b = -.02, CI [-.07, .02] 








b = -16, p < .001 
b = -.46, p < .001 
b = .27, p = .002 
Indirect, b = -.03, CI [-.06, -.01] 
Indirect, b = -.04, CI [-.08, -.02] 






Figure 2.10. Multiple mediation of the Political Ideology to Implicit Bias relationship by the 
Outgroup Individualizing index and by the Standard Binding index. 
 
2.17. Discussion 
Study 4 demonstrated a similar overall pattern to the first three studies, but there 
were a few differences; this was not entirely unexpected given the unclear nature of the 
standard moral foundations questionnaire with respect to groups. Using the Standard-
Foundations minus the Outgroup-Foundations for the Preference score analysis, we once 
again observed  a significant, negative relationship between Political Ideology and the 
Individualizing and the Binding Preferences Score; the relationships were, however, much 
weaker, potentially due to the lack of clarity on the standard MFQ (i.e., Standard minus 
Outgroup). We again observed significant differences on Fairness as observed in Studies 1 
and 3, and for Loyalty and Authority foundations as observed in Studies 1, 2, and 3; we did 
not find significant relationships for the Purity or the Harm Preference scores; this result 









b = -16, p < .001 
b = -.10, p = .002 
b = .08, p = .008 
Indirect, b = -.01, CI [-.014, -.002] 
Indirect, b = -.01, CI [-.023, -.004] 




In Study 4, differences by ideology were also detected when considering the 
Outgroup- to the Standard-, rather than the Ingroup-MFQ highlighting the importance of 
considering the group level in MFQ research. In accordance with Studies 1, 2, and 3, 
Standard Binding foundations significantly negatively correlated with Political Ideology, while 
the Outgroup Individualizing foundations significantly positively correlated with Political 
ideology. Interestingly, Standard Loyalty, Authority, and Purity all were significantly related 
to ideology, which was most similar to Study 1 in which the ingroup and outgroup framing 
were to abstract groups and which was similar to Study 4 for the framing to abstract 
outgroups and to a mostly undefined MFQ. Finally, less conservatism or more liberalism 
significantly predicted less explicit and less implicit bias, and less threat. 
Considering the mediation analyses, it was found that Outgroup Individualizing and 
Standard Binding foundations mediated Threat perceptions as in Study 2 and 3 which 
examined Ingroup Binding foundations. Yet, only Outgroup Individualizing foundations 
mediated Bias in Study 4 in contrast to Studies 2 and 3 in which Ingroup Framed Binding 
foundations did mediate Bias. For Implicit Bias, it was found that both the Outgroup 
Individualizing foundations and the Standard Binding foundations mediated this relationship 
in Study 4, similar to Study 3, which used the Ingroup Binding foundations instead of mostly 
undefined labels; these results suggest the potential role of moral foundations in 
understanding implicit forms of biases. Overall, Study 4 used the Standard MFQ and found 
generally similar patterns as would be found using the ingroup framed foundations in 
Studies 1, 2, and 3. This suggests that people may be more likely to perceive the moral 
foundations questionnaire in terms of their ingroups, and this has especially important 




2.18. General Discussion 
Our research was the first to demonstrate that liberals were significantly more and 
conservatives significantly less invested in harm and fairness when it was framed towards 
outgroups. The pattern held when moral foundations were framed about abstract outgroups 
(Studies 1 and 4, with the exception of outgroup harm in Study 1) and when moral 
foundations were framed about specific groups (a British-ingroup and Pakistani-immigrant 
outgroup) within the U.K. (Studies 2 and 3). Even when the target group was specified in 
Studies 2 and 3, linear regressions for outgroup harm and outgroup fairness were still 
significant as a function of ideology; this was further supported by the preference scores 
(i.e., ingroup minus outgroup scores); The harm preference score was significant in Studies 
1, 2, and 3 and fairness preference score was significant in Studies 1, 3, and 4 while the 
individualizing preference score (i.e., average of harm and fairness) was significant across all 
studies (Studies 1, 2, 3 and 4). Together these findings suggest that liberals are generally 
more invested in harm and fairness values when framed about outgroups than are 
conservatives, and this helps to explain differences in intergroup attitudes as a function of 
moral and political ideology. A further Study (Study 4) found that the Standard MFQ 
(Graham et al., 2008) behaved much like the Ingroup MFQ and found similar patterns using 
the outgroup MFQ to those detected in Studies 1, 2, and 3. The Ingroup-framed 
Individualizing foundation to Ideology relationships were, however, much smaller and much 
less consistent; they were non-significant in Studies 1 and 2 (R2 = .00 and .01), and 
significant, but small (R2 = .03 and .04) in Studies 3 and 4; Thus, across these four studies, 




Our research was also the first to demonstrate that conservatives were significantly 
more and liberals significantly less invested in loyalty, authority, and purity when they were 
framed about the ingroup on the MFQ; this conclusion is supported by the consistently 
significant linear regressions for Ingroup-Authority, Ingroup-Loyalty and Ingroup-Purity 
(Studies 1, 2 & 3) and Standard-Loyalty, -Authority, and -Purity in Study 4. In addition, we 
observed consistently significant Ingroup preference relationships across Loyalty, Authority, 
and Purity foundations scores in Studies 1, 2, and 3 and for the Preference Score in Study 4, 
with the exception of a non-significant Purity preference score finding in Study 4. Moreover, 
the averaged binding preference score was significant across all studies (Studies 1, 2 3 and 
4). Thus, even if liberals often think about individuals when making harm and fairness 
judgments, we demonstrated that group status (i.e., ingroup-outgroup) will be taken into 
account as a locus of moral judgment, and that liberals and conservatives differ on using 
ingroups and outgroups depending upon the foundations considered and that these 
differences have important consequences for intergroup contexts and cultural divides. 
There was also an interesting pattern of data for the Outgroup-Binding foundations 
in which more investment in Outgroup-Binding was related to less liberalism and more 
conservatism in Studies 1, 2, and 4. The largest relationships were observed in Studies 1 and 
4 (R2 = .06 and .09) using Abstract groups and smaller ones in Studies 2 and 3 (R2 = .02 and 
.00) using Specific groups. So, we can tentatively hypothesize that there may be a weaker 
investment for liberals and a stronger investment for conservatives in Binding foundations 
when framed about outgroups. It is possible that this effect may reflect liberals wanting 




respect for authority of their (own) group. Future research will need to confirm this pattern 
of results. 
Given that we were testing multiple linear regression relationships throughout the 
research studies reported here this may increase the risk of familywise error. As an 
additional control for familywise error we also calculated a Bonferroni correction for the 
linear regression results in each study. In order to do this we divided the desired p value 
threshold by number of analyses for the 7 preference score regression slopes, the 7 ingroup 
framed regression analyses and the 7 outgroup framed regression analyses for each study. 
Using the p < .05 significance threshold and dividing by the 7 analyses in each case left a new 
Bonferroni significance threshold of p < .007. Using this new threshold which conservatively 
controls for familywise error from multiple analyses and applying this significance threshold 
to the findings of each study produces a recalculated estimate of significance.  
Applying the Bonferroni correction (p < .007) to the Study 1 results demonstrated 
that the Ingroup-Harm Preference score was no longer significant (p = .029) and the 
Outgroup-Loyalty regression slope was no longer significant (p = .014) all other significant 
findings from the sets of linear regressions (preference score analyses, ingroup framed 
foundation regressions and outgroup framed foundation regressions) remained significant in 
Study 1 including those regarding the focal hypotheses of the ingroup binding and outgroup 
individualizing foundations. Using the Bonferroni threshold (p < .007) on the Study 2 findings 
did not change the significance of any of the existing significant results in the preference 
score results. For the ingroup framed linear regressions, Ingroup-Fairness becomes non-
significant (p = .042) using the Bonferroni threshold. For the outgroup linear regressions the 




of these findings relate to the focal hypotheses of the study regarding outgroup 
individualizing and ingroup binding foundations though more caution may be needed when 
interpreting these Ingroup-Fairness and Outgroup-Binding slopes for this study. Using the 
Bonferroni threshold in Study 3 (p < .007) for the preference scores all significant results 
remained significant. For the ingroup linear regressions, Ingroup-Harm becomes non-
significant (p = .017) and for the outgroup linear regressions all significant results remained 
significant. 
Finally using the Bonferroni threshold (p < .007) on Study 4 only the Authority and 
Binding Preference scores remained significant as the Fairness (p = .016), Loyalty (p = .037) 
and Individualizing (p = .047) Preference scores became non-significant. While this study 
shows less differentiation than our preference scores in our earlier studies detecting any 
differences on the standard (rather than ingroup MFQ) as compared to outgroup MFQ is 
noteworthy given there was no ingroup framing in this study. In addition the Bonferroni 
correction represents a highly conservative statistical correction. For the standard MFQ in 
Study 4 applying the Bonferroni correction meant that the standard MFQ Individualising 
regression slope became non-significant (p = .016) with all other significant findings 
remaining significant. For the outgroup foundations only Outgroup-Harm became non-
significant (p = .036). Crucially the Standard Loyalty, -Authority and -Purity as well as 
Standard-Binding foundations slope all remained significant with the Bonferroni correction 
as well as the Outgroup-Fairness and Outgroup-Individualizing slopes. 
In the current studies, a more liberal political ideology was related to less bias (Study 
2, 3 and 4), negative bias (Study 2, 3), implicit bias toward immigrants (Study 3 and 4) and 




that negative bias (Study 2 and 3), explicit bias (Study 2, 3, and 4) and implicit bias (Study 3 
and 4) as well as perceived threat (Study 2, 3, and 4) were mediated by more investment in 
outgroup individualizing foundations. In contrast, ingroup binding foundations mediated bias 
(Study 2 and 3), perceived threat (Study 2 and 3), negative bias (Study 2 and 3) and implicit 
bias (Study 3); however, the Standard Binding foundations did not mediate explicit bias in 
Study 4, but they did mediate threat and implicit bias in this study. Overall, these findings 
have important implications for interventions designed to reduce intergroup tensions and 
enhance social cohesion by identifying which foundations are important and the type of 
framing of those foundations that may reduce bias. 
In our research, we demonstrated that the types of groups that come to mind matter 
when making moral judgments; liberals appeared to be more influenced by outgroups as a 
focus of their moral judgment within harm reduction and fairness domains, while 
conservatives were more influenced by ingroups within loyalty, authority, and purity 
domains. The observed differences for harm and fairness are in line with other research 
showing that liberals show more promotion focus when searching novel stimuli (Shook & 
Fazio, 2009), show higher levels of openness to experience (Carney et al., 2008; Thórisdóttir 
et al., 2007; Sibley et al., 2012), and that they show less acceptance of inequality and more 
acceptance of change (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Federico et al., 2009; Jost, 2009; 
Jost, 2017; Jost et al., 2003). The observed differences for loyalty, authority, and purity are 
also in accordance with other research showing that conservatives may attend to and may 
be more vigilant for threat or danger cues that may impact on loyalty, authority, or purity 
concerns relating to ingroup boundaries (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Jost et al., 2003; Jost & 




observed that more perceived threat from immigrants (i.e., combination of perceived 
symbolic threat and realistic threat) was associated with a more conservative ideology. This 
perception of threat may reflect wanting to protect group boundaries, customs, and 
traditions, and wanting to minimize exposing one’s group to risk. In democratic and open 
societies, risk minimization will need to be balanced with acceptance of risk. This is 
especially true in societies with birth rates below population replacement that will continue 
to rely upon immigration to maintain population growth, which is often intimately tied to 
economic growth. Thus, examining the influence of threat on these processes will continue 
to be an important line of research. 
In considering the consequences of these tendencies, we demonstrated that liberals 
showed less bias, less negative bias, and less implicit bias toward immigrants in general. 
Moreover, liberals’ increased investment in harm reduction and in fairness, when related to 
outgroups, should be associated with more willingness to include others in their harm and 
fairness judgments and should be associated with less bias toward outgroups, in general. 
While there may be some exceptions that show that both groups can show bias on general 
cognitive processing, such as biased assimilation of information (Conway et al., 2016; Brandt 
et al., 2014), it remains that liberals tend to show less bias to a larger range of outgroups as 
demonstrated by the current studies and the overall research evidence in the field (review 
Jost, 2017; Jost et al., 2003; Chambers & Schlenker, 2013; for meta-analysis, see Jost, 
Sterling, & Stern, 2017). Importantly, in Studies 2 and 3, we were the first to demonstrate 
that the relationship to explicit bias was mediated by investment in outgroup individualizing 
foundations of harm and fairness; Moreover, outgroup individualizing foundations mediated 




mediated the relationship to implicit bias in Studies 3 and 4. Thus, willingness to include 
outgroups in moral judgments of harm and fairness is important for reducing implicit bias as 
well as negatively charged bias and explicit biases.  
The binding foundations, however, did not mediate explicit bias in Study 4, which 
used the Standard Binding foundations while the Ingroup-framed Binding foundations did 
mediate explicit bias in Studies 2 and 3. In Study 4, we may not have replicated Kugler et al.’s 
(2014) findings of a positive relationship between the Standard MFQ binding foundations 
and outgroup hostility because we used a measure of explicit bias towards immigrants as 
opposed to the more extreme outgroups used in their measure of outgroup hostility (i.e., 
illegal immigrants, and Muslims versus Christians). Yet, we have found that the Ingroup 
Binding foundations did mediate explicit bias in Studies 2 and 3 suggesting that, overall, 
there is evidence that binding-focused foundations relate to bias, at least when people are 
focused on thinking about an ingroup in relation to the binding foundations. Given the lack 
of clarity in regard to the target groups of moral judgments on the Standard MFQ, it may 
take more extreme outgroups to observe the relationship between binding foundations and 
bias. More research will need to examine further the relationship between the binding moral 
foundations and measures of explicit bias and whether it is easier to detect stronger biases 
such as negative attitudes than more general attitudes when using the binding foundations. 
This is an interesting area for future research related to the binding foundations that will 
need to be considered. 
The differences in relying on ingroups and outgroups when thinking about morality 
can be helpful in understanding differences in reactions to immigrants and other outgroups, 




for immigrants; this may be particularly true for people who view prototypical members of 
their society as very homogenous. Our research can help inform how to frame discussions on 
this topic, and other topics related to ethnicity and intergroup relations, and a number of 
other issues dividing liberals and conservatives. For explicit bias, negative bias, and implicit 
bias, highlighting the UK’s history of the inclusion of others within society could help to 
reduce these biases. However, this may work well with only roughly half the population 
(moderates to liberal) who respond more positively to thinking about outgroups (i.e., 
outgroup-individualizing); so other ways of discussing these issues will also need to be 
sought to improve public dialogue. Given that investment in ingroup-binding was associated 
with more conservatism and less liberalism and that it was associated with higher levels of 
explicit bias and implicit bias, it would be a good candidate for framing research. Moreover, 
given that perceived threat was strongly linked to political ideology and to the binding 
foundations within our studies and that binding mediated the political to threat relationship, 
reducing threat related to binding foundations may be one of the most important focuses 
for future research and future dialogues.  
When discussing these intergroup topics, we should be cognizant to strike a balance 
between threat acceptance and threat minimization to begin to bridge some of the partisan 
divides. Our research highlights the notion that differences in threat perceptions may relate 
to different levels of comfort in risk acceptance and risk minimization between liberals and 
conservatives, and that neither one of these preferences is necessarily better than the other, 
though there are important consequences in a world that is becoming more socially and 
culturally diverse; Such a focus could provide a common avenue for discussing partisan 




risk minimization. One such approach is reducing threats to binding motivations and 
reducing symbolic and realistic threats. To offset perceived realistic threats, the positive 
economic impacts of immigrants and immigration could be discussed at the outset, while 
also acknowledging that undue risks could be minimized. To offset symbolic threat, 
discussions can be focused upon the ideas that efforts would be taken to ensure law and 
order, and to help immigrants learn the country-specific systems in order to contribute to 
the country’s prosperity. For liberals, either the inclusion of others framing or the threat 
reduction framing should help to reduce bias because liberals can also show increased bias 
when threats are explicitly highlighted (Van de Vyver, Houston, Abrams, & Vasiljevic, 2016). 
Of course, within open and democratic societies, we would need to balance the risk of 
including others with the minimization of too much risk. This will continue to be a challenge 
as immigration will likely continue and ethnic, cultural, and linguistic diversity will likely 
increase. In these contexts, finding ways to have constructive dialogue, and not ones driven 
by threat and fear, will be important to moving the debates forward, and should provide 
avenues for tackling other intergroup issues as well as other general topics that divide 
liberals and conservatives and lead to political polarization. 
Conclusions 
Our research adds to recent research showing differences between liberals and 
conservatives as being influenced by social context (Morgan, Skitka, & Wisneski, 2014; 
Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013), and importantly, our research highlights the importance of 
using ingroups and outgroups differently when making moral judgments and the impact that 
it may have on intergroup bias and intergroup situations. Such threat and bias towards 




matter if they have lived in the country for 4 years or 40 years; this can become a problem in 
a world that is becoming increasingly diverse. Based upon group and moral judgments, we 
have identified avenues to pursue that may improve intergroup dialogues on these issues. 
Future work will need to investigate this idea more thoroughly to ask how and when our 
moral decisions tend to be tied to our group loyalties, and what influence that has for 







                                                          
1 Only four of the six Loyalty items in the MFQ refer to the group, which allows for significant 
interpretation of the target group in each question (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2008; retrieved 
after July 2008). 
 
2 The pattern of results for the regression analyses was similar for the 153-participant 
sample and the full 162 participant sample, and all significant results remained significant. 
 
3 As part of a separate exploratory study, participants completed the Behavioral Activation 
Scale (BAS), Model of Moral Motives (MMM), Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP), Belief 
in a Dangerous World scale (BDW), and some questions about contact with a minority group. 
 
4 As an exploratory variable, we included a second question about political orientation. This 
item was exploratory because it has not been used in moral foundations research and it was 
asked immediately after the main political question, but its scale anchor points (1 = Left, and 
9 = Right) were opposite to those of the main question. Thus, the results using this variable 
are tentative. For the difference score analyses, all results remained the same. For the 
individual regressions, the pattern of results remained the same for the ingroup-framed 
foundations. For the outgroup-framed foundations, the pattern of results remained the 





                                                                                                                                                                                     
5 The alternative left right measure of political ideology used in Study 1 as a validation check 
(see endnote 4) was employed again in Study 3 and replicated the general patterns found 
when using the liberal conservative ideology measure. Using the alternative left-right 
measure of ideology, the linear regression analysis for the Political to Ingroup-Harm 
relationship was non-significant and the Political to Outgroup-Authority slope was 
significant. The other relationships and Preference score analyses replicated the general 










CHAPTER 3: MORAL VALUES, POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND THREAT-BASED 
COGNITION: IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERGROUP RELATIONS. 
 
3.0. Abstract 
Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) has provided an account of the moral values which 
underscore different cultural and political ideologies, these moral values of Harm, Fairness, 
Loyalty, Authority, and Purity can help to explain differences in political and cultural 
ideologies; however, the extent to which moral foundations relate to intergroup based 
processes is still being developed. To explore this relationship, we present two studies. In 
Study 5 (N = 90) we show the moral foundations are important in understanding a number 
of intergroup relations focused variables including threat, bias, collective action, perspective 
taking and collective narcissism. In Study 6 we extend these findings to the understanding of 
strong group-focused political ideologies such as Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and 
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). Study 6 (N = 157) demonstrated a negative relationship 
between the individualizing moral foundations (average of harm and fairness) and bias as 
mediated by SDO and a positive relationship between the binding moral foundations 
(average of loyalty, authority, and purity) and bias as mediated by RWA. Further analyses 
also suggested the importance of threat as an underlying explanatory variable. These studies 
have a number of important implications for using MFT to understand intergroup relations 
and political ideologies. 
 
Keywords: Moral Foundations Theory, Political Ideology, Threat, Intergroup Relations, 




Moral Values, Political Ideology, and Threat-Based Cognition: Implications for Intergroup 
Relations. 
3.1. Introduction  
Moral Foundations theory (MFT) has presented a compelling way to understand 
differences in political opinions and cultural attitudes by demonstrating that political 
ideologies may be underscored by differences in moral values where each side believes that 
they are right and employs different moral values to justify their attitudes, opinions, and 
beliefs (Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009). Moral 
Foundations Theory (MFT) suggests that humans have evolved five core moral values that 
underlie our beliefs and attitudes and are expressed differentially both within and between 
cultures. These five moral values have further been used to explain differences observed 
between different political ideologies (Haidt, 2007; Graham et al., 2009; Haidt 2012). In 
exploring moral cognition,  MFT has identified moral values concerned with Harm (as 
reflected as reduced harm toward humans and animals) and Fairness (as reflected in 
equality toward others), which were collectively termed the “individualizing” moral 
foundations because they are said to relate to concerns based on the moral rights of 
individual members of society (Haidt, 2012). Three additional moral values have been 
identified as Authority, Loyalty, and Purity and are associated with deference to authority 
figures (such as elders), loyalty to one’s ingroups (such as family and country), and an 
increased tendency to endorse concepts of purity and sanctity (Haidt, 2012). These moral 
values have collectively been termed “binding” foundations because they are argued to be 
orientated around binding communities and groups together (Haidt, 2012). The 




important implications for a number of diverse political and cultural ideologies (Haidt 2012). 
Crucially, the role of moral values for understanding intergroup relations is unclear and the 
relationship to strong socio-political ideologies is still under development. This paper aims to 
show how individualizing and binding moral foundations have different relationships to 
intergroup variables of threat and intergroup biases and further aims to develop our 
understanding of the relationship to strong socio-political ideological belief systems.   
A number of studies have suggested that moral foundations may help to explain 
forms of political ideology associated with strong ideological views concerning intergroup 
relations. These extreme or strong ideologies include Altemeyer’s (1988; 1996) Right Wing 
Authoritarianism (RWA) and Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle’s  (1994) Social Dominance 
Orientation (SDO); these ideologies are theoretically and empirically distinct and have a 
number of important implications for intergroup relations (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; 2010). 
RWA comprises three main components based upon preference for heightened conformity 
to norms, submission to authority figures, and endorsement of aggression against outgroups 
that deviate from subscribed norms (Altemeyer, 1996). In contrast, Social Dominance 
Orientation (SDO) reflects preference for hierarchy and status-based societal relations, even 
if this has a negative impact on other groups or individuals with “lower” status. Individuals 
high in SDO also endorse beliefs that people act in a competitive ways (Duckitt and Sibley, 
2009; 2010). Overall, research has demonstrated that RWA and SDO represent distinct 
constructs (Duckitt and Sibley, 2009; 2010). Both of these ideologies also have important 
implications for intergroup relations because RWA and SDO predict distinct types of 
prejudice and have been related to negative outgroup attitudes across a large body of 




3.1.1. Moral Foundations and Intergroup Attitudes 
The relationship between moral foundations, intergroup relations and beliefs is not 
understood well, and the influence of strong ideologies like RWA and SDO is only partially 
known. Early work has suggested that the individualizing foundations of harm and fairness 
negatively relate to SDO (Federico, Weber, Ergun, & Hunt, 2013; Kugler, Jost, & 
Noorbaloochi, 2014), which may reflect an anti-egalitarian stance of those high in SDO 
(Federico et al., 2013; Pratto et al. 1994). In contrast, RWA has been found to positively 
relate to the binding foundations of loyalty, authority, and purity, which may reflect the high 
emphasis on conformity to societal norms and traditions within authoritarian ideologies (see 
Federico et al., 2013; Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012; Kugler et al., 2014). This 
research has deepened our understanding of moral values in the formation of these strong 
ideological beliefs, but, with the exception of a single study, the relationship between moral 
foundations and general intergroup relations is unknown (Kugler et al., 2014), and the 
influence of RWA and SDO on this relationship is untested even though it may have 
important implications for social and political psychology and social interventions. 
Given that Individualizing and Binding foundations relate to SDO and RWA 
respectively, and that SDO and RWA often relate to negative attitudes toward outgroups, 
moral foundations may be related to negative intergroup attitudes in some situations. Kugler 
et al. (2014) observed that the binding foundations of Loyalty, Authority, and Purity 
positively correlated with hostility toward outgroups.  While increased hostility was 
observered, the generality of this effect is still uncertain because the measure included a 
number of outgroup comparisons that could be considered extreme for Americans (e.g., 




confirm this relationship. In other research, Smith, Aquino, Koleva, and Graham (2014) found 
that strong support for the binding foundations related to more support for strongly 
negative treatment toward outgroups (e.g., torture, willingness to share water resources), 
but only if participant’s moral identity was low. As Kugler and colleagues (2014) have noted, 
moral foundations may not always have positive social effects even though they are 
purported to be about binding groups together. Given these issues and the dearth of 
evidence linking binding foundations with negative intergroup attitudes, it is necessary to 
conduct further research to elucidate the relationship between moral foundations and 
outgroup attitudes more generally.  
3.1.2. Threat Processing In Intergroup Relations and Political Ideology 
In considering the implications of moral foundations for intergroup relations, there is 
a further rationale to also consider threat perceptions as an explanatory variable. In early 
models of intergroup relations and social conflict, objective and subjective threats to 
resources, to the ingroup’s existence and to economic and material well-being, have all 
played a crucial role in creating intergroup conflict (Levine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1966). 
In addition, symbolic threats to morals, values, beliefs, and attitudes of one’s ingroup have 
been added to these models and have been linked to intergroup attitudes and prejudice 
(Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Stephan & Stephan, 1996). More 
recent research has demonstrated a strong association between perceived symbolic and 
perceived realistic threat and prejudice (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006; Stephan, Ybarra & 
Bachman, 1999). While threat has been examined for intergroup relations, it also has 
important implications for the study of moral foundations and more extreme ideologies, 




Moreover, research has also further highlighted how psychophysiological indices of threat-
based processes more generally can predict ingroup-focused social policy support (Oxley et 
al, 2008).  
Threat may play an important role in developing the psychological understanding of 
differences in social ideologies. For example Belief in a dangerous world (Altemeyer, 1988) 
has been found to underlie strong social ideologies such as RWA (Duckitt 2006; Duckitt & 
Sibley, 2009; 2010), and RWA has been found to predict viewing outgroups as threatening 
(Duckitt, 2006); thus binding foundations may be viewed as being related to threats, given 
that binding foundations are related to RWA (Federico et al., 2013; Kugler et al., 2014) and 
the relative preference of individualizing over binding foundations is negatively related to 
belief in a dangerous world (Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009). As a result of these findings, we 
propose that binding foundations will be related to increased perceived threat toward 
outgroups. We therefore suggest that this heightened threat processing could translate to 
increased vigilance toward outgroup targets among those high in the binding foundations, 
while those more invested in individualizing foundations may show lower levels of outgroup 
vigilance and thus less perceived threat toward outgroups.  
3.1.3. Moral Foundations and Intergroup Relations: The Present Research 
In the current research, we aim to consider the impact of moral foundations on 
psychological variables that may impede positive intergroup relations. Bias against 
immigrants and perceived threat toward immigrants have not been considered in the 
previous moral foundations literature, and in Study 5, we investigated how the moral 
foundations related to intergroup bias and perceived threat toward immigrants, and a few 




(2014) regarding outgroup hostility, we hypothesized that Harm and Fairness foundations 
would negatively predict both intergroup bias and perceived threat and that the binding 
foundations of Loyalty, Authority, and Purity would be positively related to perceived threat 
(Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009). In regard to bias, it is much less clear if investment in binding 
foundations would also translate into bias toward immigrants, given the lack of research 
examining this phenomena and moral foundations.  
One variable of further interest was collective action, which is often examined in 
intergroup relations (Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009), but which has not yet been 
considered in the context of the moral foundations. We believe that willingness to support 
collective action would be more readily predicted by individualizing foundations because of 
previous research showing a connection between individualizing foundations and less 
prejudice (Kugler et al., 2014) and that researchers have identified a strong social justice 
emphasis within this set of moral values (Haidt, 2012; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013).  
In the current research, we have also included a few exploratory variables to begin to 
identify the relationships moral foundations have to other intergroup concepts. One such 
concept is the attitude of collective narcissism (Golec de Zavala, 2011). This variable has 
been found to correlate with strong ideologies including SDO and RWA, but its relationship 
to moral foundations had not been investigated. Given the previous findings regarding 
collective narcissism and its relationship to RWA and SDO, which have been linked to the 
binding foundations (Federico et al., 2013; Kugler et al., 2014), it was hypothesized that the 
binding foundations would correlate with collective narcissism, and may have implications 
for understanding factors associated with barriers to positive intergroup relations, social 




Finally, we examined the perspective taking subscale of the interpersonal reactivity 
index (IRI, Davis, 1983) and a measure of generalized trust (Yamagishi & Yamgishi, 1994). 
Previous research has not found a consistent difference in perspective taking by political 
ideology (Falk, Spunt, & Lieberman, 2012; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). Some 
work in moral foundations has suggested that harm and fairness positively relates to 
perspective taking (Glenn, Iyer, Graham, Koleva, & Haidt, 2009), but overall, research 
considering moral foundations and perspective taking is sparse. As a result of the lack of 
clear and consistent prior evidence, we make no predictions regarding how individualizing 
and binding moral foundations would relate to perspective taking, though individualizing 
may positively correlate if cognitive perspective taking acts in the same manner as empathy. 
More general intergroup relations research has also considered trust and its relationship to 
intergroup processes (Schmid, Al Ramiah, & Hewstone, 2014). Here we consider generalized 
trust (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994), which has implications for the study of social and 
political psychology and has not yet been examined in relation to moral foundations. Again, 
given the lack of prior evidence in this area, we make no predictions as to how trust 
processes will relate to the moral foundations.  
3.2. Study 5 
3.2.1. Hypotheses 
  In Study 5, we hypothesize that (H1) individualizing foundations will positively relate 
to suppport for collective action and negatively relate to bias and threat perceptions, and 
that (H2) binding foundations will negatively relate to support for collective action and 
positively relate to threat, bias, and collective narcissism. We make no predictions regarding 






The study employed a correlational design examining relationships between 
individualizing and binding moral foundations, intergroup bias, collective action, collective 
narcissism, perspective taking, generalized trust, and threat. Measures of collective action, 
collective narcissism, perspective taking and generalized trust were presented to 
participants in a random order. We followed previous research in using the Individualizing 
Foundations (average of Harm and Fairness) and Binding Foundations (average of Loyalty, 
Authority, and Purity) as general indexes of moral orientations (Smith et al., 2014; Van 
Leeuwen & Park, 2009; Kidwell, Farmer, & Hardesty, 2013). 
3.3.2. Participants 
Ninety-eight participants from the United States participated using Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk online recruitment. We used a U.S. sample because it was the only sample 
to which we had access via an online format in MTurk (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). 
As is standard in moral foundation research, eight participants were removed for 
demonstrating acquiescence on items that check for inattention (Graham et al., 2009). An 
example inattention item is answering that it is more than slightly relevant that someone is 
good at math “when you decide something is right or wrong.” The final sample consisted of 
90 participants with an age range of 20 to 61 years (M = 33.99, SD = 9.71), and 81.1% were 
Caucasian and 46.7% were female. Participants completed the study in exchange for 






3.3.3. Materials  
Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). The Moral Foundations Questionnaire 
(MFQ) consists of 32 items (see Appendix H) with two items used to ensure participants are 
paying attention while completing the scale (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2008). The remaining 
30 items assessed investment in the five moral foundations of Harm, Fairness, Authority, 
Loyalty, and Purity. Each moral foundation (e.g. Harm) consisted of six items which are 
averaged to form an overall score for each foundation. The reliability for each subscale was: 
Harm (M = 4.66, SD = .83, α = .71) Fairness (M = 4.63, SD = .82, α = .77), Loyalty (M = 3.24, SD 
= .83, α = .72), Authority (M = 3.49, SD = .90, α = .74) and Purity (M = 2.95, SD = 1.34, α = 
.89). Items within the relevance and judgment MFQ subscales were presented to 
participants in a random order. The computer program coded the relevance subscales of the 
MFQ as 1 = Not at all relevant, and 6 = Extremely relevant, and the judgment subscales were 
coded 1 = Strongly disagree, and 6 = Strongly agree. 
Intergroup Bias. To assess participant’s bias, we used 5 items adapted from Saguy et 
al. (2009). Participants were asked to rate their feelings toward immigrants on 5 evaluative 
dimensions (i.e., Warmth, Negativity, Friendliness, Suspicion, and Admiration) on 9-point 
scales with a neutral midpoint (i.e. 1 = Extremely Cold to 9 = Extremely Warm). Two items 
were reverse scored and the 5 items were averaged to form a measure of bias with higher 
scores reflecting higher bias toward immigrants (M = 3.86, SD = 1.72, α= .95). 
Collective Action. Support for collective action was measured using three items 
adapted from Saguy et al. (2009). Items were completed on a 5-point scale from (1) Support 




that will improve the position of Immigrants within the US.”  Items were then averaged to 
form an overall measure of support for collective action (M = 3.01, SD = 1.31, α = .93). 
Collective Narcissism. The collective narcissism scale was comprised of 9 items such 
as “I insist upon my group getting the respect that is due to it” and responses were from (1) 
Strongly disagree to (7) Strongly agree (Golec de Zavala, 2011). One item was reverse scored 
and the scale was averaged to create an overall collective narcissism index with higher 
scores indicating higher collective narcissism (M = 2.75, SD = 1.16, α = .85). 
Perspective Taking. The interpersonal reactivity index (IRI: Davis, 1983) includes 28 
items assessing four subscales with 7 items assessing cognitive perspective taking (PT), 
including items such as “I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a 
decision.” Responses were scored on a 5-point scale from (1) Does not describe me well to 
(5) Describes me very well. Two items were reverse scored and the scale was averaged to 
form an overall index of perspective taking (M = 3.50, SD = .76, α = .85). 
Generalized Trust. Trust was measured using the 6-item generalized trust scale 
including items such as: “Most people will respond in kind when they are trusted by others” 
(Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). The response format ranged from (1) Strongly Disagree to (5) 
Strongly Agree with a neutral midpoint; items were averaged to form a generalized trust 
score (M = 3.64, SD = .67, α = .88). 
Perceived Threat.  Perceived threat from immigrants was measured using a scale by 
Stephan et al. (1999). The measure comprises two subscales regarding realistic threat, 
“Immigration has increased the tax burden on Americans,” and symbolic threat, “The values 
and beliefs of immigrants regarding social relations are NOT compatible with the beliefs and 




(7) Agree Strongly with neutral midpoint. Eight items were reverse scored and the 15 items 
were then averaged. Given the high correlation between symbolic and realistic threat (r = 
.789, p < .001) and the use of a collapsed scale to assess threat in prior research (Tip, 
Zagefka, González, Brown, Cinnirella, & Na, 2012), we collapsed symbolic and realistic 
subscales and computed a measure of overall perceived threat toward immigrants (M = 
3.26, SD = 1.31, α = .95). 
Math Items. Four math items acted as an additional attention check with the aim of 
excluding participants who scored all of these incorrectly. No participants met these 
exclusion criteria. 
Demographics. Finally, participants supplied demographic information including age, 
gender, education, ethnicity, and political ideology. The item measuring political ideology 
asked participants to rate their “personal political orientation” on a vertical scale from (1) 
Extremely Conservative at the top to (9) Extremely Liberal at the bottom, and with 
Moderate/Centre at the midpoint (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009). 
3.4. Results 
 
3.4.1. Intergroup Variables 
 
To analyze the influence of moral values on the intergroup variables, an 
Individualizing Foundations score was first created by averaging the Harm and Fairness 
foundations (M = 4.65, SD = .73, α = .82), and a Binding Foundations score was created by 
averaging Loyalty, Authority, Purity foundations scores across participants (M = 3.23, SD = 
.88, α = .90). Both scores demonstrated good levels of reliability with higher scores on each 
index reflecting higher investment in the set of moral values. We next conducted a 




related to each other as expected. Overall this correlational analysis showed that Perceived 
Threat positive correlated with Bias, and negatively correlated with Collective Action and 
Perspective Taking as expected (Table 3.1); interestingly, it also correlated positively with 
Collective Narcissism and negatively with Trust. 
 
TABLE 3.1.  
Correlation matrix for the main Intergroup Variables. 
 1. Trust 2. CA 3. PT 4. Bias 5. Threat 6. CN 
1. Trust 1      
2. Collective Action  .281** 1     
3. Perspective Taking  .177   .189 1    
4. Bias  -.389*** - .750*** -.320** 1   
5. Threat  -.329** - .716*** -.330**   .777*** 1  
6. Collective Narcissism  .070 - .100 -.051   .092   .237* 1 
Note: p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001*** 
 
 
3.4.2. Moral Foundations and Intergroup Variables  
We next conducted analyses to test the main hypotheses of Study 5. First, we tested 
the proposed positive correlation between the Individualizing Foundation score and 
Collective Action support and the proposed negative correlation with Bias and Perceived 
Threat (H1). We also tested the proposed negative correlation between the Binding 
foundation score and Collective Action support and the proposed positive correlations with 
Perceived Threat and Collective Narcissism (H2). The analysis found support for Hypothesis 1 




Collective Action to aid immigrant groups and negatively and significantly related to 
perceptions of Bias against and Threat from immigrant groups (Table 3.2). Our analysis of 
Hypothesis 2 yielded partial support for our predictions; while Binding Foundations were 
positively related to Bias and negatively related to Collective Action, neither reached 
significance. However, Binding Foundations were significantly related to more Perceived 
Threat and Collective Narcissism. Finally, we observed an unanticipated significant 
correlation between the Individualizing Foundation score and Cognitive Perspective Taking. 






Bivariate Pearson’s correlations of Individualizing and Binding Foundation Scores with the 
Intergroup Variables.  
 




Bias Threat Collective 
Narcissism 
Individualizing -.139  .134  .337**  .309** -.436*** -.333** -.108 
Binding        1  .109 -.143 -.043  .193  .264*   .402*** 
 





Study 5 demonstrated that moral foundations have a number of important 
implications for understanding and improving intergroup relations. We observed a 
relationship in which more investment in the Individualizing Foundations (average of Harm 




Threat perceptions toward immigrants. This suggests that those with strong harm and 
fairness values may perceive immigrant groups more positively and may feel less threatened 
by outgroups in general. We further observed that more investment in Individualizing values 
was related to more willingness to support Collective Action, which is in line with perceiving 
less threat and reporting less bias toward immigrants. We also observed a relationship 
between the Individualizing moral values and Perspective Taking in which higher scores on 
perspective taking were related to higher individualizing scores. Because individualizing 
values of harm and fairness are highly endorsed across the political spectrum (Haidt, 2007), 
this research suggests the potential for enhancing positive intergroup relations through 
reminders of one’s investment in fairness and harm reduction.  
 In terms of the Binding moral values, we observed that more investment in Loyalty, 
Authority, and Purity was correlated with more Collective Narcissism and more Perceived 
Threat from immigrants. The current study was the first to show that Individualizing and 
Binding foundations were related to perceived symbolic and realistic threat. These results 
also match other research indicating that investment in Binding foundations is related to 
stronger Authoritarianism and Belief in a Dangerous World, both of which are proposed to 
be positively related to threats (Kugler et al., 2014; Federico et al., 2013; Van Leeuwen & 
Park, 2009). We, however, did not find a significant correlation between more investment in 
Binding Foundations and either less support for Collective Action or more Bias against 
immigrants, which previous research by Kugler and colleagues (2014) suggested was likely. 
One point of difference between the current study and the Kugler study was the more 
extreme outgroup comparisons included in their measure of outgroup hostility as compared 




the bias and threat relationships appeared to be the most consistent, we aimed to test the 
robustness of these findings by using a larger sample in Study 6. We also aimed to consider 
the influence of strong socio-political ideologies such as RWA and SDO which may partially 
explain the relationships between moral foundations and intergroup attitudes.  
3.6. Study 6 
3.6.1. Introduction and Hypotheses 
Given that threat may be an underlying process in the evaluation of outgroups and 
immigrant groups, it is worth considering the role that strong group-focused ideologies such 
as authoritarianism and social dominance orientation may have in explaining the 
relationship between moral foundations and bias. Building on our findings from Study 5, we 
set out in Study 6 to replicate patterns of relationships between Individualizing and Binding 
Foundations and Bias, and also to examine how Social Dominance Orientation and 
Authoritarianism mediate these relationships.  
Previous work using the moral foundations has demonstrated that different moral 
foundations can predict RWA, which is characterized by strong group normative traditional 
values, and SDO, which is characterized by strong hierarchical values (Altemeyer, 1996; 
Pratto et al., 1994). For example, Federico et al. (2013) demonstrated that RWA was more 
consistently and strongly correlated with Binding foundations than with the Individualizing 
foundations, while SDO was more strongly correlated with Individualizing foundations than 
with the Binding foundations. Kugler et al. (2014) demonstrated similar relationships 
between RWA and Binding foundations, and SDO and Individualizing foundations, though 
they also found SDO to be related to Loyalty and Authority. They further demonstrated a link 




to test whether outgroup hostility relationship demonstrated by Kugler et al. (2014) 
translates to the evaluation of general immigrant groups, and to replicate the Perceived 
Threat findings. In addition, we again consider whether Individualizing foundations predict 
Perspective Taking. Finally, we explore the role of RWA, SDO, and Threat in relationships 
between moral foundations and intergroup variables. 
We predict that Individualizing foundations will negatively correlate with Perceived 
Threat and Bias, and that Binding foundations will positively correlate with Perceived Threat, 
and with Bias given the larger sample size. In addition, we predict a replication of Study 5 in 
which Individualizing will be positively and significantly correlated with Perspective Taking, 
while Binding foundations would not. Based upon the findings of Federico et al. (2013) and 
Kugler et al. (2014), we predict that Individualizing moral values will negatively relate to SDO 
and that SDO will mediate the relationship between the individualizing foundations and 
Intergroup Bias. Finally, we predict that the Binding foundations will positively relate to 
RWA, and that RWA will significantly mediate the Binding to Bias relationship; such a 
mediator can be observed even in the absence of a significant effect between Binding and 
Bias (Hayes, 2013). 
3.7. Method 
3.7.1. Design and Procedure 
The study employed a measurement of mediation regression design with the MFQ 
Individualizing Foundations and MFQ Binding Foundations as predictors, and Bias and 
Perceived Threat as outcome variables. Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) was the 
mediator for the Individualizing to Intergroup Bias analysis, and Right Wing Authoritarianism 




as mediators instead of Individualizing and Binding as mediators because moral foundations 
are meant to be basic values, and we were interested in further examining the 
Individualizing to Bias and the Binding to Bias relationships. To statistically control for order 
effects of the mediators, we created a number of counterbalanced orders of the mediators 
and of the outcome variables. The study included four orders to which participants were 
randomly assigned (Order 1: MFQ-filler task-SDO-RWA-filler-Bias-Threat-Perspective Taking; 
Order 2: MFQ-filler task-SDO-RWA-filler-Bias-P.Taking-Threat; Order 3: MFQ-filler task-RWA-
SDO-filler-Bias-Threat-P.Taking; Order 4: MFQ-filler task-RWA-SDO-filler-Bias-P.Taking-
Threat). A numerical filler task and a reading filler task were included before and after the 
mediators in order to reduce participant suspicion. The MFQ predictor variables were 
administered first, followed by mediators, and then outcome variables as recommended for 
mediation analyses when the mediators are measured (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). 
All participants received the MFQ first followed by the first filler task. After completion of 
the first filler, task participants in Orders 1 and 3 received RWA followed by SDO while those 
in Orders 2 and 4 received SDO followed by RWA; all participants then received a second, 
reading filler task followed by the Bias outcome measure. Bias was measured first because it 
was a short, five-item measure which may be more influenced by socially desirable 
responding than the longer, fifteen-item threat measure that asked about a larger variety of 
opinions. The Threat and Perspective Taking measures were counterbalanced where 
participants in Orders 1 and 2 received Threat followed by Perspective Taking and 
participants in Orders 3 and 4 received the Perspective Taking subscale followed by Threat. 
After these measures were completed, all participants completed demographic measures 





A total of 172 participants completed the study using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
online platform in exchange for monetary compensation. All participants who completed the 
study were located in the United States. Following the procedure from Study 5 and from 
research using the MFQ, participants whose responses indicated they were not paying 
attention on the two MFQ attention items were excluded from the sample. This left a final 
sample of 157 participants with an age range from 21 to 61 (M = 32.92, SD = 9.12), and with 
78.3% Caucasian and 39.5% female. 
3.7.3. Materials 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). To measure participants’ investment in 
moral issues, we used the same MFQ that was used in Study 5 (Graham et al., 2008), with 
items within the MFQ relevance and judgement subscales presented in a random order to 
participants. The Binding Foundation (α = .92) score was created by averaging Loyalty, 
Authority, and Purity scores and the Individualizing Foundation Score (α = .79) was 
calculated by averaging Harm and Fairness scores (Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009).  
Filler Task 1 (Numerical filler task). To act as a buffer between the MFQ measure and 
the mediators (i.e., RWA and SDO), we used a filler task termed a "short task of cognitive 
processing.” Participants were told that they would select the number indicated from a list 
of numbers. They were asked to be as fast and accurate as possible and that in each trial 
they would be asked to click on a target number among 9 other distractor numbers which 
varied throughout the task. They then completed 40 trials with the target number changing 




changing on each trial. The task was designed to be simple and engaging so as to act as a 
delay between sections of the study. 
Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) Short-Form Scale. To measure investment in 
Authoritarian ideology, we employed the 15-item short form version of the RWA scale 
(Zakrisson, 2005). Participants responded to statements such as “If the society so wants, it is 
the duty of every true citizen to help eliminate the evil that poisons our country from within.” 
Responses were completed on a 7-point Likert scale labelled from (1) Very Negative to (7) 
Very Positive. Items within the RWA scale were presented to participants in a random order. 
After reverse scoring seven items, the scale was averaged with higher scores reflecting 
higher authoritarian ideology (M = 2.78, SD = 1.17, α = .92; See Appendix I). 
Group-Based Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). To measure participant level of 
Social Dominance Orientation toward groups, we used the group-based, 16-item version of 
Pratto et al.’s (1994) SDO scale. It includes such items as: “To get ahead in life, it is 
sometimes necessary to step on other groups.” All items were completed on a 7-point Likert 
scale ranging from (1) Very Negative to (7) Very Positive. Items within the SDO scale were 
presented to participants in a random order. After reverse scoring eight items, the scale was 
averaged with higher scores reflecting higher social dominance ideology (M = 2.13, SD = 
1.18, α = .96; See Appendix J). 
Filler Task 2 (The Growing Stone Task). We used the growing stone task that has 
been included in other research as a delay task (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon & 
Breus, 1994); it acted as a second filler task between the mediators and the main outcome 
variable of the study. In this filler task, participants read a literary passage and then rated 




race. Participants were first asked to rate the passage in terms of “How do you feel about the 
overall descriptive qualities of the story?” providing a rating on a 9-point scale ranging from 
(1) not at all descriptive to (9) very descriptive. Participants also rated how engaging and 
imaginative they found the story using a 9-point scale.  
Intergroup Bias. We used the same measure of bias that was used in Study 5 
(adapted from Saguy et al., 2009). Higher scores on this measure indicated higher bias 
against immigrants (M = 3.95, SD = 1.66, α = .96).  
Threat Perceptions. We used the same measure of perceived threat toward 
immigrants that was used in Study 5 (Stephan et al., 1999). As in Study 5 the realistic and 
symbolic threat subscales were highly correlated (r =.814, p <.001) and all items were again 
averaged to form a measure of threat following previous research (see Tip et al., 2012; M = 
3.18, SD = 1.39, α = .96; See Appendix K).  
Perspective Taking Subscale. We used the same measure of cognitive perspective 
taking that was used in Study 5 (Davis, 1983). The items were averaged to create an index of 
participant perspective taking (M = 4.06, SD = .72, α = .87). 
Mathematics Items. Following Study 5, we again included math items as a test of 
participant attention with participants who provided incorrect responses for all items being 
excluded. Only one participant answered all items incorrectly however this participant had 
already been excluded based on the attention check item within the MFQ. 
Demographics. After completion of all of the main items in the study, participants 
then completed demographic items including age, gender, ethnicity, number of years 
speaking English and number of years living in the US, political ideology, and level of 





3.8.1. Moral Foundations and Political Ideology 
 In Study 6, we replicated the associations between the Individualizing Foundations 
and Perspective Taking, R2 = .07, ϐ = .26, t = 3.37, p < .001, with bootstrapped b = .28, 95% CI 
[.11, .47], p = .002, and Intergroup Bias, R2 = .05, ϐ = -.23, t = -2.99, p = .003, with 
bootstrapped b = -.58, 95% CI [-.97, -.15], p = .006, and Threat, R2 = .06, ϐ = -.24, t = -3.10, p = 
.002, with bootstrapped b = -.50, 95% CI [-.81, -.14], p = .004. We also replicated the non-
significant association between the Binding Foundations and Perspective Taking, R2 < .01, ϐ = 
-.02, t = -.22, p = .83, with bootstrapped b = -.01, 95% CI [-.13, .11], p = .81, and the 
significant association with Threat, R2 = .25, ϐ = .50, t = 7.17, p < .001, with bootstrapped b = 
.75, 95% CI [.53, .96], p < .001. However, the Binding Foundations to Bias relationship, while 
still positive like Study 5, was now significant, R2 = .14, ϐ = .37, t = 4.94, p < .001, with 
bootstrapped b = .67, 95% CI [.39, .95], p < .001. 
Mediational analyses were conducted using PROCESS for SPSS as suggested by Hayes, 
2013. Both the Individualizing Foundations (M = 4.60, SD = .67, α = .79) and the Binding 
Foundations had good reliability (M = 3.28, SD = .92, α = .92). In Model 1, we entered the 
Individualizing Foundation score as a predictor variable and Bias against immigrants as the 
outcome variable, and entering SDO as the mediator. As expected, we observed a significant 
indirect effect of SDO on the relationship between Individualizing Foundations and Bias in 
which higher SDO scores were related to less investment in Individualizing Foundations and 
to more Bias (see Figure 3.1). When SDO was included in the model as the mediator variable, 









Figure 3.1. Mediation model of the relationship between Individualizing Foundations to 
Intergroup Bias by Social Dominance Orientation. All betas represent unstandardized values 
from Bias Corrected Bootstrap Analysis with 5,000 samples. CSIE represents the Completely 
Standardized Indirect Effect. 
 
 
In Model 2, we explored the relationship between Binding Foundations and the 
prediction of Bias against immigrants. The Binding Foundations score was entered as the 
predictor variable, and Bias as the outcome variable, RWA was entered as the mediator. As 
expected, we observed a significant indirect effect of RWA on the relationship between 
Binding Foundations and Bias in which higher RWA scores were related to more investment 
in Binding Foundations and to more Bias (see Figure 3.2). Once RWA was included as a 







b = -1.15, p < .001 b = .87, p < .001 
Total effect, b = -.58, p = .003 
Direct effect, b = .42, p = .063 







Figure 3.2. Mediation model of the relationship between Binding Foundations to Intergroup 
Bias by Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA). All betas represent unstandardized values from 
Bias Corrected Bootstrap Analysis with 5,000 samples. CSIE represents the Completely 
Standardized Indirect Effect. 
 
 
Some researchers have suggested that the social-political attitudes of RWA and SDO 
may be exogenous and predict moral foundations instead of moral foundations predicting 
the mediators of RWA or SDO (Federico et al., 2013). Given that we have used cross-
sectional data, this explanation is possible, but it is also an empirical question. We can use 
structural equation modeling to check whether the moral foundations as predictors model 
demonstrates better fit than the RWA and SDO as predictors model. There, however, is one 
important problem with using structural equation modeling with mediation models with just 
one mediator (i.e., tri-variate mediation model). Research has recently shown that we 
cannot test for differences in fit between models by reversing the directed arrows within the 
mediation model so that Individualizing mediates the SDO to Bias relationship instead of 
SDO mediating the Individualizing to Bias relationship as in Figure 3.1; we cannot make these 




b = .96, p < .001 b = .56, p < .001 
Total effect, b = .67, p < .001 
Direct effect, b = .12, p = .540  






models produce identical fit statistics to each other (MacCallum, Wegener, Uchino, & 
Fabrigar, 1993; Thoemmes, 2015). We, however, can use models in which both RWA and 
SDO are included in order to compare the MFQ as predictor models to the RWA and SDO as 
predictors models.  
Thus, we compared a model in which the Individualizing to Bias relationship was 
mediated by SDO and RWA (similar to Figure 3.1) to an Alternative model in which SDO and 
RWA predicted Bias and was mediated by Individualizing. We also compared models in 
which Individualizing was replaced with Binding foundations, and we used the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to compare fit. 
These fit indices are necessary when comparing the non-nested models that we are 
comparing, and lower AIC and BIC values indicate better fit (Kline, 1998). If social-political 
attitudes are exogenous to moral foundations, then those models would have lower AIC and 
BIC values. Table 3.3 demonstrates that contrary to the socio-political as exogenous 
hypothesis, both Moral Foundations as Predictor Models fit better than the Alternative 










TABLE 3.3.  
Information criteria comparing the Moral Foundations Predictor Models to the SDO and 
RWA Alternative Models. 
Fit Indices Model 
 Individualizing as Predictor Alternative 
   
AIC 2655.13 2664.19 
BIC 2963.81 2972.87 
   
 Binding as Predictor Alternative 
AIC 3276.93 3294.63 






3.8.2. Exploratory Analyses Considering the Role of Threat 
 Given that previous research has indicated that perceptions of symbolic and realistic 
threat are an important antecedent to prejudice, we tested whether Perceived Threat would 
be a significant mediator in addition to SDO for the Individualizing to Intergroup Bias 
relationship, and in addition to RWA for the Binding to Bias relationship (Duckitt & Sibley, 
2009; Riek et al., 2006). With both SDO and Threat in the model, we found a significant 
indirect effect for Threat on the relationship between Individualizing Foundations and Bias in 
which more Perceived Threat was related to lower investment in Individualizing Foundations 
and more Bias (see Figure 3.3). However, there was a non-significant indirect effect of SDO 







Figure 3.3. Mediation model of the relationship between Individualizing Foundations to 
Intergroup Bias by Social Dominance Orientation and Threat. All betas represent 
unstandardized values from Bias Corrected Bootstrap Analysis with 5,000 samples. CSIE 




With both RWA and Threat in the model, we observed a significant indirect effect for 
Threat on the relationship between Binding Foundations and Bias in which more Perceived 
Threat was related to more investment in Binding Foundations and more Bias (see Figure 
3.4). There was a non-significant indirect effect of RWA with both Perceived Threat and RWA 






b = -1.15, p < .001 b = .12, p = .261 
Total effect, b = -.58, p = .003 
Direct effect, b = .01, p = .954 
SDO indirect effect, b = -.14, 95% BCa CI [-.46, .11], CSIE = -.06 











Figure 3.4. Mediation model of the relationship between Binding Foundations to Intergroup 
Bias by Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Threat. All betas represent unstandardized 
values from Bias Corrected Bootstrap Analysis with 5,000 samples. CSIE represents the 
Completely Standardized Indirect Effect. 
 
3.9. Discussion 
The mediation models demonstrated that strong group-focused ideologies such as 
SDO and RWA are related to Individualizing and Binding foundations, respectively, as 
predicted by past research. The current study was the first to extend this research by 
showing that these rigid ideologies also provide one explanation for the connection between 
moral foundations and bias. The link between Individualizing and lower Social Dominance 
was associated with less Bias against immigrants and the link between Binding and more 
Authoritarianism was associated with more Bias. Threat processes also appear to play an 




b = .96, p < .001 b = .03, p = .777 
Total effect, b = .67, p < .001 
Direct effect, b = -.09, p = .527 
RWA indirect effect, b = .03, 95% BCa CI [-.22, .27], CSIE = .02 








previous work showing that moral foundations and strong ideologies can be used to 
understand both bias toward outgroups and threat perceptions toward outgroups. Crucially, 
the role of threat in such phenomena should play a focal role in future studies of moral and 
political ideology and intergroup attitudes.  
3.10. General Discussion 
 Overall these studies provide evidence that moral foundations play an important role 
in understanding perceptions of intergroup relations and also have a strong association to 
intergroup focused social-political ideologies (e.g., Authoritarianism and Social Dominance 
Orientation). In Study 5, investment in the Individualizing foundations (i.e., Harm and 
Fairness) was associated with significantly more cognitive Perspective Taking, and with less 
Intergroup Bias toward immigrants and less Perceived Threat toward immigrants, while 
investment in the Binding foundations (i.e., Loyalty, Authority, and Purity) was associated 
with more Collective Narcissism and more Perceived Threat toward immigrants, while the 
relationship to Bias, was small and not significant. With a larger sample, Study 6 replicated 
the Individualizing associations with less Bias and Perceived Threat and found that 
investment in Binding foundations was significantly related to more Perceived Threat and 
now to more Bias. This was the first time that Perceived Symbolic and Realistic Threat had 
been linked with Individualizing and Binding foundations. Moreover, this was the first time 
that Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) had been shown to mediate the Individualizing to 
Bias association and Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) had been shown to mediate the 
Binding to Bias association; both of these mediations became non-significant once Perceived 




The observed pattern of results shed light on how underlying moral values may help 
account for intergroup beliefs and attitudes and further suggests that the moral foundations 
could be used to contribute to potential ways of understanding more rigid or strong 
ideologies such as RWA and SDO. This research also highlights potential avenues for 
improving negative intergroup attitudes more generally by addressing groupings of moral 
values as work on moral framing has begun to hint that framing policies with moral 
foundations may persuade people who invest in the relevant foundations (Kidwell et al., 
2013; Feinberg & Willer, 2013). Unfortunately, to date, this research is in its early stages and 
has often produced small and weak effects and can also cause entrenchment of existing 
beliefs (Day, Fiske, Downing, & Trail, 2014; Kidwell et al., 2013; Feinberg & Willer, 2015). So, 
much more research needs to be conducted to understand these moral framing processes.  
Across two studies, a consistent pattern regarding moral foundations and 
perceptions of intergroup threat was demonstrated. In both studies, investment in 
Individualizing moral foundations was consistently associated with less Perceived Threat, 
and investment in Binding moral foundations was significantly related to more Perceived 
Threat. This research was the first to show this consistent pattern between Binding and 
Individualizing foundations and Perceived Realistic and Symbolic Threat. The link with 
Binding foundations is in accordance with other research showing that more investment in 
Binding foundations is related to more endorsement of Belief in a Dangerous World or Right 
Wing Authoritarianism, both of which are constructs that are proposed to be related to 
threat and threat perceptions (Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009; Federico et al., 2013; Duckitt & 
Sibley, 2009). Our findings are also consistent with new research linking more investment in 




normative (i.e., radicals and socialists, illegal immigrants, atheists, transvestites, etc.; Sinn & 
Hayes, 2016). Thus, it appears that perceptions of symbolic and realistic threat may be key 
factors in the relationship between moral values and intergroup bias. Moreover, the threat 
perceptions may relate to a difference in risk acceptance, which may provide an avenue for 
discussions of how to balance risks.  
The pattern of relationships between moral foundations and Intergroup Bias was 
somewhat less consistent than prior research had suggested that it might be (Kugler et al., 
2014). We observed, across both studies, that Individualizing moral foundations were 
significantly related to less Bias toward immigrants. The Binding moral foundations, 
however, were related to more Bias (r = .193, R2 = .037), but this effect was fairly small and 
not significant within Study 5, while they were significantly related to more Bias and with a 
larger effect size (R2 = .136) in Study 6 in which we used a larger sample based upon the 
strength of associations observed in Study 5. Importantly, Study 6 also found that RWA 
mediated this Binding to Bias relationship. While there was some inconsistency to the Bias 
findings, previous research with Binding foundations and intergroup bias is quite limited. 
Kugler and colleagues (2014) showed that the Binding foundations were significantly related 
to more outgroup hostility. However, the measure of outgroup hostility included a number 
of extreme comparisons for the American sample (i.e., Muslims compared to Christians, and 
illegal immigrants); so, a less extreme outgroup comparison may or may not have been 
related to the Binding foundations. We’ve found some preliminary support that this 
relationship may hold with the general outgroup of immigrants given that, across both 
studies, it appears that there may be a small to medium association between Binding 




that binding foundations would often be related to bias to outgroups. It is also noteworthy 
that Study 6 was the first to show that SDO mediated the Individualizing to Bias relationship 
and that RWA mediated the Binding to Bias relationship. Moreover, Structural Equation 
Models indicated that models of Individualizing to Bias (or Binding to threat) with SDO or 
RWA as mediators showed better fit (AIC and BIC statistics) than the alternative SDO and 
RWA to Bias (or to Threat) models with Individualizing (or Binding) as a mediator; thus, our 
use of Individualizing and Binding foundations as predictors based both upon moral 
foundations theory and based upon the limited statistics (AIC and BIC) available for such 
comparisons. 
Moreover, it is unlikely that including Bias before the Threat measure in all conditions 
of Study 6 was an explanation for either the observed Bias effects or the observed Threat 
effects. In Study 3 of Chapter 2, we fully counterbalanced the presentation of Bias and 
Threat in order to statistically control for order effects. In Study 3, we observed the same 
basic pattern of Political to Bias and Political to Threat as we had observed in Study 2 in 
which Bias and Threat were not counterbalanced. Thus, we have good confidence that the 
observed Bias and Threat effects hold regardless of the order of presentation, and that we 
would see a similar pattern in Study 6 if Bias and Threat had been counterbalanced. At the 
time of conducting Study 6, which occurred before Study 3 of Chapter 2, we had been more 
concerned with the potential for Threat to influence Bias judgments more than the potential 
of Bias to influence the larger, more complicated scale used to measure Threat judgments. 
 Both Study 5 and 6 included participants from a variety of ethnic backgrounds, and 
one question that may be asked is the extent to which the findings are robust if we consider 




included only participants who had lived in the US for a set number of years. Including only 
participants who identified as Caucasian did not change any of the general patterns 
observed between the individualizing and binding foundations and intergroup variables in 
either Study 5 or Study 6 (see Appendix M); it also did not change the results of the 
mediational analyses. Including only participants who had lived in the US for 10 or more 
years (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004) also did not change any of the general patterns or 
significant results observed in Study 5 or Study 6 (Three participants removed from Study 5 
and zero from Study 6). We also explored alternative analyses which found that the Binding 
foundations (and not Individualizing foundations) were strongly and significantly correlated 
with RWA. The SDO variable was also more strongly correlated with the Individualizing 
foundations than with the Binding foundations which gives confidence in our models (see 
Appendix M for alternative model); within the results section of Study 6, we also considered 
comparisons using Structural Equation models on the full sample of 157 participants to 
support our model construction (See Table. 3.3). Conducting these alternative analyses 
across both studies also demonstrated that neither ethnicity nor years living in the country 
was an explanation of the effects observed. 
 If immigrant groups are being perceived as threatening by those high in binding 
foundations, this has important implications for intergroup relations, especially given the 
likelihood of continuing immigration within the US and around the world due to the need to 
maintain population and economic growth. Finding ways to reduce threat perceptions 
directed toward immigrant groups may provide an important step in reducing intergroup 
and ideological-based tensions. In our exploratory analyses, we observed that accounting for 




of SDO on the Individualizing to Intergroup Bias relationship, and also significantly reduced 
the indirect effect of RWA on the Binding to Bias relationship. This pattern of results 
supports the idea that threat processing may play a key role in both Authoritarianism and 
Social Dominance Orientation, which is in-line with research on RWA (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; 
Federico et al., 2013; Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009) and on SDO (Morrison & Ybarra, 2008; 
Vezalli & Giovannini, 2010). However, such an important role of perceived symbolic and 
realistic threat has not been shown with Individualizing and Binding foundations previously. 
Thus, reducing perceived symbolic and realistic threats relating to harm and fairness, and 
relating to binding values of loyalty, authority, and purity may be avenues for reducing bias 
toward immigrants in an increasingly hostile climate, and for improving dialogues between 
groups with strong ideologies. 
 Overall the current research suggests some early steps which may aid our 
understanding of moral beliefs and intergroup relations, and ways to improve perceptions 
and relations among groups with different ideological positions. Moral beliefs and strong 
ideologies may contribute to perceptions of immigrant groups as being threatening and 
negative. Investment in the Individualizing foundations of harm and fairness was related to 
less Bias and less Perceived Threat, whereas investment in the Binding foundations of 
Loyalty, Authority, and Purity was related to more Bias and more Threat. The Binding to Bias 
relationship was mediated by Threat perceptions (both RWA and Perceived Threat) while 
Individualizing to Bias was mediated by SDO and Threat perceptions. Therefore, reducing 
such perceptions of perceived threat may play an important role in reducing intergroup 
tensions. The current emphasis on threats in the U.S and in Europe may exacerbate these 




intergroup tensions, it may also provide an avenue to discuss ways to continue being an 




CHAPTER 4: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The current thesis extends the role of moral foundations theory to the intergroup 
level. In doing so it has considered the role of threat perceptions, strong social ideologies 
and the intergroup bases of moral decisions to develop a more rigorous model of moral and 
political cognition. The findings in the thesis have a number of implications for thinking 
about intergroup relations in the context of moral and political cognition as well as for future 
research and interventions aiming to reduce prejudice and to improve intergroup relations. 
In the first line of research we considered how framing the MFQ in terms of ingroups 
and outgroups would influence investment in the moral foundations as a function of political 
ideology, which addressed an important and unresolved debate within the Moral 
Foundations literature (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013; Graham, 2013). Drawing on the 
existing empirical literature surrounding threat (Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009), approach 
avoidance distinctions (Shook & Fazio, 2009), negativity biases (Hibbing et al., 2014) and 
ideology more generally (Jost et al., 2003) we predicted that using a preference score 
analysis to subtract each outgroup from each ingroup framed moral foundation score to 
measure an overall ingroup preference (i.e. Ingroup Harm – Outgroup Harm = Ingroup Harm 
Preference), would yield stronger investment for conservatives and lesser investment for 
liberals across all five foundations. Detecting this pattern highlighted a difference in group 
based morality as a function of political ideology. This was then broken down into linear 
regressions to highlight where the differences lay, here we predicted that political liberalism 




and that political conservatism would relate to ingroup framed binding (Loyalty, Authority 
and Purity) foundations. 
In a second study we predicted the same pattern (this time using specified group 
framing) and further that outgroup individualizing foundations would mediate the 
relationship of political ideology to bias (we made no predictions for ingroup binding 
foundations) and that outgroup individualizing foundations and ingroup binding foundations 
would both mediate the hypothesized relationship from political ideology to threat. We did 
not make predictions in regards to perspective taking. After finding in Study 2 that bias, 
negative bias and threat were significantly mediated by both outgroup individualizing and 
ingroup binding foundations, for Study 3 we predicted the same pattern of mediations and 
made no predictions regarding implicit bias. In Study 3 we found the same mediation pattern 
as Study 2 and found that implicit bias was also mediated by outgroup individualizing and 
ingroup binding foundations. Study 4 compared the standard to the outgroup framed 
version of the MFQ where we explored whether comparing these versions of the MFQ would 
yield patterns similar to those detected within the ingroup and outgroup framed studies. 
In the second line of research we considered how the general moral foundations 
questionnaire (MFQ; Graham et al., 2008) related to a number of important intergroup 
relations focused variables including Intergroup Bias (Saguy et al., 2009), Perceived Threat 
(Stephan et al., 1999), Collective Action (Saguy et al., 2009), Perspective Taking (Davis, 1983), 
Trust (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994) and Collective Narcissism (Golec de Zavala, 2011). 
Based on prior research we predicted that the Individualizing foundations would predict 
lower perceived threat and the Binding foundations would predict higher levels of perceived 




foundations would predict lower bias. For the Binding foundations while the prior research 
regarding the binding foundations and outgroup attitudes was more limited (Federico et al., 
2013; Kugler et al., 2014) we predicted that the Binding foundations would positively predict 
bias. In light of the current literature (Haidt, 2012; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013; Kugler et 
al., 2014) we also predicted that the Binding foundations would be linked to higher collective 
narcissism (based on the relationships to other strong belief systems, see Federico et al., 
2013; Kugler et al., 2014) and predicted that the binding foundations would negatively, and 
the individualizing foundations positively relate to support for collective action. Given the 
sparse prior literature we made no predictions in regards to trust or perspective taking. Here 
we found support for the Individualizing predictions and partial support for the Binding 
predictions. 
In a final study we aimed to further examine the relationship of individualizing and 
binding foundations on levels of intergroup bias, while also considering how these moral 
foundations influence strong ideologies such as Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA: 
Altemeyer, 1988; 1996; 1998) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO: Pratto et al., 1994). In 
addition we wished to further examine the role of threat based processes in these 
relationships. In this research we predicted that Individualizing foundations would negatively 
predict Bias and Threat and also following Study 5 would positively predict Perspective 
Taking. In contrast we predicted that the Binding foundations would positively predict Bias 
(given higher statistical power with the larger sample size of Study 6) and Threat and 
following the findings of Study 5 would have no relationship to Perspective Taking. Finally we 




SDO would mediate the relationship from Individualizing foundations to Bias and RWA 
would mediate the relationship from Binding foundations to Bias. 
4.0. Moral and Political Cognition is Related to Group-Focused Cognition. 
The current thesis has played an important role in clarifying the influence of 
intergroup comparisons within moral foundations theory and intergroup relations. It has 
achieved this through using the technique of framing the moral foundations items by asking 
participants to think about either ingroup or outgroup members when considering moral 
investment across the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham et al., 2008). In 
Chapter 2, this dissertation addressed a crucial yet previously unresolved debate within 
Moral Foundation Theory (MFT) research regarding how the ingroup and outgroup level 
influence moral foundations; previous debates had largely been theoretical before the 
current research (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013a; Graham, 2013; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 
2013b). 
 By framing the moral foundations in terms of abstract ingroups and outgroups as 
well as specific ingroups (British) and outgroups (Pakistani Immigrant) across four studies, 
we have found clear patterns in the way in which the moral foundations function when 
considering the intergroup level. Our ingroup and outgroup measures of the MFQ 
demonstrated comparable levels of reliability to the standard version of the MFQ (Graham 
et al., 2008; Graham et al., 2009) and we were able to detect important differences in the 
measurement of moral cognition after highlighting the ingroup and outgroup level. Across 
three ingroup-outgroup studies, a general pattern emerged in which conservative political 
ideology related more to ingroup-framed binding foundations whereas a liberal political 




number of important implications for MFT and debates about the intergroup level in MFT 
(Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013a; Graham, 2013; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013b) and further 
in terms of understanding attitudes and perceptions toward group- and immigration-based 
social policies.  
 Within MFT, it has been argued that only conservatives care strongly about the 
wider group when making moral judgments and that liberals are not focused on broader 
group-level thinking when making moral judgments, and are instead said to be invested in 
the individual-focused foundations of Harm and Fairness (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, 2012). 
However, the research presented in this thesis has demonstrated that once the moral 
foundations themselves are framed in terms of ingroups and outgroups, a more complex 
pattern emerges.  
The current research is the first to demonstrate that liberals are more invested in the 
individualising foundations when framed about outgroups, which supports the idea that 
liberals may care about a wider range of societal groups when making their moral 
judgements around harm and fairness foundations, and are not simply invested in protecting 
individuals. Moral foundations researchers have previously said that liberals are not 
concerned with group-based morality (Graham et al., 2009); however, the research 
presented here does not support this proposition. Instead it suggests that liberals do extend 
their moral investment to outgroups and potentially a wider range of groups. In contrast, 
conservatives were much more invested in the binding-foundations (of Loyalty, Authority, 
and Purity) when framed about the ingroup, and inconsistently more invested than liberals 
when binding foundations were framed about specific outgroups, though this effect was 




observed in Study 1 with abstract outgroups (R2 = .06). This pattern of results suggests that 
MFT may be correct in assuming that conservatives are more ingroup orientated than are 
liberals, though there is some inconsistent evidence in regard to outgroup-binding 
foundations and what more investment in binding values means when framed about the 
outgroup; does it mean that participants wish that people from other groups should remain 
loyal to and respect the authority of their (other) group? This is an interesting future 
direction to pursue. Overall, the current research does suggest that whilst conservatives 
invest in a wider range of moral foundations, they are more focused towards ingroup 
concerns, at least in regard to strength of investment; this focus has important implications 
for moral and political psychology and differential policy perceptions as a function of 
ideology.  
Our research further challenges the assumption that liberals do not care about the 
group-level in moral investment and our findings suggest important differences in further 
intergroup focused variables as a result of differential investment in ingroup and outgroup 
framed foundations amongst liberals and conservatives. Debates around moral foundations 
have highlighted the need for more scrutiny of the group level (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 
2013; Graham, 2013; Sinn & Hayes, 2016). Arguably, part of the reason this group level has 
remained a point of debate is that within MFT research, the group level is currently only 
explicitly considered within 4 of 6 loyalty foundation items of the 30 item moral foundations 
measure (see Graham et al., 2008). Even within such items, only ingroups, (and not 
outgroups), are explicitly considered which has made it more difficult to determine how 
moral and political ideology relate to intergroup processes. While prior research has also 




(Sinn & Hayes 2016; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013) and suggested different ideologies may 
have differential perceptions of groups (Waytz, Iyer, Young, & Graham, 2016), these have 
been only theoretical challenges. That research has not done so by framing the MFQ itself in 
terms of ingroups and outgroups across the MFQ scale; thus, many questions have been left 
unresolved. Therefore, by clarifying the role of the group level in the measurement of moral 
foundations our research was also able to demonstrate the important influence of the 
group-level on moral concerns. These were shown both when our version of the MFQ was 
framed abstractly in terms of ingroups and outgroups and when the groups were specified 
as a ‘British ingroup’ and ‘Pakistani immigrant outgroup.’ Overall this variation in groups 
bolsters the confidence in the effects demonstrated here as being relevant to general as well 
as more specific intergroup processes. 
 Our findings on the ingroup-outgroup distinction in Moral Foundations Theory have 
further practical and theoretical implications in relation to broader intergroup relations. In 
order to examine these implications, we examined a number of potentially important 
intergroup outcome variables from the social cognition and intergroup relations literature. 
The research presented in Chapter 2 suggests that investment in individualising foundations 
(i.e., fairness and harm reduction) when framed about outgroups (as opposed to ingroups) 
may promote a more positive reception of outgroups and immigrant groups. In the 
mediation models from Studies 2 and 3, we found that outgroup individualizing foundations 
mediated the relationship between political ideology and explicit bias, explicit negative bias, 
implicit bias, and threat perceptions against immigrants; with outgroup individualising 
foundations investment reducing scores on these outcome variables. Study 4 found the 




implicit bias against immigrants using the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP: Payne et 
al., 2005). These findings are especially important in light of previous research linking liberal 
ideology with less caution in a learning task (Shook & Fazio, 2009), higher levels of openness 
to experience (Carney et al., 2008) and fits with the call from Dodd et al. (2012) that focusing 
on approach behaviour may also be beneficial, rather than solely focusing on threat 
responses. Our findings may also help to explain why liberals may have more favourable 
views of policies such as immigration (Pew Research Centre, 2014). 
In regards to the findings concerning the binding foundations (of Loyalty, Authority 
and Purity), we observed that ingroup binding foundations mediated the relationship 
between political ideology and threat perceptions as well as negative bias and explicit bias 
towards immigrant groups. Across Studies 2 and 3, more investment in the ingroup binding 
foundations was related to higher perceived threat from immigrants and more negative bias 
and more bias towards immigrants. In Study 4, standard binding foundations (i.e., no group-
focus specified) mediated the relationship between political ideology and threat, but not 
explicit bias. Thus, the relationship to more explicit bias was inconsistent (significant 
mediation in Study 2 and Study 3, but not in Study 4, though this study had a vaguer group 
focus between a standard MFQ and an outgroup-MFQ). This research helps to explain the 
role that different kinds of moral cognition have in explaining threat perceptions 
surrounding immigration and immigration-based attitudes. In doing so, this research 
suggests potential opportunities for interventions in these areas and fits with prior research 
linking the standard-binding foundations of the MFQ with perceptions of a dangerous world 
(Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009) and other threat indices (Sinn & Hayes, 2016). It also suggests 




foundations could have negative consequences in intergroup contexts (Smith et al., 2014). 
This research therefore has not only demonstrated that there are important differences in 
the MFQ once the group-level is accounted for, but has further elaborated this conclusion by 
demonstrating that this differential investment in ingroup and outgroup focused moral 
foundations has a real impact on a number of other important intergroup and social 
cognition outcomes including explicit bias, explicit negative bias, implicit bias, and threat 
perceptions regarding immigration. 
Recently there has been an emphasis on the ways in which ideological orientations 
can relate to broader social perceptions and attitudes (Carney et al., 2008; Jost, 2006; 
Hibbing et al., 2014a; Hibbing et al., 2014b; Shook & Fazio, 2009). Our research provides 
further evidence for the ways in which moral and political attitudes influence perceptions of 
different societal groups using a novel method, which has observed a consistent pattern 
using different samples (laboratory and online) and different ingroups and outgroups 
(abstract and when specified as a ‘British ingroup’ and a ‘Pakistani-immigrant outgroup’) to 
show that the intergroup level does relate to differential investment in moral foundations 
for people with different political ideologies. The relationship of the outgroup individualising 
foundations as negative predictors, and ingroup binding foundations as positive predictors of 
perceived threat also fits with threat based accounts of political ideology (Jost et al., 2007; 
Lilienfeld & Latzman, 2014; Oxley et al., 2008). For example, Dodd et al. (2012) have 
highlighted how an enhanced vigilance to threat may help to explain more ingroup-focused 
policy emphasis amongst those who are more politically conservative and our findings 
regarding ingroup-framed binding foundations support this idea. In contrast, liberals may be 




assist in understanding our findings regarding the outgroup individualising foundations here. 
Finally, our work suggests that liberals do take into account group-concerns which has been 
suggested by some theorists, but has not been explicitly tested using group-based framing 
within the MFQ. Overall our research should cause a rethink in the way the group level is 
considered in future moral foundations and political ideological research and highlights the 
importance of considering and accounting for the group level. 
4.1. Moral Foundations, Strong Ideologies, and their Relationship to Intergroup Relations. 
The method of framing the moral foundations in our research was found to be highly 
effective in understanding the influence of the group level in moral foundations. However, 
we also conducted a series of studies employing the standard measure of moral foundations 
the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham et al., 2008) to examine its association 
to intergroup relations more generally and to further consider the relationships to strong 
ideological orientations, such as Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994) and 
Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1988; 1996; 1998; Federico et al., 2013; 
Kugler et al., 2014), and to perceptions of threat. To first consider how the MFQ related to 
intergroup variables using a broad approach, we conducted an exploratory study in Chapter 
3 between the MFQ (Graham et al., 2008) and a number of important intergroup variables 
from social psychology including trust (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994), collective action 
(Saguy et al., 2009), perspective taking (Davis, 1983), explicit bias (Saguy et al., 2009), 
perceived threat (Stephan et al., 1999), and collective narcissism (Golec de Zavala, 2011); 




(average of Authority, Loyalty and Purity) foundations had different relationships with these 
intergroup variables.  
In our studies, we observed that the individualising foundations positively predicted 
collective action support and perspective taking, but negatively predicted both explicit bias 
toward immigrants and perceived threat from immigrants, whilst the binding foundations 
positively predicted threat and collective narcissism. This is some of the first research to 
support the idea that moral foundations inform attitudes towards a host of important 
intergroup variables in meaningful ways. Research considering the impact of MFT on how we 
view other groups has been hitherto lacking despite the fact that MFT relates to a number of 
other important social policy issue perceptions (Koleva et al., 2012); therefore, this 
exploratory first step highlighted their relevance in understanding a host of different 
intergroup variables using the standard MFQ measure (Graham et al., 2008). Given that MFT 
relates to a number of important social and political attitudes we believe applying MFT to 
intergroup relations is important, novel and timely. 
After establishing the relationship between the MFQ (Graham et al., 2008) and 
intergroup variables generally, our research in Chapter 3 went on to extend prior research 
which has considered the relationship between moral foundations and strong socio-political 
ideologies such as SDO and RWA (Federico et al., 2013; Kugler et al., 2014). In doing so the 
current project demonstrated that binding foundations were significantly related to explicit 
bias in our second and larger study. The research also examined how SDO and RWA 
ideologies mediated the relationships between moral foundations and explicit bias towards 




and Purity) predicted bias towards immigrants (as measured via the total effect) and this 
relationship was mediated by RWA. A separate model that examined the relationship 
between the individualising foundations (average of Harm and Fairness foundations) and 
explicit bias found that SDO mediated this relationship. Further, Structural Equation Models 
indicated that the MFQ to SDO or RWA models fit better than the SDO to RWA models. So, 
our modelling was warranted based both upon the theoretical ideas of moral foundation 
theory and based upon our empirical evidence. This research has helped to answer 
questions about the equivocal relationship between Binding foundations and intergroup 
bias. It also concurred with prior work demonstrating how RWA and SDO ideologies relate to 
different sets of moral foundations (Kugler et al., 2014; Milojev et al., 2014; Sinn & Hayes, 
2016) whereby different moral cognition underpins the development of strong ideologies 
differentially. However, our work has extended this idea to explain how these relationships 
impact upon intergroup relations; crucially, we then also considered the role that threat 
perceptions may play in these relationships. 
 To explore the role of threat in Moral Foundations, strong ideologies and bias 
against immigrant groups, a further exploratory mediation-analysis was conducted in which 
a measure of threat perceptions was entered alongside SDO in model 3 and RWA in model 4. 
Across models it was demonstrated that threat more effectively explained the relationship 
between individualising foundations and bias than SDO (Study 6, Model 3, Figure 3.3) and 
binding foundations and bias than RWA (Study 6, model 4, Figure 3.4). This highlights the 
importance of the role of threat perceptions in understanding the relationship between 
moral values, strong ideological values, and intergroup bias; other models have previously 




foundations may relate to threat (Sinn & Hayes, 2016; Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009). Our 
research, however, was the first to show how threat was most effective in explaining the 
relationships between moral foundations and bias, when entered into mediations with 
either RWA or SDO. This finding suggests that realistic and symbolic threat perceptions may 
be an important underlying variable in understanding strong social ideologies and attitudes 
toward immigrants whilst accounting for moral foundations. However, it should also be 
noted here that the measure of threat employed in our study was measured in relation to 
threat perceptions surrounding immigration; thus, there is a common target for the threat 
and bias measures, which could add to the effects observed. However, given that the Threat 
effect was so much larger than the SDO or RWA effects, it is unlikely that this common target 
explains all of the difference in variance observed. In future, it would be beneficial to test 
these effects with a target group other than immigrants for the bias measures. We had kept 
the groups on the bias measures consistent throughout this thesis in order to compare 
effects across studies and across chapters and countries. Now that we have established 
these effects, future studies can systematically vary the target group to test whether the 
effects change. This analysis was also exploratory in Studies 5 and 6, and therefore, should 
be tested and confirmed in future research. Understanding the antecedents to strong social 
ideologies especially as they relate to intergroup relations remains an important area for 
psychologists and the research here highlights important relationships between moral 






4.2. General Implications and Further Considerations 
We now consider the more general implications of the findings from the empirical 
research conducted in Chapters 2 and 3 regarding the relationships between moral 
foundations and intergroup variables, such as bias and threat perceptions. Here we further 
discuss what these findings mean in the broader context of political psychology research and 
social cognition.  
4.2.1. Binding Foundations, Bias and, Threat Perceptions 
In the studies presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, we found a consistent pattern 
regarding the binding foundations and heightened perceived threat and negative bias 
towards immigrants. While this was the case for negative bias, the pattern regarding explicit 
bias towards immigrants was more inconsistent. The binding to explicit bias relationship was 
positive, but not significant in Study 5 (R2 = .037), but was significant in Study 6 (R2 = .136) 
with a larger sample, but also a larger observed effect size. While the studies in the Ingroup-
Outgroup Moral Foundations Chapter 2 did not test the direct binding to bias relationships, 
they did test the mediation of political ideology to bias with ingroup-binding foundations as 
the mediator. In both Study 2 and Study 3, Ingroup-Binding foundations significantly 
mediated this relationship. The effect, however, was non-significant in Study 4 in which the 
standard binding foundations were used. These findings together present a complex picture 
on the relationship between the binding foundations and explicit levels of bias towards 





While there has been little prior research on the intergroup implications of MFT, the 
implicit and explicit bias patterns detected in our studies may fit with the small number of 
prior research studies. In one instance, the binding foundations have been related to 
strongly negative attitudes towards outgroups (Kugler et al., 2014), while other researchers 
have found that conditions such as low moral identity were necessary to detect negative 
attitudes in relation to binding foundations (Smith et al., 2014). Here it could be the case 
that in instances of very strong negative attitudes such as in those measured by the 
immigration posse scale (Sinn & Hayes, 2016, Study 1), there is a relationship between 
binding foundations and intergroup bias, which may also relate to development of strong 
socio-political ideologies potentially due to some of the moral values within the binding 
foundations overlapping with a strong normative group-focused ideology of RWA (Federico 
et al., 2013; Kugler et al., 2014). For more general attitudes, this relationship between 
binding foundations and bias may be weaker and harder to detect. More research 
considering the relationship of the binding foundations to bias is required for a future 
understanding of the extent and conditions under which such foundations are implicated in 
more generally biased attitudes towards immigrant groups. While this is the case if the 
binding moral values contribute to negative attitudes, and in certain cases, bias, this has 
important research implications for reducing prejudice.  
In further understanding the intergroup implications for MFT, this research was the 
first to consider the relationship between different sets of moral foundations and realistic 
and symbolic threat, which are important variables for research in intergroup attitudes and 
social psychology, including important predictors of bias (Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan 




threat contributed to understanding both moral cognition and strong ideologies as related to 
immigration perceptions. Together the findings from Chapter 2 (ingroup-outgroup MFQ) and 
Chapter 3 (MFQ, RWA, SDO) demonstrated the importance of threat perceptions for 
understanding both general political ideological and strong social ideologies. The research in 
this thesis has demonstrated a consistent relationship between the moral foundations and 
threat perceptions across all studies in both chapter 2 and 3. 
 The general pattern from the threat findings across the studies in Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3 included the individualising foundations being significantly related to lower 
perceptions of threat while the binding foundations were related to higher levels of threat. 
Our work on group-based framing in Chapter 2 also suggests that liberals being more 
invested in individualising foundations when framed about outgroups is at least a partial 
explanation for the significant political ideology to threat relationship (see also Study 4); 
these findings indicate that liberals may be less risk averse, whereas conservatives may be 
more risk averse, which would provide a partial explanation for why they are more invested 
in binding foundations when framed about ingroups. The detection of a significantly 
negative relationship between the individualising foundations and threat perceptions and a 
significantly positive relationship between the binding foundations and threat perceptions in 
Studies 5, and 6 also suggests that threat perceptions play a vital role in understanding 
abstract moral foundations, when group-status of the targets was underemphasized. 
Together these studies highlight the central role that threat may play in relation to moral 




Our findings regarding threat are in line with the literature showing that liberals are 
more open to experience, less avoidant of uncertainty or accepting of dogmatism, and may 
also been viewed in light of previous findings regarding the positive relationship between 
the binding foundations and belief in a dangerous world (BDW; Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009) 
and other uncommonly used threat indices using extreme examples of groups such as radical 
artists, illegal immigrants, transvestites, and radical environmentalists (Sinn & Hayes, 2016). 
Threat has played an important role in understanding ideology both generally (Jost et al., 
2003; Jost et al., 2007; Jost, Stern, Rule, & Sterling, 2017) and in terms of understanding 
extreme social ideologies, such as RWA (Stenner, 2005) and SDO (Morrison & Ybarra, 2008; 
Vezalli & Giovanni, 2010) and ingroup-focused policy support (Oxley et al., 2008). One of the 
most promising avenues for future research should therefore be finding effective ways to 
reduce threat perceptions via either moral framing (Feinberg & Willer, 2013; Feinberg & 
Willer, 2015; Kidwell et al., 2013; Day et al., 2014) or techniques for addressing threat 
perceptions more directly (Lavine et al., 1999); our research may also aid in debates 
between liberals and conservatives regarding improving dialogues and differences in 
perspective around intergroup relations and intergroup social policies.  
The current threat findings here may also be considered in light of research which 
suggests that in times of heightened threats or increased focus upon threats, moral and 
political cognition may also shift towards more conservatism (Van der Vyer et al., 2016) 
showing how threat relates to ideology generally, and that amongst those with strong RWA 
ideologies, perceptions of increased racial diversity increased negative attitudes towards 
minority groups and increased threat perceptions, which is of concern for reducing prejudice 




that the changing context and increased salience of threat perceptions can have on social 
and ideological attitudes and making more negative attitudes towards intergroup relations. 
Given that this is the case, it is an important challenge for psychologists to unpick the 
nuances of threat and ideological cognition to reduce prejudice. The work in the current 
thesis has contributed to this area by highlighting some of the ways in which moral and 
political cognition relate to threat perceptions.  
Across the current studies, we used a composite measure of threat because symbolic 
and realistic threat subscales were highly correlated and highly reliable. In addition, Stephan 
et al.’s (1999) measure of threat has been combined in a number of prior studies considering 
the role of threat perceptions in intergroup relations (Tip et al., 2012; Verkuyten, 2009). 
While dissociations between realistic and symbolic threats perceptions may sometimes 
occur (Duckitt, 2006), studies on race and immigration perceptions generally observe no 
such dissociation. Future research could consider if different social groups would cause a 
dissociation between symbolic and realistic threat as has been detected in some prior work, 
though in relation to SDO and RWA and not in relation to bias. It, however, is striking that 
both realistic and symbolic threat were highly correlated across all of the studies presented; 
this finding mirrors previous work on racial policy perceptions and threat (Tip et al., 2012; 
Verkuyten, 2009). It also further suggests that when considering the topic of threat 
perceptions around immigration in both the U.S. and the U.K., perceived threats to both 
societal resources and social and cultural values may both be perceived as important factors 
in threat perceptions (Stephan et al., 1999; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Such threat 
perceptions may therefore be playing an important part in prejudicial and negative attitudes 




perceptions may be important in the design of future interventions and policies surrounding 
perceptions of immigration and societal cohesion. 
4.2.2. Study Design and Cultural and Demographic Factors 
The studies conducted in the current project were quasi-experimental in design in 
which we did not manipulate political ideology and employed it as a continuous measured 
variable as is standard in the majority of research on political ideology (see Jost et al., 2003; 
Jost et al., 2017). Work aiming to manipulate the moral foundations as an independent 
variable is still under development within the field (Day et al., 2014; Kidwell et al., 2013; 
Feinberg & Willer, 2015). However, previous studies using moral framing to examine the 
impact upon attitudes have found reasonably small effect sizes for most studies (Day et al., 
2014, R2 = .02; Kidwell et al., 2013; Feinberg & Willer, 2015). In light of this, the aim of our 
research was not to manipulate ingroup and outgroup cognition to change opinions or 
attitudes, and was instead to investigate differences in moral investment while considering 
the ingroup and the outgroup level in the measurement of the moral foundations 
questionnaire items (Graham et al., 2008). Using this method of group-level measurement 
across the MFQ demonstrated important differences in moral emphasis between liberals 
and conservatives once the group level was accounted for as evidenced by both the 
preference score analyses and ingroup-outgroup linear regression analyses found in Chapter 
2. The current studies used quasi-experimental designs because of the inclusion of political 
orientation, and also carefully counterbalanced measures and used the optimal order of 
measures to allow for measurement of mediations (Baron & Kenny 1986; Hayes, 2013). We 
also tested alternative models to show our reasoning for the development of the models in 




two nations, which has increased our confidence in the observed results. Studies of political 
ideology often rely on quasi-experimental designs due to being unable to simply and easily 
manipulate someone into thinking in a more liberal or conservative way (see Kaplan, Gimbel, 
& Harris, 2016). Using ideology as a continuous variable also represents a more ecologically 
valid means of examining the role of ideology in intergroup relations, especially for research 
aimed at establishing the relationship between ideologies, moral foundations, and 
intergroup relations. Future experimental research might be conducted to test the influence 
of manipulated political ideology on the reliance on ingroups and outgroups in moral 
cognition, but such a robust manipulation remains to be developed.  
Our research was carried out in the Western nations of the U.S. and the U.K. because 
prior research in moral foundations theory had found that liberal and conservative ideology 
related to moral foundations in a similar way within the U.S. and the U.K. (Graham et al., 
2009; See Graham et al., 2011, Table 11 for comparisons). While it was not an aim of the 
current project to consider perceptions of immigration and intergroup relations within 
eastern nations, the existing MFT research does suggest that the binding foundations may be 
more emphasised in such contexts (Haidt, 2012; Graham et al., 2011), however, this does 
lead to questions regarding whether immigration perceptions in such nations would be 
perceived differently or not, or whether the effect sizes would simply be larger, even with 
the already medium to large effect sizes observed in the current studies for the binding 
foundations. MFT was developed through the study of different cultural emphasis in moral 
values (Haidt & Joseph, 2004) and therefore future work considering the operation of 
intergroup thinking in moral values in eastern nations may be an interesting expansion of 




There already exists a large cross-cultural psychological literature considering other cultural 
differences globally such as in individualism and collectivism (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; 
Markus & Conner, 2014); therefore, understanding if these moral and cultural value 
differences lead to differences in perceptions of intergroup relations in these cultures 
remains and interesting and unexplored area. 
While the findings were conducted in western countries, the inclusion of multiple 
nations also strengthens the findings of the current project because it replicated the moral 
foundations and intergroup relations effects across nations. This is especially relevant given 
the salience of immigration in political debates in the UK, Europe, and the U.S. It is also 
important that we found broadly replicable patterns within the different samples collected 
in each nation increasing our confidence in the findings. In terms of the samples collected in 
this research, we used online methods to collect data in both the U.S. and the U.K., with 
research demonstrating that community and online samples tend to be more diverse and 
representative of populations (Henry, 2008) than student laboratory samples, which can 
have more culturally narrow characteristics (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010a; Henrich, 
Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010b). In addition, the fact that our laboratory sample findings 
matched the general pattern of findings observed in the online studies for the U.K. samples 
gives us increased confidence that our results in the online setting replicated the more 
tightly controlled, but more demographically constrained research environment of the 
laboratory. In order to validate the models across nations it would also be of further benefit 
to conduct further research based on Studies, 1, 2, 3 and 4 in the U.S. and Studies 5 and 6 in 




4.2.3. Measurement of Political Ideology  
Moral foundations have often been used to highlight the complexity of differing 
political ideologies by considering how they are predicted by different sets of moral values 
with different ideologies constituting different blends of moral investment (Haidt et al., 
2009); the current work has highlighted how such values are even more complex once the 
group level is considered. In our framing studies, we used a single item liberal-conservative 
measure of ideology (Jost, 2006) to examine the relationship of political ideology to ingroup- 
and outgroup-framed moral foundations in the U.K. and to general moral foundations in the 
U.S. Past research using this measure of ideology has also found the same results across U.S 
and U.K. samples for the standard MFQ (Graham et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2011).  
Some may ask if the liberal-conservative distinction is similar to other measures of 
ideology expressed via left and right terminology, especially within the U.K. In order to be 
confident in our findings using the liberal-conservative item, a further left-right wing single 
item measure of ideology (adapted from Dawson & Tyson, 2012; as developed using Jost et 
al.’s, 2008 ideological categorisation) was included as a validation check in Study 1 and 3, 
using this left-right ideology item (Dawson & Tyson, 2012) it was found that in our U.K. 
sample the patterns on the ingroup and the outgroup moral foundations related in broadly 
the same way to the left-right ideology as they did for the liberal-conservative measure of 
ideology. Given this pattern of results, we are more confident in the effectiveness of our 
liberal and conservative ideology item which has been used across a large host of political 
psychology research (Jost, 2006; Graham et al., 2009) and remains powerful as a predictor of 




Crucially it was necessary to use a liberal-conservative single item measure to examine this 
relationship to the framed version of the MFQ because previous research using the standard 
MFQ had primarily used the liberal-conservative measure (Graham et al., 2009; Graham et 
al., 2011). While this is the case, the addition of the left-right ideological measure as an 
additional check increased our confidence in our findings. 
 While single item measures of political ideology are powerful predictors (Jost et al., 
2017), other researchers have questioned the extent to which a single item of ideology 
overlooks economic and social aspects of political ideology (see Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; 
Feldman & Huddy, 2014). Our research partially addressed this question by also examining 
the relationship between moral foundations and the more polarised ideologies of SDO and 
RWA, which have been argued to relate to economic and social ideological concerns 
respectively (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Feldman & Huddy, 2014; See also Altemeyer, 1998). Our 
research has observed that moral foundations similarly related to these distinct ideologies as 
individualising foundations were negatively related to SDO and binding foundations 
positively related to RWA as is indicated in prior research (Federico et al., 2013; Kugler et al., 
2014; Sinn & Hayes, 2016). This use of a number of different metrics regarding ideological 
cognition and its relationship to the moral foundations increased the scope and confidence 
we have in the results when considering how political and moral ideology relate to 
intergroup processes. Overall the diverse number of ideological measures considered in the 
studies presented within this thesis also increases the generalisability and the practicality of 





4.2.4. Implicit Cognition and Moral Foundations Theory 
The picture presented from the current research in terms of the relationship 
between ingroup- and outgroup-focused moral foundations and implicit cognition and 
explicit cognition prompts important remaining questions. We observed a consistent pattern 
between the sets of ingroup and outgroup moral foundations and implicit bias. We used the 
Affective Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne et al., 2005) as the measure of implicit bias 
because this measure has been used across the social cognition and the implicit bias 
literature as a measure of implicit bias or implicit prejudice (for a review, see Payne & 
Lundberg, 2014). While we found consistent results, they were smaller than expected. There 
are a few reasons why our measure of implicit bias may not have found larger effects across 
studies. First, the order of the administration of the AMP was later in the order of 
experimental materials and followed the measurement of Explicit Bias and Negative Bias in 
Study 4, and occurred 3 to 9 weeks after these measures in Study 3; while this procedure 
was used to reduce the influence of the implicit measures on the explicit measures, this 
order could have reduced the overall level of bias observed on the implicit measure 
(Cunningham et al., 2004; McConnell & Leibold, 2001). If the explicit before implicit order 
caused participants to attend more to the face primes, which has been shown to decrease 
bias on the AMP, then the implicit measure may have been attenuated (Payne et al., 2013).   
Second, Study 4 was completed at the same time as when we were using the AMP in 
other, unrelated research. Thus, Study 4 may have had smaller effects because participants 
had seen the AMP in other studies up to 2 additional times. Chandler, Paolacci, Peer, 




and one month apart reduces the effect size observed at the second measurement and this 
reduction in effect size (~70% of the effect size from the first measurement) occurs for a 
wide range of tasks (e.g., anchoring and adjustment, gain versus loss framing, imagined 
contact, norm of reciprocity, etc.). So, it is possible that the AMP underestimated the true 
effect size in these studies. However, it is also possible that the effect size is, in fact, small to 
medium. To test this possibility, future research will need to be conducted in which the AMP 
is administered first, and either, in a research context in which participants had not been 
exposed to the AMP previously or in which other implicit measures are used (e.g., the 
Implicit Association Test; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998).  
We included a measure of explicit bias within all of our studies in order to compare 
across studies both within chapters and between chapters, and also to accommodate more 
practical matters (i.e., in Studies 2, 5, & 6, we did not have the capacity, at that time, to 
conduct implicit measures of bias in an online study). The use of the online context allowed 
for a more diverse and a larger sample than our lab context allowed. Overall, we felt that the 
continued inclusion of the explicit measure was warranted for a number of reasons. First, we 
did not observe floor effects in which all participants responded at the bottom of the scale. 
In fact, we observed substantial effect sizes for these measures (R2 = .15, R2 = .12, and R2 = 
.10 in Studies 2, 3, and 4 for explicit bias, R2 = .14, and R2 = .19 for negative bias in Studies 2 
and 3). Second, we wanted to keep a few measures the same between studies in order to 
compare across studies. Third, our results were in line with other research on political 
ideology and bias, in general, which we reviewed in the introduction for Chapter 2 
(Cunningham et al., 2004; Luguri et al., 2012; Nisbet & Shanahan, 2004; Whitley & Lee, 2000; 




were identifying, at least partially, a true effect. However, it is possible that there was some 
socially desirable responding. Liberals may have been reporting less bias than they actually 
felt, though we believe this would be a small change because they also showed little bias on 
the implicit measure (4.4% and 0% bias on the AMP in Studies 3 and 4). It is also possible 
that conservatives reporting of bias was deliberately higher on the explicit measures, which 
increased the overall effect size. Is it possible that in the modern climate (Brexit, the current 
political climate in the U.S., etc.) they felt okay about expressing bias against this group? This 
is a future direction that will need to be tested; one such test may be to use these measures 
with a greater variety of outgroups in order to begin to clarify this issue. 
4.3 Limitations and Future Considerations  
We now discuss potential limitations and areas for development in future research. 
Here we address the following areas: (1) statistical power in Study 5, (2) the focus on specific 
immigrant groups and generalizability to different groups, (3) intragroup processes and 
levels of political identification and (4) conclusions regarding direction of causality among 
variables.  
One potential limitation of the current research is that in comparison to the other 
studies conducted within this research, Study 5 had a relatively lower sample size which may 
have reduced the levels of statistical power to detect an effect in this study. Here the sample 
after filtering out participants who were acquiescent when completing the MFQ (Graham et 
al., 2009) left a total of 90 participants in the final sample. It is of note that in Study 5 we 
were unable to detect a relationship between the binding foundations and bias. However 




lack of relationship was due to no effect being present or whether the low sample size 
reduced the power to detect such an effect. While the aim of Study 5 was exploratory and 
correlational, it is of note that the sample size for this study was low and thus the findings 
from this study should be treated with more caution before generalizing the outcomes. 
Study 6 contributed to explaining the relationship between RWA and SDO ideologies, moral 
foundations and intergroup processes with a more robust sample size and did detect a 
binding to bias relationship. Future research with larger sample sizes should aim to further 
examine and confirm the relationships between moral foundations and intergroup outcomes 
such as bias and collective narcissism considered within Study 5. 
The current research was also concerned with perceptions of immigrant groups in 
general as well as more specified groups (Pakistani-immigrants) but did not consider other 
forms of non-immigrant social group such as those based on gender or different religious 
orientations as well as other different types of specified immigrant groups. The findings 
considered here may be useful for understanding factors affecting perceptions of 
immigration and immigrant groups in general as well as perceptions of Pakistani immigrants 
more specifically. However more research is required before we can apply the findings here 
to an even more broad appreciation of intergroup relations and also to more fine-grained 
patterns regarding different types of specified immigrant groups. The findings here make an 
important step in understanding perceptions of immigrant groups and forms of bias using 
the MFT, and detected a general replicable pattern regarding the groups considered. 
Whether the attitudes measured in our research also apply to non-immigration based 
attitudes towards different racial groups remains an important question for future 




research would also aid in making broader inferences about the processes involved in 
immigration perceptions which involves a number of diverse and unique, cultural, ethnic and 
religious groups within society. 
When considering the specified immigrant group considered within this research it is 
important to note that when framing the MFQ measure within Studies 2 and 3 we used a 
Pakistani immigrant outgroup. Pakistani immigration represents one of the higher 
populations of foreign born immigrants to the U.K. (Rienzo & Vargas-Silva, 2017) and is also 
a group that is growing within the U.K population (see Jivraj, 2012; Office of National 
Statistics, 2011). Some research has suggested that groups with lower populations may be 
more subject to societal stigma. Carslaw (2013) employed a measure from Sidanius and 
Pratto (1999) in which participants were asked to order what they conceived to be the most 
to least stigmatised groups using a ranking system, using this data Carslaw related these 
scores to national data and a variety of other sources reflecting estimates of the size of the 
group in the population. Overall it was found that higher population groups were associated 
with less perceived stigma, though later studies using agent based modelling demonstrated 
further complex factors that may also affect this relationship (Carslaw, 2013). Carlsaw had 
explained this data using Allport’s (1954) contact hypothesis in which opportunities to 
engage in contact with members of different groups reduces overall levels of prejudice and 
bias. Of Sidanius and Pratto’s (1999) stigma ranking task used in Carslaw’s (2013) research, 
Pakistani groups came 7th of a total of the 23 groups listed for overall highest perceived 
stigma. Therefore looking at whether changes in population size change perceptions of 
groups and to what extent opinions change as a function of population size remains an 




immigration remains an important priority for a number of policy makers both nationally 
and internationally and therefore extending the research to a broader selection of 
immigrant and non-immigrant groups representing high and low levels within the national 
population may also extend the impact and implications of the research here, when 
considered in future research designs. 
A further consideration when designing future research studies should also be the 
distinctions in intragroup processes as well as considering different levels of identification 
participants have with their political ideologies. The intragroup (within-group) level plays an 
important role in Self-Categorization Theory (SCT; Turner et al., 1987; See also Spears, 2011). 
While our research here has made important steps in understanding the intergroup 
(between-group) level of ingroups and outgroups for the role of Social Identity processes in 
MFT, future work could focus more on within-group (intragroup) distinctions when 
considering framing of the MFQ and political identification. Research with large sample sizes 
could also aim to distinguish how different identification levels within the liberal or 
conservative dimensions of the political spectrum differ from each other when forming 
attitudes. Some research has already highlighted important subtleties in moral value 
investment within democratic party supporters in the U.S and how these differences predict 
support for different democratic party political candidates (Iyer, Graham, Koleva, Ditto, & 
Haidt, 2010). While other research has highlighted that strength of moral identity can have 
an impact on intergroup outcomes (Smith et al., 2014) and strength of moral conviction on 
political engagement (Skitka, 2010; Skitka & Wisneski, 2011). The role of strength of political 
ideological identification will be important in future research aiming to extend the 




with their political ideology may therefore be an important next step. Future research could 
employ statistical moderation designs to account for high and low identification with 
political ideology to further elaborate the models presented here. 
Finally while the studies included in the current research were designed with a strong 
consideration of the order of administration of variables and methodological rigor. We 
cannot make causal inferences concerning the direction of causality, as the studies used 
quasi-experimental designs. The reason for the use of the quasi-experimental methods was 
due to considering political ideology as a continuous variable with people’s political 
ideological positions being difficult to manipulate (see Kaplan, Gimbel, & Harris, 2016). Due 
to the quasi-experimental designs used there are remaining questions regarding causality 
and which processes are antecedents in predicting attitudes. Future experimental designs 
may aim to resolve these debates by manipulating different threat perceptions or finding 
methods to more effectively manipulate ideology though the latter may be more difficult. 
One method for addressing causality while still using a continuous measure of ideology 
would be to conduct longitudinal cross lagged regression designs to further establish how 
variables at one time point influence those at a later time point and to test the direction of 
causality in a sample over time while maintaining the continuous (rather than categorical) 
measure of ideology. While our research cannot make conclusions about causality here due 
to the static time point quasi-experimental design, we did design our studies with a strong 
degree of rigor including steps such as counterbalancing and randomization and found 
replicable general patterns highlighting variables of importance for intergroup relations. In 
Study 6 we also included Structural Equation Models (SEM) to justify the use of moral 




now look to confirm which variables are antecedent and consequent in these relationships 
and to establish causality which may further be useful for future interventions and designs.  
4.4. Future Research and Policy Implications 
The findings of this research project have important implications for the 
communication and reception of policy messages surrounding perceptions of immigrant 
groups, and outgroups in general. Immigration plays an important role in U.K business, 
health services, research and higher education, and beyond and it remains a necessary and 
important feature of the growth of the economy (He, 2017). Whilst this is the case, 
perceptions of immigration remain a salient and polarising issue in social and political 
discourse. In recent times within the political sphere, the debate surrounding immigration is 
perhaps more salient than previously due to changes in policy around the European Union 
and BREXIT in the U.K., and changes in U.S. policy towards immigration and the current 
debates within the US Congress. In light of these changing times, it is increasingly important 
for researchers and policy makers to identify ways to reduce polarisation and increase forms 
of dialogue between different groups as well as to tackle hate crimes (Home Office, 2015-
2016) and to understand the factors that contribute to development of strong ideologies 
that may exacerbate divisions. The current project considered attitudes towards Pakistani 
immigrants and perceptions of immigrant groups, and therefore, future research should be 
conducted to consider wider and different groups to broaden the impact of the current 
findings, which are limited to immigrant groups. Overall the current project assists in 
suggesting some important ways in which moral and ideological cognition relate to 




4.4.1. Future Research in Moral Foundations and Group-Based Framing 
There is previous evidence to suggest that MFT can be used to cross political divides 
and help individuals to see a different perspective on different policy issues. Previous 
research using MFT has been able to achieve this by framing policy messages to focus on the 
specific moral concerns underlying liberal and conservative political attitudes. Framing 
techniques have been used as a way of understanding social attitudes in the social 
psychological and behavioural economic literature whereby the method around the way in 
which a message is communicated can influence attitudes and behaviour even if the 
message itself does not change (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Lavine et al., 1999; Sunstein & 
Thaler, 2008) for example in understanding  how framing a message x in terms of either loss 
for not doing x or reward for doing x influences the behaviours and attitudes people pursue 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1984).  
 Using framing in the domain of moral foundations theory, Feinberg & Willer (2013) 
have found evidence that climate change was often talked about from the perspective of 
liberal moral values to the neglect of conservative concerns (Feinberg & Willer, 2013, studies 
2a and 2b). In order to look at how moral foundations could be used to improve reception of 
climate change messages they framed climate change using a purity moral foundation frame 
reflecting contamination and uncleanliness to the environment around not pursuing climate 
change behaviours as compared to a liberal harm foundation frame (Feinberg & Willer, 
2013) here it was found that using this purity framing increased willingness to endorse 
climate change interventions amongst those who were more politically conservative. Further 




terms of the conservative binding foundations (e.g. “join the fight recycle today”) caused 
increased recycling willingness amongst conservatives while for liberals an individualising 
(Harm & Fairness) foundations frame was effective (study 1, Kidwell, Farmer, & Hardesty, 
2013; 2013b, see p.4). Whilst framing in the moral domain has had some promising initial 
results there are a number of areas suggesting that such an approach may be more complex 
than initially perceived. 
 More recently research by Day et al. (2014) has provided evidence that in some 
cases framing policy messages using moral foundations can lead to ideological strengthening 
of attitudes to those already inclined towards message favourability, while attitude change 
was much more difficult to achieve (Day et al., 2014). While some research in framing 
messages using the moral foundations has been effective in changing opinions, much of this 
research relied on relatively large sample sizes to observe small experimental effects (Day et 
al., 2014; Feinberg & Willer, 2015; Kidwell et al., 2013) while these effects may be important 
over large populations, other forms and methods of message framing may potentially 
generate larger experimental effects and more effective persuasion. 
4.4.2. Threat Focused Framing Interventions and Political Ideology. 
One potential area in which framing messages surrounding immigration especially in 
cases of strongly polarised attitudes may be potentially effective is in threat based framing. 
Research by Lavine et al. (1999) found that those high in RWA were more likely to respond 
to a voting message framed in terms of the negative loss of not voting rather than one 
emphasising the positive features of voting suggesting that strong ideologies are especially 




also Stenner, 2005). There is also evidence to show that heightened threat leads to more 
negative attitudes towards minorities (Craig & Richeson 2014b; Riek et al., 2006) as well as 
changes in social policy based ideological attitudes surrounding the ingroup (Oxley et al., 
2008) which means that reducing perceptions of threat may be one way of improving 
negative attitudes and an area future framing and other forms of research should consider. 
Our research has helped to elucidate the mechanisms by which morality, threat, and 
ideology relate to intergroup attitudes and it is hoped that this research can therefore 
inform future framing experimental interventions. As well as provide a greater 
understanding of the ways in which ideologies function in relation to moral values and the 
effects upon intergroup relations. The current research also paves the way for future 
research testing whether differences in ingroup and outgroup moral investment and threat 
perceptions also predict attitudes to a host of broader social groups (such as those based on 
culture, gender or religion) and to expand our findings here regarding bias in relation to 
immigration. This research could also employ psychophysiological measures of threat or 
vigilance (Hibbing et al., 2014) and utilise different forms of implicit measures (Greenwald et 
al, 1998) and explore different manipulations of threat in which the group is non-specified to 
examine causality of threats using more generalised measures and manipulated 
experimental designs. Finally, future research could examine different cultural contexts and 
behavioural outcomes (Shook & Fazio, 2009) as well as longitudinal and contextual changes 
in attitudes while measuring moral foundation investment and threat perceptions over time. 
Experimental designs may be useful within future studies designed at establishing the causal 





4.5. Overview: Going Beyond Moral and Political Ideology. 
The research reported in this thesis has detected important relationships between 
moral foundations and intergroup variables in both the U.S. (using online methods) and the 
U.K. (using laboratory and online methods). The research presented here has also 
considered the relationships between moral investment and attitudes towards a host of 
different target groups including abstract ingroups and outgroups, British ingroups and 
Pakistani immigrant outgroups, and immigrants as a general group. The methods in this 
thesis used two distinct types of research design to examine how moral values and political 
ideology relate to intergroup processes. The first set of study designs focused on framing the 
MFQ (Graham et al., 2008) in terms of both ingroups and outgroups to provide novel 
answers to important theoretical debates (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013a; Graham, 2013; 
Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013b) demonstrating that liberals and conservatives showed 
different group based emphasis in moral foundations, with liberals investing more in 
outgroup individualizing foundations and conservatives in the ingroup binding foundations. 
Our research then went on to apply these differences to understanding intergroup attitudes, 
including explicit bias, negative bias, implicit bias and threat. The second set of studies in this 
project set out to understand how the MFQ in its standard format related to a host of social 
psychological variables with importance for intergroup relations and the MFQ’s relationships 
to strong ideologies (SDO, RWA) and explicit bias around immigration extending previous 
models (Federico et al., 2013; Kugler et al., 2014) to account for intergroup factors.  
Both of the two lines of research considered here have yielded important insights 




implications when considering the group level. The current thesis has argued that it does not 
make sense to consider political and moral beliefs as divorced from intergroup processes. By 
considering the role of the intergroup level we can form a more comprehensive and 
informative view of how moral and political beliefs function and have important implications 
for societal attitudes and cohesion affecting societal attitudes, policy perceptions and 
behaviour. Understanding this relationship leads to new methods and techniques to improve 
intergroup relations and reduce intergroup prejudice. 
 We also hope the findings here may help to reduce political polarisation and 
encourage debates amongst those who are liberal and conservative in which an appreciation 
of different ideological bases of emphasis in moral and political attitudes is more fully 
understood in the intergroup context as Dodd et al. (2012) note; “…in light of the connection 
between location on the political spectrum and physio-cognitive differences, those on the 
political right and those on the political left may simply experience the world differently…” 
(Dodd et al., 2012, p.647) and therefore the understanding of how different bases of moral 
reasoning (Haidt, 2012), threat vigilance (Jost et al., 2007; Hibbing et al., 2014; Lilienfeld & 
Latzman, 2014) and risk perceptions (Shook & Fazio, 2009) contribute to different policy 
perceptions is important especially in enabling liberals and conservatives to understand each 
other’s points of view and to reduce ideological polarisation.  
Finding ways to enhance social cohesion, reduce political polarisation, understand 
threat perceptions, and reduce prejudice will remain focal issues for society and for social 
and political psychologists. This thesis has demonstrated that the intergroup level has 




the area of empathy has found that ingroup and outgroup distinctions have a similarly 
important impact on improving intergroup attitudes (Bruneau, Cikara, & Saxe, 2017). It is 
hoped that the work presented in this thesis will contribute to a new understanding of moral 
and political cognition by encouraging consideration of the intergroup level in political 
psychology research and the implications this has for improving social harmony, reducing 
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While it is of note that a few alpha values were slightly low, many other moral foundations 
researchers have also demonstrated a mixture of low to high reliabilities. Federico, Weber, 
Ergun, & Hunt (2013) observed a range of reliabilities from α = .52 to .73 across two separate 
samples. As Federico et al (2013) noted, lower reliability in the moral foundations subscales 
is partially due to the way the scale was created to capture broad moral dimensions instead 
of maximizing internal consistency. Furthermore, we observed similar reliabilities to Graham 
et al., 2009, in which they measured the relationship between moral foundations and 
political orientation (see below), and a similar range of reliabilities to other previous work 
(Graham et al., 2012; Hirsh, De Young, Xu, & Peterson, 2010). 
 
Graham et al. (2009) divided the foundations into the 3 item (per foundation) relevance 
subscale (Study 1) and found reliabilities of α = .62 for Harm, α = .67 for Fairness, α = .59 for 
Loyalty, α = .39 for Authority, and α = .70 for Purity. In our study for the Outgroup relevance 
subscales (3 items per foundation) we found reliabilities of α = .74 for Harm, α = .78 for 
Fairness, α = .70 for Loyalty, α = .60 for Authority and α = .66 for Purity. For the ingroup 
relevance subscales we found reliability values of α = .63 for Harm, α = .60 for Fairness, α = 
.67 for Loyalty, α = .51 for Authority and α = .68 for Purity. Graham et al. (2009) also 
investigated the reliabilities for the 4 item judgment scales (Study 2) and found reliabilities 
of α = .50 for Harm, α = .39 for Fairness, α = .24 for Loyalty, α = .64 for Authority, and α = .74 
for Purity. In our study for the Outgroup Judgement subscales (3 items per foundation) we 
found reliabilities of α = .51 for Harm, α = .52 for Fairness, α = .44 for Loyalty, α = .54 for 
Authority and α = .58 for Purity. For the Ingroup Judgment subscales we found reliabilities of 
α = .44 for Harm, α = .40 for Fairness, α = .49 for Loyalty, α = .52 for Authority and α = .70 for 
Purity even though we used the current 3 item (per foundation) judgment subscales. 
 
Alternative Measure of Political Ideology 
 
 Sometimes liberal and conservative classifications of political ideology are referred to 
using a left- right terminology where “the right-wing label has come to represent political 
views that are conservative, supportive of the status quo, and hierarchical in nature, 
whereas left-wing views connote progressive social change and egalitarian ideals” (Jost, 
Nosek, & Gosling, 2008, p.127).  We conducted additional analyses in order to confirm that 
the liberal-conservative measure of ideology used in moral foundations theory research and 
in the current studies was similar to other left-right measures of political ideology 
sometimes employed in other research.  
 
The additional analyses indicated that using a left-right political ideology item 
(adapted to the U.K from Dawson & Tyson, 2012) to measure the relationship between 
political ideology and ingroup and outgroup focused moral foundations generally replicated 




item was also included in Study 3 and again replicated the general patterns of the findings 
using the liberal conservative measure. Overall this analysis gives us confidence that 
participants in our studies have similar investment in ingroup and outgroup moral 
foundations when political ideology is measured using a liberal conservative item, or a left-
right political ideology item.  
 
Models Entering Ingroup Binding Foundations Alongside Ingroup Individualizing 
Foundations to Predict Outcome Variables 
 
We constructed mediation models entering the ingroup individualizing foundations 
alongside the ingroup binding foundations as mediators to predict bias from political 
ideology; these models indicated ingroup individualizing indirect effects were non-
significant. In Study 2 (N = 307) using this model, the path from political to ingroup 
individualizing was non-significant (b = .04, p = .175) and the path from ingroup 
individualizing to bias was non-significant (b = -.15, p = .150), with the ingroup individualizing 
indirect effect being non-significant (b = -.01, CI -.025, .002) and the ingroup binding indirect 
effect remaining significant (b = -.06, CI -116, -.011). Similar findings in Study 2 were found 
when constructing the same model for negative bias where the path from political to 
ingroup individualizing was non-significant (b = .04, p = .175) and the path from ingroup 
individualizing to negative bias was non-significant (b = -.07, p = .617). Here the indirect 
effect of ingroup individualizing foundations were non-significant (b = -.003, CI, -.025, .006) 
and again the indirect effect of the ingroup binding foundations was still significant when 
including the ingroup individualizing foundations in the model (b = -.17, CI -.257, -.101).  
  
We again constructed mediation models for Study 3 entering the ingroup 
individualizing foundations and the ingroup binding foundations as mediators to predict 
levels of explicit bias and negative bias. The ingroup individualizing indirect effect findings 
for explicit bias and negative bias models replicated those found in Study 2. In these models 
(N = 288) using explicit bias as the model outcome variable the path from political to ingroup 
individualizing foundations was significant (b = .08, p = .002) while the path from ingroup 
individualizing to bias was non-significant (b = -.11, p = .395). The path from ingroup binding 
to bias was now also non-significant (b = .20, p = .079), while the indirect effect for the 
ingroup individualizing foundations was non-significant (b = -.01, CI -.034, .007) and the 
indirect effect for the ingroup binding foundations was non-significant (b = -.04, CI -.093, -
.004). We constructed the same model using negative bias as the model outcome variable 
and observed that the path from political to ingroup individualizing foundations was 
significant (b = .08, p = .002) and the path from ingroup individualizing to negative bias was 
non-significant (b = -.06, CI -.392, .266) while the same paths for ingroup binding were 
significant (p’s < .001). The indirect effect for ingroup individualizing foundations was non-
significant (b = -.005, CI -.032, .017) with the indirect effect for ingroup binding foundations 
again being significant (b = -.118, CI -.195, -.059).  
 
 Overall these findings indicate that including ingroup individualizing foundations did 





Appendix M: Supplemental Analyses, Chapter 3. 
 
All analyses in the supplemental materials are conducted on samples without participants 
who failed the MFQ attention checks. 
 
Study 5 
TABLE S.1: Study 5 Correlation matrix for the main Intergroup Variables Based on 
Participants Identifying as Caucasian Ethnicity and who passed the MFQ attention checks (N 
= 73) 
 
 1. Trust 2. CA 3. PT 4. Bias 5. Threat 6. CN 
1. Trust 1      
2. Collective Action .335** 1     
3. Perspective Taking .219 .199 1    
4. Bias  -.442*** -.779*** -.288* 1   
5. Threat  -.394** -.750*** -.318** .800*** 1  
6. Collective Narcissism .038 -.093 -.068 .066 .222 1 
Note: p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001*** 
 
TABLE S.2: Study 5: Bivariate Pearson’s correlations of Individualizing and Binding 
Foundation Scores with the Intergroup Variables Based on Participants Identifying as 
Caucasian Ethnicity and who passed the MFQ attention checks (N = 73) 
 




Bias Threat Collective 
Narcissism 
Individualizing .107 .348** .307** -.461*** -.357** -.190 
Binding .104 -.189 .054 .185 .290* .441*** 









TABLE S.3: Study 5 Correlation matrix for the main Intergroup Variables Based on 
Participants who had Lived in the U.S. for more than 10 years and who passed the MFQ 
attention checks (N=87). 
 
 1. Trust 2. CA 3. PT 4. Bias 5. Threat 6. CN 
1. Trust 1      
2. Collective Action  .279** 1     
3. Perspective Taking  .170   .187 1    
4. Bias  -.388*** - .756*** -.322** 1   
5. Threat  -.334** - .723*** -.323**   .780*** 1  
6. Collective Narcissism  .082 - .104 -.010   .082   .222* 1 
Note: p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001*** 
 
 
TABLE S.4: Study 5: Bivariate Pearson’s correlations of Individualizing and Binding 
Foundation Scores with the Intergroup Variables Based on Participants who had Lived in the 
U.S. for more than 10 years and who passed the MFQ attention checks (N=87).  
 




Bias Threat Collective 
Narcissism 
Individualizing  .127  .343**  .279** -.437*** -.322** -.065 
Binding  .122 -.147 -.026  .184  .260*   .389*** 
Note: p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001*** 
Study 6 
TABLE S.5: Study 6: Correlations between Individualising and Binding Foundations, RWA and 
SDO (N =157). 
 1. Individualizing  2. Binding 3. SDO 4. RWA 
1. Individualizing 1    
2. Binding  .082 1   
3. SDO -.657*** .296*** 1  
4. RWA  -.143 .757*** .436*** 1 




Study 6: Effects of Moral Foundations on Bias Controlling for Participant Race and Years 
Lived in the U.S.  
 To control for the influence of race an analysis was conducted in which participants 
not identifying as Caucasian were filtered from the sample. We then conducted regression 
models examining the influence of the moral foundations on Explicit Bias and Threat (N = 
123 across models). To examine Explicit Bias a linear regression was conducted on this 
filtered sample entering the Individualizing foundation score as a predictor and Explicit Bias 
as the outcome variable. It was found that the Individualizing foundations were still a 
significant and negative predictor of Explicit Bias (Model R2 = .07, ϐ = -.27, t = -3.03, p = .003). 
Conducting a linear regression in which the Binding foundation score acted as a predictor 
found that Binding foundation score was still a positive and significant predictor of Explicit 
Bias (Model R2 = .12, ϐ = .35, t = 4.08, p < .001). 
To control for the influence of Years Lived in the U.S. models were constructed (N 
=157) entering this variable alongside the different sets of moral foundations. In the 
presence of the Years Lived in the U.S. variable the Individualizing foundation score was still 
a significant and negative predictor of Explicit Bias (Model R2 = .80, Individualizing 
Foundations predictor: ϐ = -.24, t = -3.09, p = .002). Running the same model entering the 
Binding foundation score alongside years lived in the U.S again found that Binding 
foundations were a significant and positive predictor of Explicit Bias when controlling for 






Study 6: Effects of Moral Foundations on Threat Controlling Participant Race and Years Lived 
in the U.S.  
To control for the influence of race in the findings regarding moral foundations and 
perceived threat we again used the sample filtered by race in which participants not 
identifying as Caucasian were filtered from the sample (N = 123). Again, as in the case of the 
Explicit Bias analysis, this did not change the findings as Individualizing foundation score 
negatively and significantly predicted Perceived Threat (Model R2 = .06, ϐ = -.25, t = -2.82, p = 
.006), while the Binding foundation score positively and significantly predicted Perceived 
Threat (Model R2 = .28, ϐ = .53, t = 6.79, p < .001). 
To control for the influence of Years Lived in the U.S. models (N= 157) were 
constructed entering this variable alongside the moral foundations as predictors. In the 
presence of the Years Lived in the U.S. variable the Individualizing foundation score was still 
a significant and negative predictor of Perceived Threat (Model R2 = .10, Individualizing 
Foundations predictor: ϐ = -.25, t = -3.26, p = .001). Running the same model entering the 
Binding foundation score alongside years lived in the U.S again found that Binding 
foundations were a significant and positive predictor of Perceived Threat when controlling 
for Years Lived in the U.S. (Model R2 = .27, Binding Foundations predictor: ϐ = .48, t = 6.98, p 
< .001). 
Study 6: Mediation Models 
 Conducting the four mediation models while using the sample including participants 
who identified as Caucasian and who passed the MFQ attention checks did not change any 




FIGURE S.1: Study 6: Controlling for the influence of race (N = 123) Individualizing to Explicit 
Bias mediated by SDO. 
 
FIGURE S.2: Study 6: Controlling for the influence of race (N = 123) Binding to Explicit Bias 







b = -1.20, p < .001 b = .79, p < .001 
Total effect, b = -.63, p = .003 
Direct effect, b = .31, p = .220 





b = .96, p < .001 b = .72, p < .001 
Total effect, b = .60, p < .001 
Direct effect, b = -.09, p = .691 





FIGURE S.3: Study 6: Controlling for the influence of race (N = 123) Individualizing to Explicit 












b = -1.20, p < .001 b = -.04, p = .718 
Total effect, b = -.63, p = .003 
Direct effect, b = -21, p = .246 
SDO indirect effect, b = .05, 95% BCa CI [-.28, .32] 
Threat indirect effect, b = -.47, 95% BCa CI [-.82, -.11] 
Explicit Bias 
Threat 




FIGURE S.4: Study 6: Controlling for the influence of race (N = 123) Binding to Explicit Bias 
mediated by Threat with RWA in the model. 
 






b = .96, p < .001 b = .01, p = .927 
Total effect, b = .60, p < .001 
Direct effect, b = -.19, p = .188 
RWA indirect effect, b = .01, 95% BCa CI [-.25, .29] 
Threat indirect effect, b = .79, 95% BCa CI [.53, 1.10] 
Explicit Bias  
Threat 




b = .38, p < .001 b = .61, p < .001 
Total effect, b = .67, p < .001 
Direct effect, b = .44, p = .001 
Indirect effect, b = .23, 95% BCa CI [.07, .47], K2 = .13 
Explicit Bias 
